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In this dissertation,

articulate and defend the

I

claim that there are many actual worlds

,

and so there are

many truths. My point of departure is an argument

presented and criticized by Donald Davidson:
is relative to conceptual scheme,

conceptual schemes, therefore,

(3)

(2)

reality

(1)

there are many

there are many

realities or worlds. Although it might seem that the weak
premise is (1), Davidson's strategy is to attack (2).

1

maintain that in doing this, he isolates the scheme idea
from the ontological background that gives it sense, and
so he attacks a straw man.

I

aim to provide an account of

the ontology underlying the scheme idea, which may be

summarized in the thesis that there are many actual
worlds. It follows,

I

argue, that there are many truths.

My argument for these theses is based on the conception
of what it is to be an object that Kant presents in the

Transcendental Deduction of his first Critique.
discuss the work of Whorf

,

(I

also

Quine, Goodman and Putnam, not

to mention many others.) My argument has five premises.
(1)

There are many representing beings.
vii

(2)

The set of

representing beings partitions into many non-empty
classes.

(3)

For each such class of representing beings,

there is a set of purposes, and each set of purposes
is

incompatible with every other such set.

(

4

)

For each

class of representing beings, there is an ideal sum of

representations that has an asymmetric structure that is
imposed by the set of purposes that is associated with
the class of representing beings in question.

(5)

For

each ideal sum of representations, there is an actual
world. My argument proceeds as follows.

(6)

Given,

(3)

and (4), there is no ideal sum of representations that

includes or subsumes all the ideal sums of

representations that are associated with the various
classes of representing beings.

(7)

Given (1),

(2),

(4)

and (6), there are many ideal sums of representations.
(8)

Given (7) and (5), there are many actual worlds.

Given (7) and (8), there are many truths.

vm

(9)

PREFACE
Even if a metaphor cannot be the basis of

serious philosophical argument,

a

metaphor may certainly

a

introduce such an argument. Accordingly, consider the

following metaphor
due to Otto Neurath:
1
There is no way of taking conclusively
established pure protocol sentences as the
starting point of the sciences. No tabula
rasa exists. We are like sailors who must
rebuild their ship on the open sea, never
able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to
reconstruct it there out of the best
materials. Only the metaphysical elements
can be allowed to vanish without trace.
Vague linguistic conglomerations always
remain in one way or another as components
of the ship. If vagueness is diminished at
one point, it may well be increased at
another
Here, Neurath likens our beliefs, or the sentences we

take to be true, to a ship on the open sea. When

Neurath

7

s

ship needs repairs, dry-dock is not an option,

and so it is necessary for repairs to proceed on

a

plank

by plank basis. Similarly, when our system of beliefs

needs repairs, i.e., when it is discovered to contain
false or vague beliefs, there is no epistemic position

equivalent to dry-dock, and so it is necessary for our
epistemic repairs to proceed on

a

belief by belief basis.

One of his central points is that it is, consequently,

impossible for us to replace all of our beliefs at one
time
Otto Neurath, Protocol Sentences in Logical
Positivism, edited by A.J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe
1

,

(1959) p.

201.

IX

Neurath's metaphor leaves open

a

diachronic or

historical question: Could the fragmentary reconstruction
of our beliefs result in a time when they had all been

replaced? It also leaves open

a

synchronic or

anthropological question: Could there be beings whose

beliefs were completely different from ours? The

anthropological question may be reducible to the
historical question: If there were beings whose beliefs
were entirely different from ours, could the fragmentary

reconstruction of our beliefs result in

a

time when we

had theirs? These questions raise the pivotal issue of
the conditions under which one belief system may be said
to be the same or different from another. In a way that

aptly continues Neurath's metaphor, and also discloses
this issue, Thomas Hobbes writes:
...if... for example, that ship of Theseus,
concerning the difference whereof made by
continual reparation in taking out the old
planks and putting in new, the sophisters
of Athens were wont to dispute, were,
after all the planks were changed, the
same numerical ship it was at the
beginning; and if some man had kept the
old planks as they were taken out, and by
putting them afterwards together in the
same ship order, had again made a ship of
them, this, without doubt, had also been
the same numerical ship with that which
was at the beginning; and so there would
have been two ships numerically the same,
which is absurd. 2

Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy in The English
Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, first collected and
edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., vol. 1, reprint
of the edition of 1839, Scientia Aalen, London (1962) pp.
136-137
2

,

x

Hobbes makes a quite literal point here that makes
it
possible to extend Neurath's metaphor. First, consider
the literal point. Were identity transitive, and
were the

replacement of

a

single plank to fail to yield a new and

different ship, then the original ship of Theseus would
be the same as the reconstructed ship of Theseus.

However, were we to put the old planks together, there

would be the old worn ship, there would be the shiny new
ship, and one would be two, which is absurd. One

important lesson here is that: to replace all planks is
to bring about a new and different ship. Or, more

generally, one lesson is that: to replace every part of
an object is to bring about a new and different object.

Second, to see how this point of Hobbes' thought-

experiment makes it possible to extend Neurath's
metaphor, suppose that the object in question is the

congeries of our beliefs. One way to get two ships of
belief is to begin with one ship, and then to replace all
of its planks. But, can all the planks in a ship of

belief be replaced? More literally, one way to get two
belief systems is to begin with one, and then to replace
all of its parts. Neurath has shown, however, that it is

impossible to replace all our beliefs at one time, but it

doesn't follow from this that it is impossible to replace
all of our beliefs. If we cannot replace all our beliefs

at one time, it is an open question whether there are

other conditions under which there could be two belief
xi

systems, and whether these conditions can be
realized, is
it, for example, possible to replace all our
beliefs over
an extended period of time? Powerful reasons have
been

pressed for thinking that at least some parts of

a belief

system cannot be replaced, and so the answer must be

negative
Donald Davidson has argued that not all of our

beliefs can be replaced. One way in which he has made
this point is by focusing on what he takes to be the

dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, and by then

pointing out how this metaphor reveals its incoherence.
Davidson writes:
The dominant metaphor of conceptual
relativism, that of differing points of
view, seems to betray an underlying
paradox. Different points of view makes
sense, but only if there is a common co
ordinate system on which to plot them; yet
the existence of a common system belies
the claim of dramatic incomparability. 3
As Davidson understands the conceptual relativist, she

believes that there are essentially incomparable belief
systems, and that they are incomparable in a way that is

importantly similar to the way that points of view are
incomparable. Davidson maintains that since any two

points of view must be locatable within
3

a

common co-

Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual
Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation,
reprinted with corrections, Clarendon Press, Oxford
(1986) p. 184. Hereafter: OVICS. There is an earlier and
perhaps significantly different version of this essay in
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical
Association, vol 47 (1974) pp. 5-20.
.

Xll

ordinate system, they must be comparable. So, either
there is an significant way in which conceptual

frameworks are not similar to points of view, or
conceptual frameworks must be comparable, in other words,
either the dominant metaphor is falsified, or the claim
of essential incomparability is falsified. Supposing that

the metaphor is a good one, it follows that belief
systems, or conceptual schemes, are essentially

comparable. If belief systems must be comparable, some of
our beliefs cannot be replaced, else there would be no

basis for comparison. Conseguently

,

whereas Neurath's

idea seems to have been that we cannot replace all of our

beliefs at one time, Davidson's idea is that we cannot
replace all of our beliefs.

Much of the force of Davidson's argument depends
upon the adeguacy of his premise that the dominant

metaphor of conceptual relativism is that of the point of
view. It is evident,

I

think, that it is not, since it

does belie the conceptual relativist's claim that some

conceptual schemes are essentially incomparable.
Ironically, a better metaphor might be that of the co-

ordinate system. Given the mere possibility of nonabsolute space, different co-ordinate systems do not need
a

common space within which they have absolute location.

Indeed, the idea of a space within which co-ordinate

systems have location is somewhat confused, since it is
in terms of co-ordinate systems that location is defined.

xiii

So, not only do different co-ordinate systems make
sense

it is not necessary for there to be a common space

within which they have location. So, the better metaphor
for the alternative conceptual schemes of conceptual

relativism may well be that of alternative co-ordinate
systems. The pivotal question is whether there is reason
to doubt the claim that different co-ordinate systems can
be essentially incomparable, which would mean that this

metaphor also belies the claim that different conceptual
schemes can be essentially incomparable. The answer would
be affirmative, if there were a way to transform, or

translate, any location in any one co-ordinate system
into any location in any other system. This is the

essential idea of Davidson's criticism of conceptual
relativism.
In his argument, Davidson surreptitiously

separates two questions. One: Can there be two conceptual
schemes? Two: What ontology does the scheme idea

presuppose? Davidson himself writes: "Reality itself is
relative to

a

scheme: what counts as real in one system

may not in another ." 4 If this thesis is right, and there
are many conceptual schemes, then there are many

realities. It might seem obvious that this thesis is the

weak link in the chain of reasoning that supports the
conclusion that there are many realities, but curiously,
4

OVICS, p. 183.

xiv

Davidson's strategy is not to work on breaking this link.
Instead, he aims to assail the very idea of

a

conceptual

scheme. In doing this, however, he isolates the scheme
idea from the ontological background that gives it sense.

Like the magician whose trick depends on his ability to
focus our attention on something other than the

legerdemain, the persuasive force of Davidson's argument

depends on his ability to focus our attention on

something other than the ontological background of the
scheme idea. However, in disregarding this ontology,

Davidson criticizes a shadow. The critical evaluation of
his argument, not to mention other anti-relativist

arguments, presupposes an account of this ontology.

Although this essay contains my response to Davidson's
argument, this response is incidental. In Christopher

Marlowe's Doctor Faustus, after Mephostophilis has
appeared, Faustus inquires, "Did not my conjuring raise

thee?" Mephostophilis answers, "That was the cause, but
yet per accidens

.

"5

Davidson's argument was the cause of

the appearance of my account of this ontology, but yet

per accidens

.

My aim here is to articulate and defend the

ontology that is presupposed by the thesis that there are

alternative conceptual schemes, and which has been
ignored by Davidson. In short, this ontology can be

Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, edited and
introduced by Sylvan Barnet, Signet, New York (1969)

5

33

xv

p.

expressed as the literal thesis that there are
many
actual worlds.
This work divides into four chapters. The
goal of
chapter one is to introduce the thesis that there
are

many actual worlds by introducing the thesis to which
it
is opposed, to wit, the thesis that there is just
one

world that has just one complete and true description. By

getting clear on this contrary idea,

hope to make clear

I

some of the tasks that the articulation and defense of my
idea must accomplish. In other words,

begin to explain

I

the ontology presupposed by the idea of an alternative

conceptual scheme by explaining the ontology to which it
is opposed.

that
I

I

I

will also display

a

reading of Protagoras

think illustrates the idea that

I

aim to develop.

also argue that the objection that my idea is self-

refuting fails. In chapter two,

I

will discuss the work

of Whorf and Quine, and in chapter three, will turn to

the work of Goodman and Putnam. Not only does the work of

these four thinkers illustrate various elements of the

ontology that

I

hope to articulate, but each poses

number of questions to which

I

think the explanation of

my idea must provide answers. In chapter IV,

number of the basic ideas that

a

I

I

explore

a

will use to make sense

of the thesis that there are many actual worlds, for

example, the idea that an object is what a manifold of

objective representations represent, and the idea that

world is the sum total of what exists in
xvi

a time.

I

do

a

this by appropriating the metaphysical inversion,
which
Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, called his

Copernican Revolution, and by appropriating the central
insight of Robert Paul Wolff's essay Narrative time

,

namely, that the structure of time is constituted by
6

purposes

Since the argument that follows is quite

complicated, it may serve my readers well, if

I

include

the following summary.

There are many representing beings.
Premise

(1)
[

.

(2) The set of representing beings
partitions into many non-empty classes.
Premise
[

.

(3) For each such class of representing
beings, there is a set of purposes, and
each set of purposes is incompatible with
every other such set. [Premise.]
(4) For each class of representing beings,
there is an ideal sum of representations
that has an asymmetric structure imposed
by the set of purposes associated with the
class of representing beings in question.
Premise
[

.

There is no ideal sum of
representations that includes or subsumes
all the ideal sums of representations that
are associated with the various classes of
representing beings. [3,4]
(5)

6

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by
Norman Kemp Smith, St. Martins Press, New York (1965).
Hereafter: CRITIQUE. Robert Paul Wolff, Narrative Time:
The Inherently Perspectival Structure of the Human World,
in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume 15, The
Philosophy of the Human Sciences, edited by Peter A.
French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K.
Wettstein, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame
(1990) p. 214. Hereafter: NT.

xvi 1

(6) There are many ideal sums of
representations. [1,2 ,4, 5]
(7) For each ideal sum of representations,
there is an actual world. [Premise.]

(8)

There are many actual worlds. [6,7]

(9)

There are many truths.

[6,8]

This is, however, only a summary, and it requires

expansion and explanation. To this task,

xviii

I

now turn.
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CHAPTER

1

INTUITIONS: PROTAGORAS
In this work, two theses are under consideration.

One: there are many actual worlds, and two: there are

many truths. The latter should not be taken to mean that
there are many truths in the sense that snow is white and
7 + 5

= 12 are many truths, namely, two truths. What,

then, does it mean? To explain the answer to this

question,

I

theses, and

will temporarily place aside these two
I

will consider an alternative account of

truth and what it is to be

a world.

Simply put, this

alternative is that there is just one actual world. It
consists of

a

number of representation independent

objects that have, moreover, just one complete and
correct representation, where

a

correct representation is

one that represents, or corresponds to, objects as they

independently and really are.
Hilary Putnam has succinctly summarized this

alternative
... [1] the world consists of a fixed
totality of mind-independent objects...
[2] there is exactly one true and complete
description of the way the world is... [3]
truth involves some sort of
correspondence.
.

.

Hilary Putnam, A Defense of Internal Realism, in
Realism with a Human Face, ed. James Conant, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge (1990) p. 30. Hereafter: DIR.
The parenthetic enumerations are due to me. Compare
Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (1981) p. 49. Hereafter: RTH.
I shall occasionally refer to the view summarized by
Putnam's three theses as realism he refers to this view
1

;

1

In Putnam's terms,

the truth

if one exists,

,

is the

unique, true and complete description of the way
the

world is. The truth is, in other words, all the true
sentences. A truth is just one of the many true

sentences

,

for example, snow is white or 7 + 5 = 12,

which may be seen, therefore, as parts of the complete
and true description. Context suffices,

I

think, to

disambiguate. However, there is another source of
ambiguity, since the ideas of the world, and

a

true

sentence are themselves unclear. In the context of the
alternative, or realist, account under consideration
here, these ideas can be partly clarified by showing how

Putnam's three theses form an integrated account of what
it is to be a world and a truth.

Putnam's first thesis is that independently of
every actual representation, and independently of our

capacity to represent, there is the order of things, or
objects, that possess various properties, that is, there
is the world. Note well that an important part of what

this means is that these properties are also independent
of both our capacity to represent, and how they may be

actually represented. In other words, objects are
distinct by virtue of the properties or characteristics
as metaphysical realism. The theses that there are many
actual worlds, and there are many truths, I shall, on
various occasions, refer to as relativism Note both that
I prescind from ascribing to Putnam any attitude toward
the two theses under consideration here, and that he
rejects metaphysical realism.
.

2

that they possess, or fail to possess,
independently of

whatever concepts or predicates we happen to possess.
Now, Putnam's second thesis is that the world,

that is, the representation independent order of

representation independent objects, has just one true and
complete description. As

I

said above, such a description

is the truth, but what is it for a description to be

true? Moreover, why is there just one such description?

that is, why is there just one truth? These questions

cannot be answered in the absence of

conception of what it is to be

a

a

specific

true sentence,

description or representation. Although problematic, the
required conception is provided by Putnam's third thesis.
To put Putnam's third thesis somewhat crudely,

true sentences are true because they correspond to the
facts. The problem, which makes this formulation crude,
is that the idea of a sentence corresponding to the facts

and the idea of a true sentence are equally enigmatic.

There may be no problem with understanding this in cases
such as its being true that the cat is at the door, since
the required fact would seem to be just the cat's being
at the door, and this seems both simple and easy to

understand. But, there are cases that are not so
intelligible. For example, were it true that Socrates is
not at the door, to what fact would this true sentence

correspond? It is tempting to postulate negative facts,
but these are odd posits: not only isn't Socrates at the
3

door, but Plato isn't there either, and moreover
the

round square isn't there, and so on. Moreover, it seems
that nothing distinguishes the fact that Socrates isn't
at the door from the fact that Plato isn't at the door,

not to mention that fact that the round square isn't
there. But, if facts can't be distinguished, why not say

that there is just one fact? 2

Putnam does not offer us much aid here, but

Michael Devitt, who has presented an abundance of

assenting behavior in the presence of theses such as
Putnam's, provides, or attempts to provide, a more

refined account of what it is to be
is,

a

true sentence, that

an account that does not explain the enigmatic by

means of the enigmatic. He writes:
Consider a true sentence with a very
simple structure: the predication 'a is
F ' This sentence is true in virtue of the
fact that there exists an object which 'a'
designates and which is among the objects
'F' applies to. So this sentence is true
because it has a predicational structure
containing words standing in certain
referential relations to parts of reality,
and because of the way that reality is.
Provided structure, relations and reality
are objective then the sentence is
correspondence true .... 3
.

Compare D.J. O'Connor, The Correspondence Theory of
Truth, Hutchinson University Library, London (1975) pp.
64-65.
2

Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, Princeton University
Press, Princeton (1984) p. 27. The emphasis is mine.
Hereafter: DEVITT.
3

4

Devitt's explanation relies on the notions of

designation
relations
notion of

application

,

and certain referential

but these need explanation as much as the
a

true sentence. More specifically, these

notions need to be explained because if one maintains
that the objects of which the world consists are

representation independent, and that truth is
correspondence, then one faces, as Putnam argues, two

deep enigmas.
The first enigma is that given Putnam's three
theses, that is, given realism, any representation could
be false, even if it is ideal. So, for example, it could
be that every sentient being is

a

brain in

a vat.

Putnam

argues that this — to wit: scepticism - is impossible,
and for this reason, he rejects these theses.

4

The second

enigma also turns on the premise that Putnam's three

realist theses entail that even an ideal representation
could be false. Putnam argues that if consistency is

a

necessary condition for being an ideal representation, it
is,

for model theoretic reasons, incoherent to say that

an ideal representation could be false, and so realism

ought to be rejected.
4

5

Since at least the former problem

Putnam has presented this argument in RTH

5

,

pp.

1-21.

Putnam has presented this argument in the following:
(1) Realism and Reason, Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Associations, vol. 50 (1977) pp.
483-497, (2) Models and Reality, The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 45 (1980) pp. 464-482, and (3) Model Theory
and the 'Factuality' of Semantics in Reflections on
Chomsky, edited by Alexander George, Basil Blackwell,
5

will arise again in what follows,

I

will not go any

further into the details. My point is that they reveal
the need to provide a fuller account of the referential

notions

designation, etc. — that are presupposed by

Devitt's account of truth.
To provisionally circumvent this cluster of

puzzles, and to return to the topic the place of

a

unique

truth in the ontology described by Putnam's three theses,
I

will replace Devitt's account of what it is to be

true sentence with an image, which

I

a

will entitle the

string theory of truth. Here, strings are placeholders,
and to be rid of them, it is necessary to construct an

ontological apparatus that can explain the relation
between representation and world. Although
to this topic in the sequel,

I

I

will return

will now present an

argument that Putnam's three theses, in relative

abstraction from any particular account of reference,
entail that there is just one truth. Recall that my

overall aim here is to make sense of the idea of truth,

Oxford (1989) pp. 213-232. In this work, I will not
return to this argument, because a fair examination of it
would require an excursion into a number of the
technicalities of model theory, which are beyond the
scope of my understanding at the present time. It seems
clear that Putnam's model theoretic argument shows that
Devitt should not simply assume that the referential
notions that are assumed by his account of truth are
unproblematic. A similar point about these notions holds
for Putnam's so called brains- in-a-vat argument, which I
will discuss in a subsequent section of this work.
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as in there are many truths, by making sense of the
idea
of the truth.

Here is an image that explains what it is for

sentence to be true, and that coheres,

I

a

think, with the

intuition articulated in the above quote from Devitt.
Take an object and take a name; let the latter be: a. Now
take some string, tie one end of the string to the name,
and tie the other end to the object. Now, take

a

property

and take a predicate; let the latter be: is an F. Now,

take some more string, tie one end of the string to the
predicate, and tie the other end to the set of all the

objects that have the property. - Ignore the problem of
how one ties

a

string to

a set.

— Then, a is an F is true

just when the object tied to a is an element of the set

tied to is an F.

6

For example, if we let the name be

6

Note the following. For the sake of exposition, I
ignore relations, negations, conditionals, universally
quantified elements, et cetera, of the complete and true
description, since they can be recursively specified
using what I give as a base. Moreover, I shall primarily
disregard the possibility of the actuality of worlds that
cannot be completely represented by a language that has a
structure that is fully specified by first order logic.
This is partly motivated by my aim to construct a
response to Davidson's aforementioned critique that works
within the confines of his unexpressed assumption that
whatever the world, or a world, is like, it can be
represented by a language that can be specified by first
order logic. Davidson makes this assumption throughout
his writings, but it is particularly evident in his The
Method of Truth in Metaphysics which is in his Inquiries
into Truth and Interpretation, reprinted with
corrections, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1986) pp. 199-214.
Thus, within the scope of this work, I generally suspend
the possibility of the actuality of worlds that can only
be represented, or constituted, by languages that have,
for example, a structure of the sort that Ferdinand de
Saussure attributes to languages. Compare Ferdinand de
7

Fido, and we let the predicate be is a dog, then Fido
is
a dog is true just when the object tied to Fido is
an

element of the set tied to is a dog. This is an essential
part of the idea of the complete and true description of
the world, and what it means to say that there is just
one such description. Given this account, and given that

there is just one world of representation independent
objects that have, and are distinguished by,

representation independent properties, there can only be
one truth. In other words, if the world is unique, and

truth is, in the sense just explained, correspondence,
then there is just one true and complete description of
the way the world is. The following thought experiment

shows this by showing how such a description could be

constructed, if it were possible to construct it.

With respect to the question of whether realism,
or metaphysical realism, entails that there is just one

truth, Putnam writes:

assume ...[ that ]... there is a definite
set I of individuals of which the world
consists ... .And there is a definite set of
all properties and relations .... ,call it
P. Consider an ideal language with a name
for each member of I and a predicate for
...

Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, edited by
Charles Bally and Albert Sechechaye with the
collaboration of Albert Riedlinger, translated and
annotated by Roy Harris, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois
(1986). The point of writing in terms of representations,
as opposed to propositions, or sentences, et cetera,
which have a specific sort of structure, is to write with
a generality that leaves open the possibility of
extending my argument to these possibilities.
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each member of P.
Such an ideal
language ... is unigue...and the theory of
the world... the set of true
sentences
is
unique 7
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The idea seems to be this. To construct the
one, true and
complete description of the way the world is: for
every
object, take a name, take some string

,

tie one end of the

string to the object, and tie the other end to the
name.
Do this so that no name is tied to two objects, and
that

no object is tied to two names. Moreover, for every

property, take a predicate, tie one end of the string to
the set of all the objects that have the property, and

tie the other end to the predicate. Do this in such

a

manner that no predicate is tied to two such sets, and
that no set is tied to two predicates. These two tasks
done, here is how the unique truth can be constructed.

For any name, n, and for any predicate, is P, add n is P
to the description of the world just in case the object

tied to n is an element of the set tied to is

P.

For

example, let the name be Fido, and let the predicate be
is a dog, add Fido is a Dog to the description of the

world just in case the object tied to Fido is an element
of the set tied to is a dog. When every combination of

name and predicate has been considered, the resultant
list of true sentences will be the one true and complete

description of the way the world is, that is, it will be
the truth.
7

DIR, pp.

30-31. The parenthetic addition is due to me.
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It is quite obvious that no finite being is

capable of constructing the complete description of
the
way the actual world is, but this is irrelevant to my
purposes. In this regard, recall that

ray

aim has been to

explain the meaning of two theses: one: there are many
actual worlds, and two: there are many truths. Hitherto,
my strategy has been to explain the relevant conceptions
of world and truth by explaining a realist account of

them, but the realist explanation only serves as a

beginning. According to the realist, there is just one
actual world, truth is correspondence, and so there is
just one truth. According to the relativist, there are

many truths because there are many actual worlds.
Moreover,

a

truth is what it is within the context of

Putnam's three theses, that is, truth is correspondence except that there are many truths, because there are many

totalities of objects to be described. The basic idea is
that there are many actual worlds, and although each is,
in a sense yet to be articulated, representation

dependent, there is exactly one true and complete

description of the way each world is. So, there are many
truths
The theses that there are many actual worlds, and

that there are many truths raise the obvious questions perhaps

I

should say doubts - about whether anything

goes, or whether anything may be believed. On the one

hand, although there are limits to what can be believed
10

by a finite mind, within these limits, it seems
that

there is nothing that cannot be believed. On the other
hand, this question has another sense, namely, whether

believing something is sufficient for its being true. On
one reading, this is Devitt's question: "What is the

reality that constrains us, and prevents us [sic: from?]
saying absolutely anything?" 8 If there isn't

a unique,

representation independent and belief constraining world,
why isn't saying something equivalent to its being so? In
terms of my two theses, is believing something sufficient
for the existence of an actual world where it is true?
It is not obvious what it means to say that belief
is constrained by the world, not to mention any one of a

plurality of actual worlds. To say that the world
constrains belief is not to say that the world makes us
believe what is true, and it is not to say that the world
makes us believe what we happen to believe, although the
latter may be the case. To say that belief is constrained
by the world is,

I

think, to say that not every belief is

true. In other words, to believe something is not ipso

facto to believe something true. Thus, there is an

ambiguity in Devitt's question. It is trivially true that
there are physical constraints on what can be said or
8

DEVITT, p. 56. The emphasis and the parenthetical
remark are mine. Lynn Baker has pointed out to me that it
is not obvious what it means to say that belief is
constrained by the world, and consequently it is not
obvious what a belief constraining world is. The next few
paragraphs are the result of my reflections on her query.
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believed, but there are also social and political

constraints, to wit, pointedly ostending objects, for
example, pistols. Devitt may well have intended the
Istter, but

I

will bracket this reading here. Within the

limits of physical constraints, there doesn't seem to be

anything about the world that constrains or prevents us
from saying or believing what we please. Devitt's

question seems to be motivated by the realization that
many people seem to believe quite spooky things, and the

desire to find something about the world that will stop
them. In other words, his question seems to be motivated

by the absurd desire for the world in itself to police

what we say or believe. At most, however, Devitt could
show that there are constraints on saying and believing
in this quite limited sense: to say or believe something
is not ipso facto to say or believe something true.

might be that this is all that Devitt intends, but

It
I

do

not take the denial of this to conflict with the two

theses under consideration.
The realist conception of world and truth that

have been discussing is,

I

I

think, mainly motivated by the

fact that its unique, representation independent actual

world is taken to be belief constraining. In other words,
realism is principally motivated by the idea that it
seems to yield the highly desired result that belief is
not sufficient for truth. For example, suppose that

Socrates believes that Fido is a dog, but the object tied
12

to Fido is not an element of the set tied to is a
dog. it

follows from the above account of realism that Fido is a

Dog is not true, and so in this case, belief is not

sufficient for truth. The point is general: belief or
assertion is not sufficient for truth. Now, what

I

hope

to do is to make sense of the thesis that there are many

belief or assertion constraining worlds.

I

hope to make

sense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds,
and for each, to believe something is not ipso facto to

believe something true.
Clearly, the above requires exposition, and it

raises all sorts of questions, for example: must there be

many actual worlds in order for there to be many truths?
It seems obvious that there is just one actual world, and
it seems obvious that truth is correspondence. Moreover,

although it takes

a

bit of work to articulate the

inference, it seems obvious that it follows that there is
just one truth. Consequently, it might also seem obvious

that no case can be made for the theses that there are

many actual worlds, and there are many truths. However,
Hartry Field has argued that even if there is just one

representation independent actual world, no complete and
true description could be unique. His premise is the

apparent triviality that:
The concepts we use in describing the
world are not inevitable: beings other
than our selves might use predicates whose

13

extensions differ from anything easily
definable at all in our language.... 9
The idea,

I

surmise, is this. Were there to be

collections of predicates that had extensions different
from those of our present repertoire of predicates, they

would yield different true and complete descriptions of
the way the world is, and thus there would be more than
one truth. Not only isn't Field's multiplicity of truths

the multiplicity that

I

seek to explicate, but more

importantly, Field fails,

I

think, to reconcile the

uniqueness and representation independence of the objects
of the world with the plurality of truths.

To see this more clearly, suppose, with Field,

that there might be two sets of predicates, and suppose
that no predicate from one set has the same extension as
any predicate from the other. Since the extension of

a

predicate is the set of objects to which it applies, for
each set of predicates, there would be the union of their
extensions. Or, if a predicate involves more than one
argument, let its extension be the set of objects that
are elements of the n-tuples to which it applies. Given

that there are two sets of predicates, it is possible to
ask whether the union of the extensions of one set is the
same as the union of the extensions of the other set.

Here is an essential difference between Field's

multiplicity of truths and the one

I

hope to more fully

Hartry Field, Realism and Relativism, The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 79 (1982) p. 553.
9
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explicate. When

what

I

I

say that there are many truths, part
of

mean is that there are many disjoint sets of

objects, and that for each, there is a complete and
true

description of its elements, which is just one of many
truths. When Field says that there are many truths, part
of what he means is that the above described sets of

objects are the same. Field's suggestion is that we might
use alternative predicates to differently describe the

world of representation independent objects, but then
there is still the one and only actual world that is

allegedly described differently, and not many actual
worlds that have different descriptions.
I

maintain that Field's suggestion cannot yield

a

multiplicity of truths. If there were just one actual
world that consisted of representation independent
objects, there could only be one truth, and it would be
the one, true and complete description of these objects.

Suppose that the objects that populate the world

according to Field are representation independent, as
they are within the context of Putnam's three theses.
Such objects would be distinct from one another by virtue
of the properties that they possess, or fail to possess,

independently of whatever concepts or predicates we
happen to possess. The complete description of all the

representation independent properties that all the

representation independent objects possess would be the
truth. There is, therefore, a quite determinate
15

relationship between predicates, their extensions,
and
the representation independent properties of objects,
on

the one hand, and the number of truths, on the other.
It
is irrelevant to object that were we to use different

names and different predicates, we might be inclined to
say that there are different objects. If the names and

predicates we use do not match up with the world's

representation independent objects and properties,
description that employs them cannot be

a

a

truth in the

sense explained above. Names and predicates that don't

reflect the world's objects and properties can't be part
of a description of the way the one representation

independent world of objects is. So, Field's suggestion
does not yield a multiplicity of truths.
If there are to be alternative truths, the

application of alternative predicates to alternative
grammatical subjects must be related to the possession of

alternative properties by alternative objects, which

constitute the ontologies of alternative worlds. Given
the intuitive power of the ideas that there is just one

actual world, and that truth is correspondence, how could
it be that there are many truths? My answer is that there

are many actual worlds, and so there are many truths;
namely, there is one truth, that is, one complete and

true description, for each actual world. In other words,
if there are many actual worlds, each of which consists

of a distinct order of objects, then there are, in the
16

sense explained above, many truths, that is, there
is one

complete and true description for each actual world.
Therefore, it should be clear that my task is to

explicate what it is to be a world in

a

way that makes it

possible to show that there are many actual worlds.
There is

a

problem with this way of putting

things, however. My aim is to make sense of the thesis

that there is some plurality of worlds, and that each has
a

maximally complete and true description. But, this is

misleading, because it fails to include an essential

component of the final view of this essay, namely, that

making sense of my two theses requires
ontological inversion. But,

I

a

certain

get ahead of myself. The

pictures presented in this section are sufficient to
begin to explain the conception of world and truth to be

more fully delineated in what follows.

I

mean here to

warn my readers that the contents of this section are not
final. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, these contents are

rungs to be climbed up and beyond — my reader must, so to
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed it. 10

The problem here is to make sense of the theses

that there are many actual worlds, and that there are

many truths.

I

find a clue to the solution of this

10 Compare Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus translated by D.F. Pears and B.F.
McGuinness, and with an introduction by Bertrand Russell,
F.R.S., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London (1961) p. 151,
,

section 6.54. Hereafter: TLP.
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problem in the doctrines that Plato imputes to
Protagoras. In his Theaetetus, Plato reports that

Protagoras maintained that:
...a man is the measure of all things: of
those which are, that they are, and of
those which are not, that they are not. 11

On my reading of Plato's text, this contains the seeds
of
a

coherent alternative to the idea that there is

a

unique

belief constraining world in itself that is the same for
all observers and all thinkers, yet it does not require

the rejection of the idea of a belief constraining world.
On my interpretation, Protagoras urges us to think that

there are many belief constraining worlds, and that there
are many truths. This is an idea fraught with

difficulties, but

I

find, as

I

have just said,

a

clue to

its explication, and their solution in the Protagorean

doctrines
The idea of belief constraint is not discarded by

Protagoras. This is a key element in his thought, not to

mention any viable explanation of the thesis that there
are many actual worlds and truths, but belief is not

always constrained in the same direction. As
this is essential

.

I

see it,

So it is wrong to say that his view is

that anything goes, or that nothing is objective. He

maintains that more than one thing goes, and that there
11 Plato, Theaetetus, translated with notes by John
McDowell, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1973) p. 16, 152a.

Hereafter: THEAETETUS.
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are many objectivities. Moreover, he explains
this in

terms of the idea that there are many actual
worlds.

Clearly

,

there are at least three relevant questions that

need to be answered:
(1)

What is it to be an actual world?

(2) How can there be many belief
constraining actual worlds?

and
(3)

How can there be many truths?

The text of Plato's dialogue suggests that the

Protagorean thesis that man is the measure can be

developed into an account of what it is to be an actual
world, and into an argument that employs this account to

show both that there are many actual, belief constraining
worlds, and consequently that there are many truths. In
short, the text of Plato's dialogue suggests answers to

these three questions. Since it is, in this case and at
this stage, clear that a plurality of actual worlds

entails a plurality of truths, worlds come first.

Protagoras maintained that the world of Socrates
is,

for example, the aggregate of whatever appears to

him, and since perception is the principal mode of

appearance, his world is the aggregate of what he
perceives. 12 This leaves open the question about whether
this means that his world is the aggregate of
12 How would Protagoras answer:

cannot be described?
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(i)

what he

Can something appear that

does perceive,

(ii) what he does and can perceive, or

what he does and can perceive plus whatever may
be
connected by rules to what he does and can perceive,
(

iii

)

it

is reflection upon these sorts of questions that leads
to

an essentially different version of the thesis that
there

are many actual worlds and truths. The Protagorean vision
is just one rung on a ladder.

Be this as it may, an

account of truth obviously corresponds to this ontology.
The assertion that the wind is cold is true for

Socrates just when the wind that appears to Socrates is
cold, or the wind perceived by Socrates is cold. This can

be put in the idiom of the string theory of truth.

Consider the general idea first. Take an object that
appears to Socrates, that is, take an object that

Socrates perceives. Take a name, or some expression. Now
take some string, tie one end of the string to the

expression, and tie the other end to the object. Now take
a

property, take a predicate, take some more string, tie

one end of the string to the predicate, and tie the other
end to the set of all the objects that both appear to

Socrates and that have the property. If a is the name or
expression, and is F is the predicate, then a is F is
true for Socrates just when the object tied to a is an

element of the set tied to is

F.

In the case of the

present example, if we let the expression be the wind,
and we let the predicate be is cold, then The wind is

cold is true for Socrates just when the object tied to
20

the wind is an element of the set tied to is cold.
Similarly, the assertion that the wind is warm is true
for Theaetetus just when the wind that appears to

Theaetetus is warm, or the wind that Theaetetus perceives
is warm. The string theory of truth applies similarly.

Moreover, if the wind that appears to Socrates is
cold, the assertion that the wind is not cold is not

sufficient for it to be true for him. Similarly,

if the

wind that appears to Theaetetus is not warm, the

assertion that the wind is warm is not sufficient for his
assertion to be true for him. So, one consequence of
Protagoras ' ontology, which is a desired consequence, is
that there are many belief constraining worlds. The

aggregate of whatever appears to someone, or the

aggregate of what someone perceives, is her world. Such

a

world constrains belief or assertion, that is, with
respect to such a world, saying that some object has some

property is not sufficient for that object to have the
property in question. In other words, to assert something
is not ipso facto to assert something true. There can be

many truths, because there are many belief constraining
winds, that is, one that appears to Socrates, and one

that appears to Theaetetus, and so assertion is
constrained, but not always in the same way. More
generally, for any subject, s, to assert or believe

something is not ipso facto to assert or believe
something that is true for

s.
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With this, Protagoras

constructs an alternative to the views
that there is just
one truth and, rather interestingly,
although
,

given the

aim of this work, perhaps not as importantly,
that there
is no truth.

More generally, according to Protagoras, the

aggregate of what is perceived by an individual, or
the
aggregate of what appears to an individual, is her
world.
Since there are many individuals, there are many worlds.
Clearly, such a world is not a merely possible world.

Such a world is just one of many actual worlds. For each

Protagorean world, there is

a

total description, and so

there is a truth. It is important to note that the

relevant notion of relative truth is that of

correspondence between what is said and

a

a

segment of

a

world, to wit, what is said is true just when it

corresponds to, or correctly describes, some segment of

a

world. So, this is a correspondence theory of truth as

described above. The contentious question concerns the
number of worlds to which what is said can correspond.
The difficulty lies in showing that there are many belief

constraining worlds, but once this is given, it is
obvious that there are many truths. This requires that

a

proposition, or sentence, or statement, et cetera, be
true for an individual just when it describes what she
perceives, or it describes what appears to her. A truth,
or total truth, would just be a totality of propositions,
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sentences, or statements, et cetera

,

that describe

someone's world.
It is, of course, quite difficult to understand

the status of the Protagorean account of the plurality of

actual worlds and truths, since it does not appear to be

about what is perceived by any individual. This account
seems to tell us what individuals are like independently
of how they are perceived by any individual

,

but

Protagoras has no place for such propositions in his
scheme of man measured things. His picture is that of

a

multiplicity of individuals, each of whom is conscious of
a

certain field of things, but there are different things

in different fields. A world is, in this picture,

just

the sum total of what appears, and can appear, in

a

field. Thus, there are different worlds, and, on the

assumption that truth is correspondence between what is
said and some segment of

a

world, there are many truths.

To represent a world, to have the truth, is to represent

what is in one of these fields, to give

a

complete

description of the field. It might be that no one could
produce such

a

description, but that is what

a truth,

a

total truth, would be. What about the Protagorean

picture? According to it, all pictures depict the

contents of a field. Since the Protagorean picture aims
to depict all the fields, it cannot depict the contents
of any particular field. This seems incoherent, but it is
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not a serious objection to the Protagorean
picture, or so
I argue
In his Theaetetus, Plato has Socrates raise
this

sort of objection against the Protagorean thesis
that man
is measure all things:

...it [the Protagorean thesis] involves
this very subtle implication. Protagoras
agrees that everyone has in his [sic]
judgements the things which are. In doing
that, he's surely conceding that the
opinion of those who make opposing
judgements about his own opinion - that
is, their opinion that what he thinks is
false — is true.... So if he admits that
their opinion is true - that is, the
opinion of those who believe that what he
thinks is false — he would seem to be
conceding that his own opinion is
false .... 13

This refutation begins with the assumption that the

Protagorean thesis implies that "...everyone has in his
judgements the things which are." 14 This is, however,

ambiguous between (i) when one judges truly, one judges
about the things which are in one's world, and (ii)

whatever one judges is ipso facto true. As

I

reconstruct

Protagoras, he meant the former: everyone who judges

truly judges about the things which are in her world. As
Plato reads him, Protagoras meant the latter: whatever
one judges is ipso facto true. In addition to Plato, as

13 THEAETETUS,

p. 46, 171a-b. This passage is the locus
classicus for the thesis that relativism is selfrefuting
.

14 THEAETETUS,

p.

46,

171a.
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recent an interpreter as M.F. Burnyeat
reads Protagoras
in this manner:
No one lives in a world in which his [sic]
mere belief in a proposition is either a
sufficient or a necessary condition for
its truth (in that world). But that
everyone lives in such a world is
precisely what the Measure doctrine
asserts.... Protagoras alleges we
all... live in a world in which their mere
belief in a proposition is a sufficient
and necessary condition for its truth (in
that world) 15

Plato predicates his subtle refutation of the Protagorean

thesis on this uncharitable reading. It begins with the
obvious consequence that whatever Plato judges is ipso

facto true. Since Plato judges that the Protagorean view
is false,

it follows that it is true that the Protagorean

view is false. So, the Protagorean view is false. It
seems that Plato's refutation shows that the Protagorean

thesis entails its own negation, i.e. that it is self-

refuting

.

Burnyeat also predicates his account of the subtle

refutation on this uncharitable reading. On his reading,
Protagoras offers us a picture of a multiplicity of
individuals, each of which is conscious of

a

certain

field of things. In this picture, a world is just the sum
total of what appears, and perhaps what can appear, in

a

field. The pivotal point is that for each field, the mere
15 M.F.

Burnyeat, Protagoras and Self -Ref utation in
Plato's Theaetetus The Philosophical Review, vol 85
(1976) pp. 182-183. The emphasis is due to me.
.

,
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belief in

a

proposition is both

a

sufficient and a

necessary condition for its truth. Now, given
the
assumption that Plato merely believes that the

field of

what appears to him is not such that the mere
belief in
Proposition is both sufficient and necessary for its

a

truth, it follows that the field of what appears
to Plato
is a counterexample to the Protagorean picture. So,
once

again it seems that the Protagorean thesis entails its
own negation, i.e. that it is self-ref uting

.

The pivotal

problem with these subtle refutations is that had
Protagoras asserted that whatever one judges is ipso

facto true, he would have been inane, not

a relativist.

On a more charitable reading, Protagoras meant that

everyone who judges truly judges about the things which
are in her world, and there are many worlds, et cetera.
It is not obvious that this version of the Protagorean

thesis is self-ref uting

,

but what

I

have to say about

this, and the question of whether relativism is self-

refuting in general, concerns the analysis of how self-

refutation arguments work.
Plato presents the essence of the famous objection

that relativism is self-refuting 16
.

I

will here only

16 The literature on this subject divides along an
admittedly artificial line. There are formally oriented

pieces, and there are historically oriented pieces. The
line is artificial since some involve both. The number of
times the self-refutation objection is merely asserted to
be the decisive refutation of relativism is far greater
than the number of times it comes even close to being
made formally clear. For discussions that try to be
formally clear, compare the following, (i) J.L. Mackie,
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briefly indicate why

think this objection fails, in

I

general, this objection has the following form.
Some
version of relativism, R, will be said to entail
either
its own negation or a contradiction, and then we
are

urged to reject R. Since

a

proposition entails its own

negation just when it entails

a

contradiction, and the

result is the same, namely, the proposition in guestion
is necessarily false,

I

will only discuss the former

case, which is more intuitive to me.

What is self-ref utation? This is an important

question. Although the term is often used, it is rarely

Self -Ref utation - A Formal Analysis The Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 14 (1964) pp. 193-203. Hereafter: MACKIE
(ii) Jonathan Bennett, Review of J.L. Mackie SelfRef utation - A Formal Analysis The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 30 (1965) pp. 365-366. (iii) John Passmore,
Philosophical Reasoning, Basic Books, New York (1969) pp.
58-80. Hereafter: PASSMORE, (iv) F.C. White, SelfRefuting Propositions and Relativism Metaphilosophy,
vol. 20 (1989) pp. 84-92. Hereafter: SRPR. (v) Peter
Davson-Galle Self-refuting Propositions and Relativism
Metaphilosophy, vol. 22 (1991) p. 175-178. Hereafter:
DAVSON-GALLE. Understanding the self-ref utation argument
has also benefited from various historical
investigations. The activity has mostly centered around
the interpretation of Plato's Theaetetus. The literature
on this immense. I have mostly drawn on the following.
(i) M.F. Burnyeat, Protagoras and Self -Ref utation in
Plato's Theaetetus The Philosophical Review, vol. 85
(1976) pp. 172-195. (ii) Jack W. Meiland, Is Protagorean
Relativism Self-Refuting? Grazer Philosophische Studien,
vol. 9 (1979) pp. 51-68. (iii) Mohan Matthen, Perception,
Relativism , and Truth: Reflections on Plato's Theaetetus
152-160, Dialogue, vol. 24 (1985) pp. 33-58. NOTA BENE:
Semantic self-refutation is not, I think, the same as
pragmatic self-ref utation So, even if relativism is not
semantically self-refuting, it could be pragmatically
self-refuting. In this work, I shall only focus on the
former, since I have not yet found a version of the
latter that has been formulated with the degree of
clarity required for critical evaluation.
,

.

,

,

,

,

,

.
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explained. Some writers suggest that it is best

explicated by laying out its form. For example, John
Passmore suggests that: "Formally, the proposition
p is
absolutely self-refuting, if to assert p is eguivalent to

asserting both p and not-p ." 17 This is confusing for

a

number of reasons. Asserting is something that persons
do.

Here, a formal account would be an account of the

logical structure of self-refuting propositions. It would
not matter that someone does or does not assert them, or
at least this is what a anti-relativist should say. A

formal account of modus ponens would be an account of the

logical structure of a particular sort of argument, and
it would not matter that someone does or does not assert

an argument with this structure. Moreover, it is

mysterious what it could mean to say that asserting p is
equivalent to asserting p and not-p. Does this mean that,
where p is self-ref uting

,

every speaker who intends to

assert p finds herself actually, although accidentally,
asserting, in the manner of a slip of the tongue, p

&

not-p? If this is a formal account, why mention

assertion? So, if we drop the part about asserting, we
are left with this: p is self-refuting, if p is

equivalent to both p and not-p.
Although this may be a matter of the subjectivity
of simplicity, this version is overly complicated.
17 PASSMORE,

p.

60.
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I

think it more simple to say that
p is self-refuting, if p
implies ~p. Nothing is a stake here, since
the two

versions are logically eguivalent. Note,
moreover, that
by this criterion, when p is self-refuting,
since it

is a

truth of logic that:
[P - ~P] = [p - (q & ~q)

]

p also entails a contradiction. On this account,

therefore, a case of self-refutation is the same as

a

case of contradiction. This is so even if one adopts
the

analysis of self-refutation recently offered by F.c.
White, who writes:

Self-refuting propositions have three
essential characteristics. [1] They are
false. [2] They falsify or contribute to
falsifying themselves. [3] They falsify
themselves through self-reference. 18
When White says that self-refuting propositions

"...falsify or contribute to falsifying themselves," this
amounts,

I

think, to the claim that when p is self-

refuting, if p is true, then p is false. In other words,

when p is self-refuting, p implies ~p. So,
p,

a

is self-refuting just when (1) p is false,

proposition,
(2)

p

implies ~p, and (3) p refers to p. These three features
are exemplified in what may well be the paradigm of the

self-refuting proposition: every general statement is
false. As Putnam has put this point:

18 SRPR

,

p.

84.

The parenthetic enumerations are due to

me
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A 'self-refuting supposition' is one
whose
truth implies its own falsity. For
example, consider the thesis that all
general statements are false. This is a
general statement. So if it is true, then
it must be false. [Because it refers to
itself by virtue of quantifying over
itself.] Hence, it is false. 19

The pivotal condition is (3), which is where

I

suspect

the objection from self-refutation fails.

Whatever version of relativism is considered, let
it be R, the self-refutation argument will have the

following structure, where p is

a

variable ranging over

propositions
[R]

(p)

( . .

.p.

. . )

The self-refutation argument proceeds. The variable,
is said to range over R,

p,

and it is allegedly shown that

when p takes R as a value, it is easy to show that R
implies its own negation, or to deduce a contradiction.
The conclusion is that R is incoherent, or, what is more
to the point in this context, R is self-refuting. Are

relativists without a response to this? They could say
the following: do not let p take R as
Is this ad hoc ?

I

a

value.

think that it is not. Consider

an analogous case in the world of those who think that

there is one unique world, who think that truth is

getting it uniquely right, who countenance both
bivalence and Tarski's Convention

T.

Consider the

following proposition, A:
19 RTH

,

p.

7.

The parenthetic remark is mine.
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a

form of

[A]

A is not true.

Is A true or not true? It is easy to show that A is true

just when A is not true, and this is logically equivalent

to a contradiction. We are never asked to conclude that
the non-relativist conception of truth is contradictory
or self-refuting. This contradiction does not provide the

kind of pressure required to establish the essential

incoherence of this sort of conception of truth, but what
about the contradiction?
There are many stories about this. One might say

that the specification of A is viciously circular
(Russell), or propose a hierarchy of languages and truth

predicates (Tarski), or say that since A isn't grounded,
it lacks truth value (Kripke). 20 It doesn't matter

whether or which of these is the uniquely correct one
story. Because, the point is that an anti-relativist, or

someone who wants to preserve

a

non-relativist idea of

truth, is permitted to amend a rule of her logic, if it

should yield an inference that she is unwilling to
accept. As Goodman once said: "A rule is amended if it

yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an
inference is rejected if it violates

a

rule we are

20 Compare Susan Haack, Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (1978) pp. 135-151. Peter
Davson-Galle in his recent response to White's version
of the thesis that relativism about truth is self,

refuting, suggests that "...relativism about truth would
seem to be able to spawn quasi-Tarskian variants that
escape White's argument." DAVSON-GALLE, p. 178.
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unwilling to amend." 21 Is this ad hoc ? If we deny
so in
the anti-relativist's case, we should deny so in

the case

of a relativist. From the relativist's point of
view, the

choice is between allowing and disallowing
p to take R as
a value.

What could be wrong with the following line of

reasoning? Premise: if we allow division by zero, we can
show that one equals zero. The proof is obvious.
(1)

Begin with the obvious:

1=1.

(2) From (1), and by subtracting
both sides, we get: 1-1 = 0.

1

from

(3) From (2), and by multiplying both
sides by l/(l-l) [which requires division
by 0, because 1-1 = 0, but since a point
is being made, this is allowed] we get:
(1-1) . 1/(1-1) = o . 1/(1-1).
(4) From (3), and since a • 1/a = 1, and 0
•
a = 0, we finally get the result that: 1

= 0. Q.E.D.

Conclusion: don't allow division by zero. Here,

rule is

a

amended because it yields a conclusion that we are

unwilling to accept. The rule is something like: for all
a and b, there is a c such that a/b=c, and the amendment

is that b cannot equal zero. Now suppose the relativists

allow p to take R as a value, and suppose that the anti-

relativists are correct when they claim that under this
condition, R entails either its own negation, or

a

contradiction. It is obvious that the prudent policy is

21 Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction

,

in Fact,

Fiction, and Forecast, fourth edition, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1983) p. 64.
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for the relativist to bar p from taking R as a
value. 22

Here is the argument for the prudence of this policy.

Premise

.

if we allow p to take R as a value, R entails

the negation of R, and a contradiction. Conclusion

:

do

not allow p to take R as a value. So, with this way out,
the argument from self-refutation is not a sufficient

critique of relativism, Protagorean, conceptual or
otherwise. This response is the same as the doctor's

response to the patient who says, "It hurts when

I

do

this!" The doctor says, "Don't do that!" When the anti-

relativist says, "Incoherence is the result of applying

relativism to itself!", the relativist should say "Don't
apply relativism to itself." This is

a

well known

response to the problem of propositions such as "This

proposition is not true." It seems to me that any
solution to the so-called liar paradox is, in some way,

a

22 There have been a number of controversies wherein it
has been suggested that instead of augmenting our

physics, logic itself should be changed. For a discussion
of when there could be reasons for revising classical
logic, compare Susan Haack, Deviant Logic: Some
Philosophical Issues, Cambridge University Press, London
(1974). For a recent example of the suggestion that logic
be revised, compare the controversy surrounding the
following, (i) Patrick Grim, There Is No Set of All
Truths, Analysis, vol. 44 (1984) pp. 206-208. (ii) Selmer
Brings jord, Are There Set-Theoretic Possible Worlds?,
Analysis, vol. 45 (1985) p. 64. (iii) Christopher Menzel,
On Set-Theoretic Possible Worlds, Analysis, vol. 46
(1986) pp. 68-72. Hereafter: MENZEL. (iv) Patrick Grim,
On Sets and Worlds: A Reply to Menzel, Analysis, vol. 46
(1986) pp. 186-191. Menzel claims that "...the worldstory theorist can have either his world stories [the
ontology he needs to do his semantics] or an iterative
understanding of sets that includes the power set axiom
[his logic], but not both." MENZEL, pp. 71-72.
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solution (!) to the paradox
is,

of relative truth, that

(!)

it would be, so to speak, a solution to
the

relativist liar paradox. No one says that realism,
or
anti-relativism, is self-refuting because there is no

universally accepted solution to the liar paradox. There
is,

therefore, no reason to say it of relativism.
Above,

I

is considered,

said that whatever version of relativism
it will have the structure of R, but this

fails to do justice to relativism. Indeed, it would be an

abstract relativist who would assent to R. Those who

proffer the argument from self-ref utation rarely, if
ever, attempt to figure out just what case the relativist

might be making. White is one example. 23 They assume that
the relativist thinks something witless like everything
is relative

,

and then with equal wit they go on to prove

that this is self-ref uting or incoherent. But then it

can't be claimed that the argument is based on

a deep,

or

even moderately brief, analysis of the relativist's

position. For example, it can't be claimed that the

argument is based on a deep, or even moderate, analysis
of the writings of Whorf

,

Quine, Kuhn, or Feyerabend. It

is not based on an analysis at all. This may be a

stronger response to the objection that relativism is
self-refuting. Thus, there are two responses to this.
One: the self-refutation argument must be directed at a
23 PASSMORE,

pp.

58-80; MACKIE
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,

pp.

193-203.

developed version of relativism. Two

:

the paradoxes of

relative truth can be resolved by developing

a logical

apparatus that is analogous to those that have
been

proposed to resolve the paradoxes of non-relative
truth.
The development of the required logical apparatus
presupposes, however, a given account of relativism,
that
is,

of the theses that there are many actual worlds
and

there are many truths. So, first comes the philosophical
work, and then comes the logic. Here,

to the former, and

I

I

will only attend

will leave the development of the

technical logical apparatus aside as beyond the scope of
this work. This said,

I

will now return to the task of

elucidating the analysis, or the ontology, that makes
sense of the relativist's notion of multiple actual

worlds and multiple truths.
The above version of Protagoreanism provides us

with a story wherein we can see three things:
actual world is,

(2)

what an

(1)

how it is possible for there to be,

and that there are many actual worlds, and (3) how it is

possible for there to be, and that there are many total
truths.

I

have no idea how one could prove that any

version of relativism must provide such

a story.

It has

assumed many forms. To make these ideas more clear,

I

shall examine how they function in the thought of a

number of thinkers. It might be that none of these
thinkers would accept either the epitaph, or epithet,

relativist

,

so

I

limit my investigation to the role that
35

these three themes play in their writings. Here, my
aim
is ancient:

to elucidate certain themes by showing how

I

see them developed, or able to be developed, in the

thought of my predecessors. My final cause is, of course,
to thereby articulate my own version of the development
of these themes.
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CHAPTER

2

ATTEMPTS: WHORF AND QUINE
The writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf contain
elements

that suggest an account of what it is to be

a

world that

shows how it is possible for there to be, and that
there
are many actual worlds, and so many truths.

with them. If there were
there would be,

I

a

I

will begin

plurality of actual worlds,

think, a plurality of truths, namely,

there would be one truth, that is, one complete
description, for each actual world. So,
focus on what

I

I

will mostly

think suggests an account of how there

can be a plurality of actual worlds.
As

I

have read Whorf, the premise of this account is

that "...language produces an organization of

experience." 1 This premise is not difficult to accept.
Whorf provides us with many examples, although they seem
to have been directed to linguists, anthropologists, and

those who happen to be well acquainted with

a

variety of

disparate languages. The most famous among Whorf
examples is, of course, Hopi

.

's

Suppose, as Whorf asserts,

that "...the Hopi language contains no reference to

'time'...." 2 Without a temporal vocabulary, for example,
1

Benjamin Lee Whorf, The Punctual and Segmentative
Aspects of Verbs in Hopi, in Language, Thought, and
Reality, edited and with an introduction by John B.
Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase, The M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge (1956) p. 55. Hereafter: PSAVH.
2

Benjamin Lee Whorf, An American Indian Model of the
Universe in Language, Thought, and Reality, edited and
with an introduction by John B. Carroll, forward by
,
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how could one then describe change? This
question is not
about the conditions under which it would
then be

possible to describe change, but it is about what
such
description would be like. If one doesn't think that

a

the

very idea of describing change without

a

temporal

vocabulary is incoherent, then one might suspect that
something must be omitted from

a Hopi

description of

change, but Whorf assures us that "...the Hopi language
is capable of ... describing correctly,

in a pragmatic or

operational sense, all observable phenomena of the

universe

.

3

Whorf alleges that someone who describes change

with the aid of

a

temporal vocabulary experiences change

differently from someone who describes it with an
atemporal vocabulary. The point of the above question is
to get one to see that his claim is correct. In Hopi,

Whorf asserts:
...there are no verbs corresponding to our
'come' and 'go' that mean simple and
abstract motion, our purely kinematic
concept. The words in this case translated
'come' refer to the process of eventuating
without calling it motion
they are
'eventuates to here' ( pew'i or
'eventuates from it' angqo or 'arrived'
pi. oki) which refers only to the
( pitu
terminal manifestation, the actual arrival

—

(

,

Stuart Chase, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1956)
Hereafter: AIMU.
3

AIMU, p. 58.
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p.

58.

at a given point, not to the motion
preceding it. 4

As strange as it may seem, in using Hopi to describe
the

motion of an object from one location to another, one
does not say that after the passage of some time, and

after some preceding motion, the object finally arrived
here. Moreover,

I

am not clear on what one does say. This

lack of clarity is not an objection to Whorf's example,

however, since the point of the example is,

I

think, that

anyone who experienced the object of the Hopi description

would have an essentially different experience from
someone who experienced the object of the corresponding

English description. Such examples often strike many of
us as quite alien. So, although the fact of their

strangeness, or distance may itself be one of the best
examples, or one of the most obvious consequences, of the

linguistic ordering of experience,

I

will describe and

consider another illustration of Whorf's premise.
For us, there can be at least two experiences of
the following:

(1)

if the mouse is on the house, the

mouse is dizzy, and the mouse is on the house, so the

mouse is dizzy;

(2)

if the mouse is on the house, the

mouse is dizzy, and the mouse is not dizzy, so the mouse
is not on the house;

(3)

if the mouse is on the house,

the mouse is dizzy, and the mouse is not on the house, so
the mouse is not dizzy; and (4) if the mouse is on the
4

AIMU

,

p.

60.
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house, the mouse is dizzy, and the mouse
is dizzy, so the
mouse is on the house. Someone whose vocabulary
includes,

or whose language has a syntax that can
capture, modus
pollens, modus tollens

antecedent

,

the fallacy of denying the

and the fallacy of affirming the consequent

,

will have one experience of this. Someone who lacks
this

vocabulary, and whose language lacks the relevant syntax,
will have a quite different experience. The former will

experience this as four variations on

a theme,

latter will experience it as

This is only an

a chaos.

and the

example, however. The pivotal question is whether the

premise that language orders experience can be developed
into an account of actual world multiplicity.

Not only does Whorf assert that language orders,
or arranges experience, but he also asserts the stronger

thesis that the result of this is

writes that "... language ... is

a

a

world order. He

classification and

arrangement of the stream of sensory experience which
results in

a

world-order...." 5 Although one sometimes

experiences the world, and experience is one of the many
things that comprises the world, it is important to be
clear that experience is essentially different from the
world, and so the world order is essentially other than

the order of experience. Hence, it is unclear how the

linguistic ordering of experience could be related to the
5

PSAVH

,

p.

55.
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order of the world, and it is also
unclear, perhaps more
so, how it could be that the world
itself is ordered by
language. Yet, Whorf asserts both that
"...languages
dissect nature in many ways...,*' and that »(w)e
dissect
along lines laid down by our native

languages...." 6 The difficulty, as Devitt points
out, is
that
.we can make good sense of talk of our
[language?] imposing on, organizing and
cutting up experience. But this is not to
say that we construct the world; it is our
experience of the world, not the world
itself, that we [by means of our
language?] are imposing on, organizing and
cutting up. 7
.

.

Note well that Devitt concedes that there is good sense
to be made of Whorf 's talk of our language imposing on,

cutting up, organizing, and ordering our experience of
the world. But, it is a very different thing to claim

that language imposes on, cuts up, and orders the world
itself, which would seem to be cut up, and ordered in its

own language independent way, and this is the very

difficulty at hand.
Whorf goes even further, however. He asserts that

"...different languages differently 'segment' the same

6

Benjamin Lee Whorf, Science and Linguistics in
Language, Thought, and Reality, edited and with an
introduction by John B. Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase,
The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1956) p. 214 and p. 213.
Hereafter: SL.
,

7

DEVITT, p. 140. The parenthetical inguiries are mine.
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situation or experience

» 8

Not only do different

languages differently order the experiences of
their
speakers, but in some manner, different languages

differently order the same world. So, if there are
many
languages, and there is a distinct world-order for
each
language, then there are many world-orders. It might
seem

that this is very near to affirming that there are many
actual worlds, since it might seem plausible to say that

there is one actual world for each world order. Yet, this

doesn't quite yield the conclusion that there are many
actual worlds. Note well that it is the same situation,
or world, that is differently segmented, or dissected, by

different languages, but there is an obvious difficulty
with this. As Roger Trigg has observed:
There are clearly many ways of classifying
and grouping together objects in the
world. The fact that different languages
may do it differently does not of itself
suggest that they are referring to
different states of affairs or 'different
worlds 9
'

The difficulty is that there seems to be just one nature,
or actual world, that is differently dissected by

different languages, but this only needs to mean that

different languages have different resources for picking
8

Benjamin Lee Whorf, Gestalt Technique of Stem
Composition in Shawnee, in Language, Thought, and
Reality, edited and with an introduction by John B.
Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase, The M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge (1956) p. 162. The emphasis is mine.
9

Roger Trigg, Reason and Commitment, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (1973) p. 163.

42

out and describing different
pre-existing patterns among
pre-existent language-independent objects.
So,

the

conclusion that there are many actual worlds
is guite
distant, if it is even possible to reach it

from Whorf

premise.

's

(It might be instructive to recall the
reason

that Field's suggestion does not work: if the
world

consists of representation-independent objects,
there can
only be one truth, and it would be the one, true and

complete description of these objects.) Thus, once again
the pivotal question arises about how, and, perhaps more

importantly, whether the premise that language orders

experience can be developed in an account of actual world
multiplicity.

Whorf's suggestion is that language orders
experience. Not only is this merely intuitive and
inexact, its relation to the conclusion that there are

many actual worlds is unclear, but

I

have only claimed

that it is suggestive. Something more is needed.

I

would

add an alternative to the idea that the world is some

sort of sum of experience independent objects. It is

unclear whether Whorf could imagine such a thing. As

I

have noted, he seems to have thought that there is just
one world, and that different languages have different

resources for picking out and describing different pre-

existing patterns among pre-existent and linguistically-

independent objects. However, Whorf himself maintains
that there is a significant difference between the thesis
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that "...'Sentences are unlike because
they tell about
unlike facts'...," and the thesis that
"...'Facts are
unlike to speakers whose language background
provides for
unlike formulation of them.'" 10 This suggests
the

distinction between the thesis that

a

true sentence is

one that describes a fact, and the thesis that

a

fact is

what some true sentence describes. Despite the obscurity
of the Whorfian texts, the metaphysically significant

point is that to get the conclusion that there are many

worlds from Whorf's suggestion that language shapes

experience

it is,

,

I

think, necessary to add something

like the premise that a world is the ideal sum of the

objects of an ideal sum of linguistically shaped

experiences
As

I

.

have interpreted Protagoras above, he

maintained the analogous premise that the world of
Socrates is the aggregate of whatever appears to him, and
since perception is the principal mode of appearance, his

world is the aggregate of what he perceives. To arrive at
the conclusion that there are many worlds from Whorf's

premise that language shapes experience, it is necessary
to add an additional premise such as the premise that the

world of the Hopi is the aggregate of whatever appears to
them. Moreover, since linguistically shaped experience is
10 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Languages and Logic, in Language,
Thought, and Reality, edited and with an introduction by

John B. Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase, The M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge (1956) p. 235.
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the principal mode of appearance, their
world is the
aggregate of the objects of their linguistically
shaped
experiences

Whorf seems to have believed

a

number of

trivialities. He seems to have maintained that
experience
is ordered by language

,

and that different languages

differently order experience. As

I

noted above, these are

not difficult assumptions. However, Whorf has also

indicated that he believed that there is just one world

,

and that different languages have different resources for

picking out and describing different pre-existing
patterns among pre-existent and language- independent
objects. Such assertions seem to be supported by either

reflection on common experience, or most people's natural
ontological attitude 11 So, the difficult task lies in
.

showing how, and that, these trivialities support

a

monstrosity, namely, the thesis that there are many
actual worlds. It is clear that it is necessary to make

a

case for the theses that the world is shaped by language,

that different languages order the world differently

,

and

that there are many actual worlds. The case can be made,

given the reconception of a world as an ideal sum of the
11 Compare, Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological

Attitude in Scientific Realism, edited with an
introduction by Jarrett Leplin, University of California
Press, Berkeley (1984) pp. 83-107. I only mean to borrow
this phrase from Fine for the purpose of calling up my
reader's realist intuitions, which I suspect aren't in
need of resurrection.
,
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objects of a manifold of linguistically
shaped
experiences. Then, not only are worlds
linguistically
shaped, but for each language, there is an

ideal sum of

objects of linguistically shaped experiences.
So, for
each language, there is a world. Now, were
there to

be

many languages, there would also be many worlds,
it seems
obvious that there are many languages, though this

is not

an uncontested thesis, so it should be obvious that
there

are many worlds. Moreover, if each of these worlds
had

a

complete description, there would be many truths. As has
been pointed out above, however, there are

a

number of

problems with all of this, but their solutions rest on
this reconception 12
.

1?

It may make the structure of my reconstruction of
Whorf's suggestion more clear, if I number the relevant
theses, and state the various problems and what I take to
be their solutions in a much more abstract form:

experience is ordered by language,
different languages order experience differently,
there is just one actual world,
different languages have different resources for
picking pre-existing and language-independent patterns
among pre-existing and language- independent objects,
the actual world is ordered by language
5
(6) different languages order the world differently, and
there are many actual worlds
7
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(

)

(

)

3 and 4 are supported by either reflection on
common experience, or most people's natural ontological
attitude. It is necessary to make a case for 5, 6 and 7.
The first problem is that Whorf says that 5 is the result
of 1, but there is a logical gap between 1 and 5. The
solution is that the idea that there is a gap between 1
and 5 presupposes a non-relativist conception of what it
is to be a world. Given a relativist conception of what
it is to be a world, there is no gap. The second problem
is that 5 would seem to be the only support for 6, but
the best motivation for 5 is 1, and 1 doesn't at all seem
to support 5. The solution is that given a relativist

Now, 1, 2,
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The first problem is that Whorf says that
the

world is ordered by language because experience is

ordered by language, but there seems to be

a

logical gap

between these theses. The solution to this problem is
that the idea that there is

a

gap here presupposes that

the world is an ideal sum of experience independent
objects. If a world were the ideal sum of the objects of
an ideal sum of linguistically shaped experiences, there

would be no gap.
The second problem is that the only reason for

saying that different languages order the world

differently would seem to be that the world is ordered by
language. However, the best reason for the latter is that

experience is ordered by language, but this brings us
back to the alleged first problem. Thus, the solution to
this supposed problem is,

I

think, that if a world is the

ideal sum of the objects of an ideal sum of

linguistically shaped experiences, it too disappears.

conception of what it is to be a world, this problem also
disappears. The third problem is that even if there were
support for 6, presumably from 5, which comes dubiously
from 1, 6 only seems plausible if it is read as 4. But,
when 6 is interpreted as saying 4, it offers no support
for 7, and there is, therefore, no support for denying 3.
The solution is that given a relativist conception of
what it is to be a world, 6 has another reading, and on
this reading, 6 supports 7, and 6 gives reason to deny 3.
Now the last problem is: what premise in conjunction with
1 entails 7? I would say that it is this: a world is an
ideal sum of the objects of a manifold of linguistically
shaped experiences, but this is the basis of the solution
of all these problems.
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The third problem is that there doesn't
seem to be
any reason to say that different languages
differently

order the world. On the one hand, if there were
such

a

reason, part of the best candidate would seem to
be that
the world is ordered by language, which is alleged
to be

itself dubiously supported by the premise that language

orders experience

.

But, this sort of difficulty is, once

again, partly allayed by the solution to the first

problem: a world must be conceived as an ideal sum of

objects of linguistically shaped experiences. On the
other hand, it might be alleged that the claim that

different languages differently order the world is only

plausible if it is interpreted as meaning that different
languages have different resources for picking out and

describing different pre-existing patterns among

linguistically-independent objects. But, on this
interpretation, it should be clear that this claim lends
no support to the monstrosity that there are many actual

worlds, and there is, therefore, no support for denying

the seeming triviality that there is just one actual
world. However, if a world were an ideal sum of objects
of linguistically shaped experiences, there would be

another interpretation of the thesis that the world is

differently ordered by different languages. Moreover, on
this reading, this thesis would support the monstrosity,
and it would thereby provide a reason to deny the

triviality
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Does Whorf offer us even

hint that he understood

a

that a reconception of what it is to be

a

world is

required to pass from the thesis that experience
is
ordered by language to the thesis that there are

many

worlds? The situation is ambiguous. On the one hand,
as
far as I can tell, Whorf never even imagined that the

world might be something other than the collection of
linguistically independent objects. On the other hand, it
seems to be well known that one of his most powerful

motivations was his desire to reconcile the scientific

world picture with the religious world picture. John

B.

Carroll tells us that "... Whorf 's interest in linguistics

stemmed from one in religion...." 13 George Lakoff tells
us that:

Whorf 's objectivism came from two sources:
he was a fundamentalist Christian, and he
was trained as a chemical engineer at MIT
in the 1910s. His interest in linguistics
arose from the discrepancy between his two
sources of objective truth: science and
the Bible. 14

Emily A. Schultz claims that "Whorf 's personal struggle
to resolve the competing claims of science and religion
led him to focus on the study of language as a likely

13 John B.

Carroll, Introduction in Benjamin Lee Whorf,
Language, Thought, and Reality, edited and with an
introduction by John B. Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase,
The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1956) p. 7.
,

14 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What
Categories Reveal about the Mind, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago (1987) p. 324.
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source of insight." 15 What could the insight
possibly be?
and how could it be related to the thesis that
there
are

many actual worlds?
Whorf might have thought something like the
following: if the world of science were the ideal sum of
the objects of those experiences shaped by scientific

language

and the religious world were similarly the

ideal sum of the objects of those experiences shaped by

religious language, and these languages were sufficiently

different

then there would be two worlds, and the claims

of science would not be able to conflict with the claims
of religion. As noted above, however, Whorf does not, as

far as

I

know, ever suggest that he possessed the

reconception of what it is to be

a

world required for

this type of resolution. 16
To Whorf 's work, therefore, it is necessary to add
(1)

an account of what it is to be an actual world,

(2)

an account of the multiplicity of actual worlds, and (3)
an account of the multiplicity of truths. Moreover, none
of his work even approaches (4) the question of the

ontological status of these many actual worlds. So, Whorf
15 Emily A.

Schultz, Dialogue at the Margins: Whorf,
Bakhtin, and Linguistic Relativity, The University of
Wisconsin Press, Madison (1990) p. 7.
16 Note the similarity of Whorf 's resolution of the
science-religion conflict with Kant's resolution of the
science-morality conflict. It was by reflection on the
latter that I came to conjecture the form of the former,
but I will not here provide any discussion of Kant's

position on the science-morality conflict.
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cannot answer my four questions:

(l)

what is it to be an

actual world? (2) Why are there many actual
worlds?

3

(

)

What is the ontological status of these actual
worlds?

Why are there many truths? There is no reason
that he
should be able to answer them, however, since he had
(4)

other concerns. His works are important to the

explication of my theses, because they contain the
premise that experience is shaped by language, and when
this premise is added to a sufficiently revolutionary

reconception of what it is to be

a world,

his work

becomes a model of how such questions might be answered.
This is important, since having such a model brings us

closer to my aim of explicating and defending my two
theses. Thus, his work is neither irrelevant to mine, nor

does it do mine.

There are

a

number of reasons why Whorf's work

does not do mine. First, and perhaps most importantly, he

didn't explain how language shapes experience. Second, he

didn't have

a

clue that a world might be conceived as

something other than a collection of pre-existent and

language-independent objects. So, he had no idea that

a

world might be conceived as an ideal totality of the
objects of linguistically shaped experiences. Third,
consequently, he didn't have a clue that it might be

necessary to explain the idea of an ideal totality of
objects. Fourth, even if a world is conceived as an ideal

sum of the objects of linguistically shaped experiences,
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it is not clear how subjective
experiences could be

distinguished from objective experiences. A
world cannot
be all of the objects of linguistically
shaped
experiences, since this would include the objects
of

linguistically shaped experiences that are, or would
be
considered, illusory. In short, it is not clear what

Whorfian principles would exclude the objects of illusory
experiences from a world.
Fifth, Whorf's argument, as
it,

I

have reconstructed

seems to move at the wrong level. This argument

assumes that

a

difference among worlds is due to an

empirical difference.

I

don't think that this is right:

there are different worlds not because there are

different schemes of empirical concepts, but because
there are different schemes of

a

priori concepts. The

sort of linguistic variation necessary to derive an

account of the plurality of actual worlds is not the

variation of divergent vocabularies. This is why the
infamous multiplicity of Eskimo words for snow is totally
irrelevant: world multiplicity is, to borrow some Kantian

terminology, due to

a

multiplicity of categories, not

a

multiplicity of empirical concepts. 17 Why think that
17 Compare SL,

p. 216. Compare Geoffrey K. Pullum, The
Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax, in The Great Eskimo
Vocabulary Hoax and Other Irreverent Essays on the study
of Language, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
(1991) pp. 159-171. Also compare Laura Martin, 'Eskimo
words for snow': A case study in the genesis and decay of
an anthropological example, American Anthropologist, vol
88 (1986) pp. 418-423. Moreover, compare Stephen 0.
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there are many alternative sets of
categories? But,
ahead of myself.

i

get

Sixth, Whorf's writings suggest
that if there are

many experience shaping languages, and
something is
part of a world just when it can be the
object of

a

a

linguistically shaped experience, then there are
many
worlds, and so many truths. This suggestion
presupposes
the existence of languages that are different
to
the

point of being capable of differently shaping
experience,
but this is deeply enigmatic. How different must such

languages be? One possible answer, which has been

articulated by Davidson, is that such languages must be

different to the point of untranslatability

.

There is

reason to believe, however, that an untranslatable
language could not be discovered. This would undermine
the legitimacy of the anthropological and linguistic

investigations that motivate the premise that there are
languages that differently shape experience, that is, the

premise of one possible argument for the plurality of
actual worlds. Donald Davidson illustrated this reason
well, when he wrote that:
Whorf, wanting to demonstrate that Hopi
incorporates a metaphysics so alien to
ours that Hopi and English cannot, as he
puts it, 'be calibrated', uses English to

Murray, Snowing canonical Texts, American Anthropologist,
vol
89 (1987) pp. 443-444.
.
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convey the contents of sample Hopi
sentences. 18
Upon the discovery of an untranslatable
language, one
would want to report to one's fellows that
there
are

natives who speak

a

language that cannot be translated

into our language, and this is what they say.
This cannot
be:

if this is part of one's own language, one
has

translated what is untranslatable; if this is part of
the
native's language, one has failed to report what the
natives say.
This is the argument that Davidson describes as
"...a very short line indeed." 19 its premise is that:
... nothing ... could count as evidence that
some form of activity could not be
interpreted in [or translated into] our
language that was not at the same time
evidence that that form of activity was
not speech behavior.... 20

Its conclusion is that:
...we probably ought to hold that a form
of activity that cannot be interpreted as
language in our language [or cannot be

18 OVICS, p. 184. Davidson tells us that
Whorf's phrase
is to be found in his The Punctual and Segmentative
Aspects of Verbs in Hopi. [PSAVH, pp. 51-56.] This is not
correct. This phrase occurs in Whorf's Science and
Linguistics [SL, pp. 207-219.] In this piece, Whorf
writes, "(w)e are... introduced to a new principle of
relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by
the same physical evidence to the same picture of the
.

universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are
similar, or can in some way be calibrated ." [SL, p. 214.
The emphasis is due to me.]
19 OVICS, p.

185.

20 OVICS,

185.

p.
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translated into our language] is not
speech behavior. 1
I

think that the idea is this. On the one hand,

translation is the best evidence that something
is
language. The translation of extraterrestrial

signals

would be, for example, the best evidence that they
are
language. On the other hand, repeated failure to
translate something is the best evidence that it is
untranslatable. It is trivially true that the repeated
failure to translate extraterrestrial signals is the best

evidence that they are not translatable. Perhaps it
should be said that a failure to translate

extraterrestrial sounds - in the form of electromagnetic
radiation, or something of this sort - is the best reason
one could give for saying that they are untranslatable,

since to call them signals is to suggest that they are
language. In either case, since translation and failure
to translate are mutually exclusive, the best reason that

one could give for saying that something is language and

the best reason that one could give for saying that

something is untranslatable are mutually exclusive.
Here's the difficulty. Whorf's thesis is that

different languages differently shape experience.
Davidson suggests that to make sense of this, such
languages must be different to the point of being

untranslatable, but this requires that there be something
21 OVICS,

pp.

185-186. The remark is mine.
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that is both a language and untranslatable.
Question:
What evidence could support the thesis
that this

requirement is satisfied? Answer: None. Evidence
that
some sounds or marks are language, namely,
their
translation, is obviously evidence inimical to
their
being untranslatable. To show that they are
language is
to show that it is translatable. Furthermore,
evidence
that some sounds or marks are untranslatable, namely,

repeated failure to translate it, is evidence inimical
to
their being a language. To show that something is

untranslatable is to show that it is not language. There
cannot be, therefore, evidence that something is an

untranslatable language. So, no anthropologist, no
linguist, no historian, and no social scientist could

ever persuade us to believe that there are untranslatable
languages. Therefore, no evidence could support Whorf's

thesis that different languages differently shape
experience. Languages cannot be so different that they

differently shape experience, and experiences cannot be
shaped differently by different languages. This

undermines Whorf's thesis that different languages

differently shape experience, and it thereby undermines
any attempt to employ his thesis to make sense of my

thesis that there are many actual worlds and truths.

Davidson's argument is strikingly similar to
Hume's argument against miracles. If there is

a miracle,

then there is a violation of the laws of nature. If we
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are to have evidence that there is
a violation of a law
of nature, then we must have evidence
that something is

both

law of nature of nature and yet violated.
Evidence
that something is violated is also evidence
that
a

it is

not a law of nature. Thus, there can never
be evidence

that something is a violated law of nature, that
is,

nothing could be the evidence that shows there has
been
miracle. 22 similarly,

a

an alternative experience would be

associated with a language that cannot be translated into
our language. Evidence that there is an alternative

experience is, therefore, evidence that there is

something that is both untranslatable and yet

a language.

Evidence that something is untranslatable is also

evidence that it is not

a

language. Thus, there can never

be evidence for an alternative experience.

I

will return

to this topic in the sequel.

Whorf's work only contains a hint of an account of
the theses that there are many actual worlds, and that

there are many truths. Moreover, this hint needs to be

supplemented with an account of what it is to be

a world.

The work of Willard Van Orman Quine also contains such a
hint, but it requires far less supplementation. When it
is developed, we are provided with a more or less

explicit account of what it is to be
22 Compare David Hume,

a world,

and it

Enquiries concerning the human
understanding and concerning the principles of morals,
edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, second edition, Clarendon
Press, Oxford (1902) pp. 109-131. Hereafter: HUME.
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suggests how there might be many worlds.
Unlike
Protagoras and Whorf however, it would

not be correct to

,

represent Quine as first arguing that there
are many
worlds, and then arguing that each has a
complete and
true description, and so there are many truths.
For
Quine, or at least as

I

have construed his words, there

are many worlds because there are many truths. So,
in

discussing Quine's views, it is not possible to begin
by

exclusively focusing on the issue of the guiddity and
plurality of worlds, and then to turn to the issue of the
plurality of truths as something that follows naturally
from this focus. In the case of Quine, what it is to be

a

world, the plurality of worlds, and the plurality of

truths are three closely related issues. In short, in the

following discussion of Quine's views,

I

cannot focus on

the issue of the quiddity and plurality of worlds, and

assume that the plurality of truths falls out of the
result. With this caveat in mind, what is Quine's hint?
In his essay On what there is, Quine articulates

what he takes to be the ontological question: "What is
there ?" 23 He distinguishes this question from the

question about what sentences, in general, say there is.
The former is a question about ontology; the latter is a

question about the ontological commitment. According to
23 Willard Van Orman Quine, On what there is,

in From a
Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays,
second edition, revised, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts (1980) p. 1. Hereafter: OWTI
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Quine, the answer to this second
question is that to be
is to be the value of a [bound] variable. 24
in less

felicitous words, what sentences say there
is is what
there must be in order for them to be true. As

Quine once

put the point:
...a theory [i.e., a set of sentences] is
committed to those and only those entities
to which the bound variables of the theory
must be capable of referring in order that
the affirmations made in the theory be
true 26

This does not answer Quine's first question about what

there is, since it fails to say which sentences are true,
but it doesn't follow that it is irrelevant to his first

question
Quine's central ontological insight is that if we

possessed

a

list of all of the true sentences, we would

have an answer to his question: What is there? The answer

would be: that to which the bound variables of these

sentences must be capable of referring in order for them
to be true is what there is. In essence, so to speak,

Quine maintains that science provides us with

a list of

true sentences, and he concludes, in Two dogmas of

empiricism, that: "Ontological questions ... are on a par

with questions of natural science." 26 Here, Quine adopts
24 OWTI

,

25 OWTI,

p.

pp.

15.

The parenthetical remark is mine.

13-14. The emendation is due to me.

26 Willard Van Orman Quine, Two dogmas of empiricism
in
From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical
,

Essays, second edition, revised, Harvard University
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thesis that is similar to Charles
Sanders Peirce's
thesis that what there is is what inquiry
guided by the
scientific method will tell us there is. Or,
as Peirce
himself put this point:
a

The opinion which is fated to be
ultimately agreed to by all who
[scientifically] investigate, is what we
mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real.
That is the way I would explain reality 27
.

note that Quine does not accept exactly this thesis.
He
rejects it because he thinks that it rests on the
dubious
I

notion of an infinite process of inquiry that employs
an
ideal version of the scientific method. Moreover, he

thinks that it rests on a wrongheaded application of the

concept of

a

limit to theories, which is, as he notes,

defined for numbers, but not for theories. From my
perspective, the most important reason that Quine gives
for rejecting Peirce's thesis is that it presupposes that

the result of applying the scientific method forever

would be unique, but

I

get ahead of myself.

Quine's view is that the entities to which the

bound variables of all the true sentences must be capable
of referring in order for them to be true is what there
is.

However, it is important to note that Quine's view

Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1980)
TDE

p.

45.

Hereafter:

27 Charles Sanders Peirce, The Fixation of Belief,

in

Philosophical Writings of Peirce, selected and edited
with an introduction by Justus Buchler, Dover
Publications, New York (1955) p. 38. The remark is mine.
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presupposes an ontological inversion,
and this inversion
is also presupposed by Peirce's
thesis. On the realist
view of world and truth delineated
above, the concept of
truth is explicated in terms of the
concept of
reality.

According to Peirce and Quine, however, the
concept of
reality is explicated in terms of the concept

of truth.

Their view is that reality is what all the
true

representations represent, and the practice of
science
determines which representations are true. The idea

is

really quite simple. Since what there must be in
order
for true theories to be true is what there is, and
the

practice of science determines which theories are true,
its practice determines what there is.
In other words,

to the question about what

theories say there is, i.e., the question about

ontological commitment, Quine answers that to be is to be
the value of a bound variable. To the question about what

there is, i.e., the ontological question, he answers that
to be is to be the value of a bound variable of a true

theory. Note that there is an idea here that is common to

Protagoras, Whorf and Quine, namely, the idea that there
is a order of representations, and what they represent is

what there is. For Protagoras, the representations in

question are some individual's perceptions, and for
Whorf, they are linguistically shaped experiences. These
are their versions of the previously mentioned

ontological inversion. For Quine, the ontology
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determining representations are true theories.
This
invites an obvious question: which theories are

true? To

this question, Quine defers to natural science.
His

conclusion is that natural science answers the question
about what there is, but can its answer be unique? and
is
its answer unique? As

I

anticipated above, Quine answers

such pivotal questions negatively.
In Word and Object, Quine writes that "...in

general the simplest possible theory to a given purpose

need not be unique." 28 Simplicity aside, one instance of
this is the algebraic fact that for any finite set of
data, D, that assumes the form of points in a plane,

there need not be just one theory that assumes the form
of a polynomial that will generate D. It is well known

that for any such set of points, there are indefinitely

many polynomials that will generate it. For example, if
we disregard units such as mass or seconds, we may let:
D = {<0,2>, <1,3>, <2,4>, <3 , 5> }

Here are three of indefinitely many polynomials that will

generate D:
(1)

y=x 5 -4x 4 -x 3 +16x 2 -llx+2

(2)

y=x 4 -6x 3 +llx 2 -5x+2

(

3

)

y=x+2

28 Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object, The M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge (1960) p. 22. Hereafter: Word and
Object. The emphasis is mine.
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In this example, the theories take the form
of

polynomials, and the evidence or data takes the form
of
points in a plane coordinate system. 29 Theories and

evidence come in many forms, however. The more general
point is that for any body of evidence,

E,

there are

indefinitely many theories that imply or generate

E.

So,

more than one total theory can account for all the

possible evidence.
Quine has expressed this point in several ways. In

Word and Object, he puts this point in the following
manner:
.we have no reason to suppose that man's
surface irritations even unto eternity
[i.e., all the possible data] admit of any
one systematization [i.e., total theory]
that is scientifically better or simpler
than all possible others. It seems
likelier .. .that countless alternative
theories would be tied for first place. 30
.

.

In his reply to Chomsky in Words and Objections, he

asserted that: "The totality of possible observations of
nature, made and unmade, is compatible with physical

theories that are incompatible with one another." 31 In On

29 This example comes from Carl G. Hemple, Philosophy of

Natural Science, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.

(1966) p. 41.

30 Word and Object,

p. 23. The remarks are mine. I will
Quine's promiscuous employment of
question
accept without
possible data and total theory.
the
the concepts of all

31 W V

Quine, To Chomsky, in Words and Objections:
Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine, D. Reidel Publishing
Company, Dordrecht-Holland (1969) p. 302.
.

.
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the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation

,

we are told

the following:

Theory can still vary though all possible
observations be fixed. Physical theories
can be at odds with each other and yet
compatible with all possible data
in a
word, they can be logically incompatible
and empirically equivalent. 32
In addition,

in On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the

World, Quine asserts that:
If all observable events can be accounted
for in one comprehensive scientific theory
one system of the world, to echo
Duhem's echo of Newton
then we may
expect that they can all be accounted for
equally in another, conflicting system of
the world. 33

—

—

Thus, sometimes Quine asserts that there are countless

alternative theories that can systematize, or account for
all the possible evidence, and sometimes he asserts that
if there is one theory that can account for all this

evidence, then there is at least one more theory that can
do the same. In either case, the point is that:

"Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords
even in principle no unique definition of truth." 34 In
one version of Empirical Content, Quine also expressed

this point in the following manner:
32 W.V.

Quine, On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of
The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67 (1970) p.

Translation
179.
33 W.V.

Quine, On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the
World, Erkenntnis, vol. 9 (1975) pp. 313.
34 Word and Object,

p.

23.
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.let us suppose that. .two [theory]
formulations are in fact empirically
equivalent even though they are not known
to be; and let us suppose that all the
implied observational categoricals are in
fact true although, again, not known to
be. Nothing more, surely, can be required
for the truth of either theory
formulation. Are they both true. I say
yes 35
.

.

.

,

According to Quine, what there is is what true theory
says there is, and science is supposed to provide true
theory. However, science does not provide the true

theory; it provides, or is, in principle, capable of

providing an array of true theories. Thus, there cannot
be a unique answer to the ontological question; what is

there? So, what there is is not unique. If an actual

world is all of what there is, this means that there are

many actual worlds.
In fairness to both my readers and Quine,

acknowledge that he claims that "...it is

a

I

must

confusion to

suppose that we can stand aloof and recognize all the
35 Quoted from Roger F. Gibson, Jr., Enlightened

Empiricism: An Examination of W.V. Quine's Theory of
Knowledge, University of South Florida Press, Tampa
(1988) p. 115. Hereafter: GIBSON. The remark is due to
Gibson. Quine came to substantially change this passage.
Compare W.V. Quine, Empirical Content, in Theories and
Things, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1981) p. 29.
The expression observational categorical may require
explanation. An occasion sentence is a sentence that is
true on some occasions and false on others. An
observation sentence is an occasion sentence to which
everyone in a speech community would assent on the
occasion of the like stimulation of their sensory
receptors. An observational categorical is a sentence of
the form whenever this, that, where this and that are
observation sentences. (Compare page 4 of the above
mentioned work by Gibson.)
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alternative ontologies as true in their
several ways, all
the envisaged worlds as real." 36 such
a supposition
confuses, he maintains, truth with evidential
support,

but recall that he also maintains that two
theories can
be both logically incompatible and empirically
equivalent
and empirically complete. Further, nothing more
than

empirical adequacy and completeness can be required
for

their truth. As Quine himself has asserted, "...whatever

evidence there is for science is sensory evidence." 37
There is a real conflict here. If all evidence is
empirical evidence, and an empirically adequate and

complete total theory is true, and there are, in
principle, many empirically adequate and empirically

complete total theories, then there are many true total
theories. Moreover, if a world is the object of a true

total theory, there are many worlds.

Quine suggests that the way out of this difficulty
is to find a way of making two theories one. The method
is obvious.

When a sentence is affirmed in one of two
empirically equivalent theories and denied
in the other, the incompatibility is
resoluble simply by reconstruing some
theoretical term in that sentence as a
pair of distinct homonyms [note that the
36 W.V.

Quine, Things and Their Place in Theories in
Theories and Things, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
(1981) p.

,

21.

37 W.V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized

in Ontological
Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press,
New York (1969) p. 75.
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,

incompatibility of empirically equivalent
theories must be due to their theoretical
content] ....Once the two empirically
equivalent systems of the world have been
rendered logically compatible, they can
be
treated as a single big tandem theory
consisting perhaps of two largely
independent lobes and a shared logic. 38
This will not work, however. Quine's claim
is that

theories can be logically incompatible and
empirically
equivalent, but such theories are meant to be total
or
global. As Roger F. Gibson, Jr., has pointed out,

"...when Quine is talking about underdetermination, he
is
doing so only in connection with global world theories
and not in connection with any lesser theories." 39 Thus,
it must not be forgotten that the claim is that more
than

one total theory can account for all the possible data or

evidence. Thus, there are,

I

think, three flaws with

Quine's method of making two theories one.
First, a total theory cannot be made part of a

larger tandem theory. No theory is larger than

a total

theory. Second, suppose, per contra, that there could be
a

larger tandem theory that subsumes two total theories.

Still, for any larger, that is, totalizing, tandem

theory, there must be another total theory with which it
is logically incompatible yet empirically equivalent.
38 W.V.

Quine, Reply to Roger F. Gibson , Jr., in The
Philosophy of W.V. Quine, The Library of Living
Philosophers, vol. xviii, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn and
Paul Arthur Schilpp, Open Court, La Salle (1986) p. 156.
The parenthetical remark is mine.
39 GIBSON,

p.

116.
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Thus, Quine would seem to be stuck with
the unsightly

spectacle of an infinite regress of totalizing
theories.
Third, if the reconstrual of the theoretical
terms

of two

conflicting theories were to yield a larger, or
totalizing, tandem theory that consisted of at least
two

independent lobes, then since each lesser theory would
be
both empirically adequate and empirically complete, every

phenomenon would have at least two explanations. If for
every totalizing tandem theory, there is another total

theory with which it is logically incompatible yet

empirically equivalent, then Quine would also seem to be
stuck with the really quite odd idea that every

phenomenon has infinitely many explanations. Be this as
it may,

let me note that

to get him right.

I

I

have not read Quine in order

have read him to help myself

understand my own ideas. Here,

I

have tried to be fair to

Quine by conceding that my use of his views rests on

certain amount of twisting, and by showing where

I

a

have

twisted them.
Questions of Quinean exegesis aside, since there

would be a complete description of each world, there
would be many truths. Quine himself suggests this:
Where it makes sense to apply 'true' is to
a sentence couched in the terms of a given
theory and seen from within the theory,
complete with its posited reality ... .To
say that the statement 'Brutus killed
Caesar' is true, or that 'The atomic
weight of sodium is 23' is true, is in
effect simply to say that Brutus killed
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Caesar, or that the atomic weight of
sodium is 23. 40
Thus, Quine may also be taken to have
provided an account
of how there can be many total truths.
As I have

indicated,

I

know that Quine would reject this as
akin to

perdition. He asks, "Have we now so lowered our
sights as
to settle for a relativistic doctrine of truth
rating

—

the statements of each theory as true for that
theory,
and brooking no criticism?" 41 Like Huck, he immediately

retorts, "Not so.

Why not? Quine answers, "...we

continue to take seriously our own particular aggregate
science, our own particular world-theory or loose total

fabric of quasi-theories, whatever it may be." 43 Quine

admits that there could be an alternative to our best

current theory, and that both theories could satisfy any
imaginable theoretical constraints equally well, for
example, both theories could be equally simple,

consistent, et cetera. Why then should we prefer our

present theory and its ontology? Why should we take them
seriously? Quine answers, albeit a bit vaguely, that
"...we own and use our beliefs of the moment .. .until by

what is vaguely called scientific method we change them
40 Word and Object, p.
41 Word and Object,

24.

pp.

24.

42 Word and Object, pp.

24.

43 Word and Object,

24.

pp.
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here and there for the better." 44 This answer
is,

I

think, that any theory that could do the work
that we

desire our present theory to do isn't now available
to do
that work. So, we are, proffers Quine, justified in
both our scientific practice and our present

theory with its ontology seriously.
Quine's views are not without their problems, not
to mention the myriad of exegetic problems associated

with the task of appropriating them for sake of showing
that there is a multiplicity of actual worlds. Rather

than delve any further into these problems,

I

shall focus

on the task of showing that an essential fragment of his

views fits with, or implies this multiplicity.
On the one hand, Quine adamantly maintains that

there is only one world and one truth, and being caught
in the web of scientific belief, he also maintains that

the former is the world of physics, and that the latter
is its description. On the other hand, Quine suggests a

view of ontological commitment and ontology that

I

think

implies that there are many worlds, namely, the view that

what true representations represent is what there is. His

view that there is just the world of science is not
inevitable, however, if what there is is what some

manifold of true representations represent, and there are
many distinct manifolds of true representations
44 Word and Object,

pp.

24-25.
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.

This

raises an obvious and pivotal question:
How could it be
that there are many disparate manifolds
of
true

representations? A clue to an answer lies in
Quine's
remark that "...in general the simplest
possible theory
to a given purpose need not be unique." 45
The element of

purposiveness introduces another kind of
underdetermination. Let me explain.
Suppose that both our purposes and the set of all

possible data are fixed. Suppose that there is at least
one total theory that implies all the possible data,
that
is,

suppose that there is at least one empirically

complete theory. Then, according to Quine, there is an
array of equi-simple, empirically complete, empirically
equivalent, and yet incompatible theories. Add to this
the premise that nothing more than empirical completeness

could be required for the truth of

a

theory, and it

follows that there is an array of true theories.
Moreover, it follows that there is also an array of

domains of objects that are required for them to be true.
If each such theoretically ordered domain is a world,

there is an array of actual worlds. Moreover, since each
such world has a complete description, there are many
truths. This is the familiar kind of underdetermination.

Quine tells us that it can be overcome, however.
45 Word and Object, p. 22. The emphasis is mine. By this
point, it should be clear that purposiveness will be an
essential element in my argument for the plurality of

actual worlds.
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According to him, our present theory
is to be preferred
because only it is available to do
the work that we
desire done, but this work is determined

by our purposes.

In other words, relative to our
purposes, there is a

determinate matrix of work to be done, and
so there is
preferred theory, namely, the theory that

a

gets it done.

Moreover, there is a preferred ontology, namely,
the
domain of objects that are required for the
preferred

theory to be true. At this stage, this too should
be
familiar, but there is,

I

think, an additional kind of

underdetermination, which is introduced by the very

purposiveness that Quine thinks eliminates

underdetermination
Were our purposes to conflict, we would conflict
over the work we want to see done, and so there would be
no way to identify, and so no justification for

preferring, present theory. There can be no preferred

theory in the face of conflicting purposes, and since our
purposes clearly conflict, there can be no preferred
theory. This has,

I

think, astounding consequences. Quine

tells us that relative to each set of purposes, there are

many empirically complete and equivalent yet incompatible
theories, but relative to a given set of purposes, there
is one preferable theory. However,

purposes
both

a

.

there are many sets of

This much seems clear. For each set, there is

plurality of theoretical options, and there is one

option that is preferable to all the others. Thus, for
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each set of purposes, there is an
empirically complete
theoretical option that is, on the empiricist
principles
that Quine proffers, true. Thus, since it
is clear that
there are many sets of purposes, there are
many

empirically complete theoretical options that are
true,
that is, true on empiricist grounds. For each such
theory

,

there is a domain of objects that is required
for

them to be true. If each theoretically ordered domain
is
a world,

there are many actual worlds. Moreover, if each

such world has a complete description, there are many
truths. There is, therefore, an essential fragment of

Quine's views that, in conjunction with the truism that
there are many purposes, implies that there are many

worlds and many truths. So, his view that there is just
the world of physics is not inevitable.

Quine's work, unlike that of Whorf, does not

require the addition of an account of what it is to be

a

world. So, he is able to answer the question: What is it
to be a world? However, he thinks that there is just one

world, and it is the world of science. Moreover, he

desires to eradicate any element in his views that leaves
open the possibility of a multiplicity of worlds and
truths. He at least wants to make it difficult, if not

impossible, for anyone to use his views to argue that

there are many worlds and truths. So, he has no concern
for the questions: Why are there many worlds? and Why are

there many truths?

1

have argued that contrary to Quine's
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desires, an essential element of his ontological
views

provides the foundation on which answers to these very

questions may be built. This foundation can be

extrapolated from his tacit acceptance of the ontological
inversion that is presupposed by Peirce's thesis, that
is,

from the presupposition that reality is what all the

true representations represent. In turn, this

presupposition must be supplemented with an analysis of
the role of purposiveness in theory selection. However,

Quine's work only contains a hint of an explication of
the ontological status of a world. So, although Quine can
tell a very complicated story about what it is to be a
world, the issue of the ontological status of

a

world

does not explicitly arise for him, and so he does not

explicitly offer an answer to this question: What is the
ontological status of the plurality of actual worlds?

There is no reason why he should be able to offer such
answers, however, since he, like Whorf

,

had other

concerns
Quine's aim has been to give an account of science
from the perspective of science; my aim is to give an

account of the multiplicity of actual worlds. Everything
that exists, or might exist, from the perspective of

science is just one of many actual worlds, and so science
has no special place for me. As

I

noted above,

read Quine in order to get him right.

I

I

have not

have read him to

help myself understand my own ideas. My reading of Quine
74

has been guided by the assumption that
his views on the
plurality of scientific worlds could serve as
a model for

articulating my views on the plurality of actual
worlds.
Thus, like the work of Whorf

,

the work of Quine is

relevant to mine, but it does not do mine.
There are a number of reasons why Quine's work
does not do mine. First, Quine's ontological insight is

that what all the true representations represent is what
there is, but he presupposes that every representation is
a sentence.

So, his ontological insight only has a very

narrow range of application, namely, to a world, or
worlds, that have a sentential structure. As
noted,

I

I

have

am working within the confines of this

presupposition, but it should also be noted that it keeps
a

quite wide range of possibilities from sight. Second,

Quine can only imagine the world of science. He thinks
that whatever room there is for

a

plurality of worlds

lies in the space of science, and even then he thinks

that there is really no such room.
Third, Quine maintains that to be is, in short, to

be the value of a bound variable of a true theory, and

that since the practice of science determines which

theories are true, its practice determines what there is.

There is an important ambiguity here. On the one hand,
this only needs to mean that the practice of science
leads to the discovery of which theories are true, and to

the discovery of what there is independently of theory.
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In this case, to determine is to discover
what is the

case independently of all actual and possible
re P reseri t a tions

,

but this makes nonsense of the

ontological inversion that

I

have attempted to show lies

at the heart of Quine's central ontological insight.
On

the other hand, Quine's claim can be taken to mean
that

the practice of science is what makes true theories true,
and that this practice is what makes there be what there
is.

In this case,

to make seems to be to create from

nothing, but it is a truly monstrous thing to say that

the practice of science begins with nothing, and then

creates what there is. So,

I

must reject both readings of

this pivotal term: determination

,

but this raises the

important question of how it must be understood.
Fourth, Quine's way into the plurality of worlds
is through the premise that incompatible total theories

can account for all the possible evidence, and the

premise that such theories must, on empiricist grounds,
be true, and the premise that what there is is what there

must be in order for a true total theory to be true. The
aggregate of possible evidence is not ontologically
neutral, since part of what there is is what there must
be for all the possible evidence, which Quine assumes to

take a sentential form, to be true. In other words, the

incompatible total theories must share an empirical
ontology. So, Quine's views only support the thesis that

there are many actual worlds in a limited sense, namely,
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there can be different ontologies, but only
theoretical
ontologies can differ, and empirical ontologies
must be
had in common. Thus, Quine's views do not show

us the way

to an account of the multiplicity of non-overlapping

actual worlds.
Fifth, Quine's ontological insight presupposes an

inversion, namely, that a world is everything that there

must be in order for all the true representations to be
true. As far as

I

can determine, he does not make this

inversion explicit, and so he leaves open the question of

why one should accept it. In other words, why invert?
Sixth, Quine does not answer the question about how there

can be many disparate manifolds of true representations.
I

have argued that there is a hint of an answer in his

work, but that it must be extrapolation from an single

remark that may only have the status of an aside. In
short, there are many disparate manifolds of true

representations because there are many purposes. Seventh,
consequently, Quine does not take purposiveness seriously
enough, and as

I

have noted, the premise that

representation producing beings are purposive beings will
be essential to my argument that there are many actual

worlds
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CHAPTER

3

MOTIVATIONS: GOODMAN AND PUTNAM

Whorf

s

work only contains an implicit account
of

the multiplicity of worlds and truths. One can
cull from
Quine's work a more or less explicit account of
these

multiplicities, but he would assert that there is just
the one world and the one truth of natural science.

Neither Whorf, nor Quine explains
actual worlds,

(1)

why there are many

why there are many truths, and

(2)

(

3

)

why

the aforementioned ontological inversion ought to be

embraced, which is,

I

think, among the most puzzling

things to be explained. So, they have not done what

want to do, but

I

I

have only sought to elucidate these

themes by showing how

I

see them developed, or able to be

developed, in their work. In pursuit of their further

elucidation,

I

will now draw on the work of Nelson

Goodman. More specifically,

I

will attempt to elucidate

these three themes by exploring three aspects of

Goodman's metaphysical vision.

examination of what

I

I

will begin with an

take to be Goodman's answer to the

question: Why embrace the aforementioned ontological

shift?

According to Quine, to be is to be the value of
bound variable. This thesis requires

a

a

reconception that

amounts to a fundamental ontological shift,

a

Copernican

revolution. Quine's thesis presupposes, however, that the
idea that there is just one representation-independent
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world must be supplanted by the idea
that

a

world is

everything that there must be in order for
all the true
representations to be true. In other words, his
thesis

presupposes the renunciation of metaphysical
realism, and
the appropriation of something like the thesis
that a

world is an ideal sum of what can be represented by

manifold of true , or right , representations

a

As far as

I

can ascertain, he neither makes this ontological shift

explicit, nor does he say why it should be embraced.

Moreover, the same can be said about Whorf. Since this is
a pivotal premise in my argument for a plurality of

actual worlds, not to mention an essential element of my

response to Davidson's critique of conceptual relativism,
it behooves the present writer to answer questions such
as the following. Why should the former idea be rejected?

Moreover, what could possibly compel the latter ? In
short, why shift?

Part of Goodman's importance is that he provides
us with both a proof that a shift is necessary, and a

fuller articulation of the terminus ad

quern of

such a

shift. The terminus a quo is, of course, the thesis that

there is a unique world, and neither its existence, nor
the way it is depends on the way it is represented. Given
this, a world cannot be an ideal sum of what is

representable by a manifold of right or true
representations. If the world were such

a sum,

both the

existence of the world, and the way of the world would
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then depend on the way it is represented,
which on the
hypothesis of metaphysical realism, it doesn't. It
is,

I

think, instructive to interpret Goodman's proof
in terms
of a strategy that may have been first advanced
by Kant.
In a 1798 letter to Christian Garve, Kant wrote
that

...the antinomy of pure reason [for example, pure reason

shows both that there must be a first moment, and that
there cannot be a first moment]

—

is what first aroused

me from my dogmatic slumber [which includes

transcendental or metaphysical realism]...." 1 There is

a

discernible and definite strategy here: since realism,
metaphysical or transcendental, is an essential premise
in an antinomy, and since antinomies are intolerable, the

only alternative is to give up the relevant version of
realism, and to adopt a version of the ontological shift

that is now at issue. Mutatis mutandis

,

Goodman argues

that since the realist thesis is an essential element of
an enigma, which is as intolerable as any antinomy, the

above described ontological shift must be embraced. The

pivotal question is: What is this enigma?
There are statements that can both be false, but

cannot both be true, for example,

(1)

Socrates always

flies, and (2) Socrates never flies. Such statements are

entitled contraries. Now, true statements can sometimes
1

Immanuel Kant, Kant: Philosophical Correspondence,
1759 - 1799 edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1967) p. 252.
Parenthetic remarks are due to me.
,
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appear to be contraries. For example,

(

3

)

the sun always

moves, and (4) the sun never moves are both true,
and yet
they appear to be contraries. It is important to note

that Goodman ' s enigma is not that there are true
contraries; it isn't that there are contraries that are

both true. It is also important to note that our reason
for saying that (3) and (4) are both true is closely

connected to, if not the same as, our reason for saying
that they are not contraries. Our reason for saying that
(3)

and (4) are true is that they are elliptical for two

much more complex statements, namely,

(5)

there is a

frame of reference under which the sun always moves, and
(6)

there is another frame of reference under which the

sun never moves, which are, given sufficient
qualification, both true. Furthermore, our reason for

saying that (3) and

(4)

are not contraries is that (5)

and (6) are not contraries. In this case, our

sophistication about frames of reference keeps us safe
from the enigma of true contraries. According to Goodman,
however, we are hoist by this very sophistication.
A frame of reference is a set of axes in terms of

which the position or the motion of an object can be
described; as Goodman writes, "...frames of reference are
just coordinate systems within which spatial relations

are mathematically represented." 2 Goodman's enigma rests

Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, Reconceptions in
Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Hackett
2
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on what he takes to be two fundamental truths
about

frames of reference. The first truth is, as Goodman
writes, that "...nothing is at rest or is in motion
apart

from a frame of reference

»3

I

will take it as obvious

that apart from all frames of reference, there is no
position, motion or rest. The second truth is, as Goodman
writes, that: "Frames of ref erence ... seem to belong less
to what is described than to systems of description...." 4

This is not obvious. The idea is that although

a

frame of

reference is an essential element of some systems for

describing objects, it is neither an object among the
objects that may be described with the assistance of such
a

system, nor does it characterize any such objects. In

less perspicuous words, although words that may have at

least once seemed clearer to my readers, a frame of

reference is empirically real and transcendentally ideal.
Be this as it may: not only can a frame of reference be

used to describe the spatial and temporal features of
objects; a frame of reference must be used to so describe
objects. Moreover, although a frame of reference must be

used to describe the spatial and temporal features of
objects, a frame of reference does not itself describe

Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1988)

p.

50.

Hereafter:

RP.

Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett Publishing
Company, Indianapolis (1978) p. 12. Hereafter: WW.
3

4

WW, p.

2.
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any object, in other words,

a

frame of reference is

a

necessary condition for the representation
of rest or
motion, and perhaps the representation
of any possible
object, but a frame of reference is not
itself
a

representation of any object, or any relation
among
objects. The latter part of this is not obvious.

Why

doesn't a frame of reference represent some object
or
objects? or some relation among objects? These are

quite

complex questions, and they are questions over which
shall not here worry, but the answer is,

some frame of reference were somehow
as

is

in

a

I

I

think, that if

part of the world

itself, then there would be, for example, an

up and down to this world, which, as a matter of

empirical fact

,

there isn't. In any case, Goodman

articulates his enigma by bringing these two truths

together with the reflection that the realist, as he
construes her, thinks that there must be

a

world as it is

in itself, that is, apart from all systems of

descriptions, and so there must be a world apart from all
frames of reference. Moreover, this sort of realist

thinks not only that there must be a world apart from all
frames of reference, but that there must also be

a

framework-independent way that such a world is.
Kant has an apt image for all of this. 5 It is easy
to imagine that the objects reflected in
5

CRITIQUE, p. 533, A644=B672. Compare
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p.

a

mirror have

a

300, A298=B354.

reality behind its surface,

a

farside reality. This

illicitly presumed subsurface reality is
the focus
imaginarius which is exploited by the story

of Alice.

,

The story of metaphysical realism exploits
a similar

imaginary focus, and herein lies the enigma. The

metaphysical realist begins with a number of descriptions
of objects that depend on an egual number of frames
of

reference. Then she imagines or supposes that these

objects have

a

reality that is independent of these

frames. The point of the image is that this supposedly

framework independent reality is no more legitimate than
the focus imaginarius

.

To see how this image or

supposition breaks down, let us submit to it, and let us
acquiesce in the thesis that there is a world apart from
all frames of reference. If there is such a world, then

there must be, according to the realist as construed by
Goodman, a framework-independent way that it is, but this

invites an obvious question: What is this way?

Goodman asks a remarkably simple question:
If I ask about the world, you can offer to
tell me how it is under one or more frames
of reference; but if I insist that you
tell me how it is apart from all frames,
what can you say? 6

The answer to this clearly rhetorical question is that
one can say nothing. Now, it is exactly here that

Goodman's truths about frames of reference become
6

WW, pp.

2-3.
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relevant. There is, apart from all
frames of reference,
neither motion nor rest. Apart from all
frames of

reference, events are neither simultaneous
nor

successive, and so apart from all such frames,
there is
neither simultaneity nor succession. Moreover,
although
frame of reference is an essential part of a
system of

a

description, it is not a part of what is thereby
described. With respect to these kinds of spatial
and

temporal relations, therefore, apart from all frames
of
reference, there is no way that the world is. Goodman's

enigma can be made clearer in the light of

a

certain

contrast with the Parmenidean dictum that "...you could
not know what is not — that cannot be done — nor indicate
it." 7 The relevant point is not that one cannot indicate

what is not, instead it is that what one cannot indicate
is not. The intuition that underlies Goodman's enigma,

which constitutes its suppressed premise, is that where

nothing can be said , there is nothing. In other words,
where one can say nothing, there is nothing to say, and
so there is nothing. Or, equivalently, where there is

something, something can be said, which should not be

confused with the thesis that wherever there is something
to say, there is something. According to Goodman, the

intolerable enigma is that if there are objects apart
7

G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic
Philosophers, second edition, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1983) p. 245.
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from all frames of reference, then
there is nothing to
say about them - that is, there is,
in abstraction from
all frames of reference (and note
again that the

realist's supposition is exactly that there
is
apart from all such frames) nothing to say

a

world

about objects

with respect to rest and motion - and so there
are no
such objects. Therefore, given Goodman's
suppressed
premise, there are no objects apart from all frames
of

reference. In short, if there are objects apart from
all
frames of reference, there are no objects apart from
all

frames of reference. This is an enigma, if anything
is.

Goodman's enigma can also be expressed in the

following manner. Reflexion on what it is to be

a frame

of reference should make it clear that (1) there is,

apart from all frames of reference, neither motion or
rest, and (2) although a frame of reference may be an

essential element of any system that can represent the
spatial and temporal relations of things, no frame of

reference is

a

thing - that is, object, property of an

object, or relation among objects, et cetera - in the

world as it is in itself. Now, the realist, as construed
by Goodman, maintains that apart from all systems of

representation, and so apart from all frames of
reference, there is not only a world, but there is a way
that this world is. Goodman asks: if there is, apart from
all systems of description, and so all frames of

reference, both

a

world, and a way that this world is,
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then what is this way with respect
to rest and motion? if
there are no frames of reference in the
world as it is in
itself, and there is neither rest nor
motion where there
are no frames of reference, then there is,
with respect
to rest and motion, no way that the world
in itself is.
Thus, the realist thesis that there is, apart
from all

frames of reference, both a world and a way that
it is,
and a pair of general truths about frames of
reference,

together lead to the enigma that there is such

a way,

but

there can't be such a way. Now, just as Kant didn't
think
that he had established an antinomy, Goodman does not

think that he has established this enigma. It needs
resolution. Moreover, just as Kant thought that the only

way to resolve his antinomies, not to mention escape
skepticism, is to reject realism, Goodman thinks that the
only way to resolve his enigma is to reject the realist

thesis upon which it is based.

Goodman's point has been well illustrated in

a

sphere outside that of physics, namely, that of
economics. Richard
us,

D.

Wolff and Stephen A. Resnick tell

in their Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical, that

under the framework of neoclassical economic theory,
there is

a

panoply of entities: individuals, markets,

commodities, technologies, prices, money, income,
savings, investments, individual preferences, utility,
supply, demand, production, distribution, labor, capital,
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growth, GNP, interest rates,
uncertainty, and so on.
They write that:

8

9
For neoclassical economists,
society is
the collection of individuals in
it.
Individual wants, thoughts, and deeds
combine to make society what it is. To
understand an economy is then to make
sense of the aggregate effects of
individual wants and acts. Neoclassical
theory does this by demonstrating how
individuals maximize their material selfinterests by utilizing their owned
resources and the available technology in
market transactions
.

They also tell us that under the framework of
Marxian

economic theory, there is an equally impressive
array of
different entities: class, surplus, capital, labor,

labor

power, commodities, values, production and distribution,

accumulation of capital, crises, imperialism, et cetera.
They write that "...Marxian theory ...will presume that
any event occurs as the result... of everything else going
on around that event and preceding that event.

Be this

as it may, Wolff and Resnick note that:

This partial and preliminary listing
underscores a remarkable difference in the
neoclassical and Marxian theories.
Notwithstanding the considerable overlap
in the words and phrases that appear in
both theories, basic objects on one theory
exist as secondary objects or are
altogether absent in the other. Selfinterest-maximizing individuals are as
8

Richard D. Wolff and Stephen A. Resnick, Economics:
Marxian versus Neoclassical, The Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore (1987). Hereafter: EMVN.
9

EMVN, p.

10 EMVN,

p.

15.

The emphases are due to me.

19.
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scarce in Marxian theory as surplus
labor
is in neoclassical theory
Class
exploitation is a key object for Marxian
theory, while most neoclassicals would
deny its existence; likewise, the selfinterest-maximizing individual as
specified in neoclassical theory would be
rejected as an imaginary creation by most
Marxists. 11
At this point, Goodman can be paraphrased: if

I

ask about

the economic world, you can offer to tell me how
it is

under the neoclassical and Marxian frames of reference;
1;f

I

insist that you tell me how the economic world

is apart from all such frames, what can you say?

Goodman's answer can be repeated: one can say nothing.
The same intuitions are relevant: where one can say
nothing, there is nothing to say, and so there is
nothing. Thus, the economic world in itself is nothing.

This is exactly the conclusion that Wolff and Resnick
reach: "...objects in and for one theory may literally

not exist in another

Objects of theories do not exist

out there in the world just waiting for theories to

observe [sic] and explain them." 12
Once again, note that Goodman does not believe

that he has established an enigma. Its point is similar
to the point of Kant's antinomies, to wit, realism must
be rejected, that is, it is necessary to reject the

assumption that there is, apart from all frames of
11 EMVN,

pp.

12 EMVN,

pp.

17-18.

17-18. Note that theories do not observe;
people observe.
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reference, both a world and a way that it is. 13
Goodman
concludes that:
We are confined to ways of describing
whatever is described. Our universe, so to
speak, consists of these ways rather than
of a world or of worlds. 3 4
-

The world posited by metaphysical realism is, therefore,
nothing, and so it is necessary to shift to another

conception of what it is to be a world. Goodman's
argument moves quickly, perhaps too quickly. It assumes
many things, for example, it assumes that one may

generalize from a thesis about frames of reference, that
is,

just one of many systems of description, to a thesis

about all systems of description - including conceptual

schemes - but it is not clear what justifies this.
Moreover, it isn't clear what justifies Goodman's

implicit assumption that if there is, apart from all
frames of reference, nothing to say about the motion or
rest of objects, then there is nothing at all to say

about these objects. There are many problems here, but

before

I

attend to them,

I

will discuss the second of the

13 There is an formal difference between a Kantian

antinomy and Goodman's enigma. Let R be the thesis of
realism, transcendental or metaphysical. In the case of
the Kantian antinomy, then, there is statement, S, which
is such that (1) if S and R, then not-S, and (2) if not-S
and R, then S. Kant resolves an antinomy by rejecting R,
whatever its specifics may be. Now, let F be Goodman's
pair of truths about frames of reference. In the case of
Goodman's enigma, it seems that: if R and F, then not-R.
Holding F constant, Goodman's conclusion is: not-R.
14 WW,

p.

3.
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three facets of Goodman's vision, which corresponds
to
the second of my three questions. Even if Goodman
has

given us

good reason to embrace the already discussed

a

ontological inversion, why should it be thought that
there is more than one actual world?
Even if the idea of a unique world in itself is

intolerably enigmatic, it may be that the plurality of
true or correct frame of reference dependent descriptions
may all be transformable, or translatable, into one
another. If so, there may be just one world, namely,

whatever it is that is described by all
intertransformable or intertranslatable true
descriptions. If all the true framework relative

descriptions were translatable into one another, the
unique world might be defined as everything that is

described by them, that is, if there is anything that is

described by them. As Goodman himself puts this
possibility
We might... take the real world to be that
of ...groups of them [i.e., alternative
right versions] bound together by some
principle of reducibility or
translatabi lity
.

Or,

.

in other words:

...we may say... two versions deal with the
same facts if we mean by this that they
not only speak of the same objects but are
also routinely translatable each into the
other. As meanings vanish in favor of
certain relationships among terms, so
15 WW,

p.

20.

9

1

vanish in favor of contain
relationships among versions. 16

More generally, if all the correct
representations were
transformable into one another, the world might be

defined as everything that is represented by such
representations. Why, then, think that there are many
actual worlds?

Goodman considers the example of the apparently

conflicting descriptions of the sun's motion to be
uninteresting, because they are easily transformable or

translatable into one another, and this makes it seem
that they are all somehow representations of the same
thing, that is, the same world. He writes:

The alternative descriptions of motion,
all of them in much the same terms and
routinely transformable into one another,
provide only a minor and rather pallid
example of diversity in accounts of the
world 17

Moreover, Goodman provides this warning:
If we are tempted to say that 'both are
versions of the same facts', this must no
more be taken to imply that there are
independent facts of which both are
versions than likeness of meaning between
two terms implies that there are some
entities called meanings. 18

Is it even possible for there to be a method that can

transform any correct representation into any other

apparently opposing yet also correct representation? Of
16 WW,

p-

93

17 ww,

p-

3

18 WW,

p-

93

.

.

.
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any method that appeared to be so capable,
it would be
necessary to ask: how much opposition could
such a method

transform, if such a method could transform
opposition ? 19
It is instructive to recall Quine's alleged
method for

together incompatible yet empirically eguivalent
and complete theories. Goodman must answer the
following

sorts of questions. Does the set of right representations

represent one and only one world? Can the set of right

representations be put together in such a way that they
represent just one world? According to Goodman, they do
not

,

and they cannot
Here, Goodman offers two arguments. The first

assumes the form of an invitation to make

a

number of

comparisons. In essence, he asks us to compare the

scientific pictures of the world, the moral or political
pictures of the world, and the many aesthetic pictures of
the world. According to Goodman, if one looks, one should
see that although all of these pictures are true or
right, they cannot be put together in a way that results
in a composite picture of one world. Moreover, there is

no picture to which all the others can be reduced;

Goodman asks, perhaps rhetorically, "How do you go about
reducing Constable's or James Joyce's world-view to
19 In a radically different idiom,

if there were a
dialectic that appeared able to sublate all opposing
framework relative representations, then it would be
necessary to ask: how much opposition could the dialectic
sublate, if the dialectic could sublate opposition?

93

physics?" 20

I

think that Goodman would say that

a

similar

point applies to neoclassical economic theory
and Marxian
economic theory as described by Wolff and Resnick;
not

only is it impossible to put these economic
pictures

together in a way that results in

a

composite picture of

one economic world, but neither can be reduced to the

other
Much more striking [than the alternative
descriptions of motion considered above]
is the vast variety of versions and
visions in the several sciences, in the
works of different painters and writers,
and in our perceptions as informed by
these, by circumstances, and by our own
insights, interests, and past experiences.
Even with all illusory or wrong or dubious
versions dropped, the rest exhibit new
dimensions of disparity. Here we have no
neat set of frames of reference, no ready
rules for transforming physics, biology,
and psychology into one another, and no
way of transforming any of these into Van
Gogh's vision, or Van Gogh's into
Canaletto's 2 ^
The obvious question is why not simply link the manifold
of versions, visions, works, and perceptions? and say

that what they represent is the one and only world?

Goodman answers
Such of these versions as are depictions
rather than descriptions have no truthvalue in the literal sense, and cannot be
combined by conjunction. The difference
between juxtaposing and conjoining two
statements has no evident analogue for two

20 WW,

p.

5.

21 WW,

p.

3.

The parenthetic remark is due to me.
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pictures or for a picture and a

Nothing can serve as the linking
mechani sm whereby every
element of the manifold of right or
true representations
can be put together. Juxtaposition
would leave
out

statements, and conjunction would omit
pictures. So, the
manifold of representations cannot be put
together in a
way that results in one composite
representation
of one

world.

Goodman's second argument is based on

a

well known

strategy for resolving apparent inconsistencies.
Bill is
the cat and Bill is not the cat are, for example,
consistent, if the former Bill and the latter Bill
do not
refer to the same entity. More generally, what
appear to
be inconsistent statements can be shown to be
consistent

by establishing that certain terms refer to different
objects. As Goodman writes, "...contradiction [or:

inconsistency] is avoided by segregation." 23 He thinks,

moreover

,

that such a strategy supports the conclusion

that "...conflicting statements, if true, are true in

different worlds." 24 Goodman's task is to show how this
strategy supports this conclusion. The first step
involves the example discussed above: the sun always
22 WW,

p.

3.

23 Nelson Goodman, Of Mind
and Other Matters, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge (1984) p. 31. The parenthetic
addition is due to me. Hereafter: OMOM.

24 RP,

p.

50
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moves and the sun never moves. Although
these statements
appear to be contraries, both are true.
There can't be
true contraries, however. So, the appearance
of true

contraries must be dispelled 25 Such dispelling
reveals
the connection between the strategy and the
conclusion.
,

One solution is that apparently contrary
stateinents belong to different accounts. The idea
is that

according to one account, the sun always moves, and
according to another account, the sun never moves. This
solution does not work, however. There is little, if any,

difference between these statements and the statements
that generated the puzzle in the first place. Another

solution is to relativize the relevant statements to

different frames of reference. The idea here is that
relative to one frame of reference, the sun always moves,
and relative to another frame of reference, the sun never
moves. However, this solution also doesn't work. Frames
of reference are, as Goodman thinks of them, coordinate

systems with which spatial and temporal relations can be

mathematically represented. True yet contrary
mathematical representations are as much of a problem as
the apparently true yet contrary statements with which
the present puzzle began. Goodman's solution is that such

conflicting statements, if true, are true in different
worlds. If Goodman's solution works, so to speak, there
25 Compare RP, p.

50.

96

are many worlds, but what motivates
his solution? Behind
this solution stands the intuitive
force of the well know
strategy for resolving apparent inconsistencies
described
above. If the sun always moves and the
sun never moves
are contrary yet true descriptions of the
same world, the

conflict is neither mitigated nor dispelled.
As Goodman
notes: "The apparent conflict between true
descriptions
shows that they are not descriptions of the same

thing." 26 Therefore: "The earth that is truly
described
as in motion is not the earth that is truly
described as

at rest." 27 Thus, there are many actual worlds.

Goodman concludes that since

represented by

a

a

world is what is

manifold of true representations, and

the different manifolds of true representations cannot be
put together in a way that results in a composite

representation of just one world, there are many worlds.
He writes,

"...the multiple worlds of conflicting true

versions are actual worlds.... if there is any actual
world, there are many." 28 Since a world is what answers
to a true, or correct version, and there are many such

versions, indeed the purpose of much of Goodman's work is
to lay out the ways in which many true versions can be

made, there are many actual worlds.
26 RP,

p.

51.

27 RP,

p.

51.

28 OMOM,

p.

31.
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This would seem to bring us to
the third
Goodman's metaphysical vision, and
the third of
questions: how can there be many truths?
Unlike
Protagoras and Whorf however, Goodman
does not
argue that there are many worlds, and then
turn
,

facet of
my

first
to the

task of showing that each world has a complete
and true
description, that is, there are many truths. For

Goodman,

as for Quine, or at least as

I

have construed their

words, there are many worlds because there are
many

truths. So, in discussing Goodman's metaphysical
vision,

one cannot begin by focusing exclusively on the
issues of
the quiddity and plurality of worlds, and then to
turn to

the issue of the plurality of truths. What it is to be

a

world, the plurality of worlds, and the plurality of

truths are, for Goodman, three closely related issues,
but the plurality of truths is not a consequence of his

account of the quiddity and plurality of worlds. It
should be clear that Goodman maintains that the opposite
is the case: there are many actual worlds because there

are many truths.

None of this entails that Goodman rejects the

correspondence theory of truth, or the image that
called the string theory of truth. As

I

I

have

understand

Goodman, he is an advocate of this formalism, but he
rejects, with Quine, one assessment of the priority of
its elements. Formalism aside, Fido is a dog is true if

and only if the object tied to Fido is an element of the
98

set tied to is a dog. Clearly, then, truth
can be

defined, if objects, sets, and string constituted

relations are taken as primitive. However, Goodman's
move
is to take truth as primitive, and to define
the

collections of objects that make up the ontologies
of the
manifold of actual worlds. Crudely put, on the one hand,
reality and correspondence can be taken as primitive,
and
a true sentence can be defined as a sentence that

corresponds to reality; on the other hand, truth and

correspondence can be taken as primitive, and reality can
be defined as that to which all the true sentences

correspond. Thus, in addition to his acceptance and

defense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds,
Goodman also seems willing to endorse a notion of truth
that is quite similar to that outlined in the preceding.
He affirms that:

...the familiar dictum "'Snow is white' is
true if and only if snow is white" must be
revised to something like "'Snow is white'
is true in a given world if and only if
snow is white in that world".... 29
OQ

,

120. Does Goodman's critique of worldmaking
presuppose the ontology of sets and sets of sets that
Tarski's account of truth presupposes? It is tempting to
take Goodman to be asserting that truth is primary, and
that the objects, the sets and sets of sets, which make
up the ontologies of the manifold of actual worlds, are
derivative. Goodman is, however, a nominalist. He

WW, p.

believes that there are only individuals, and that a well
made world is such that if there are k basic entities, or
atoms, there are at most 2 k -l entities that can be
constructed from them. The principal nominalist principle
is that "...if we start from any two distinct entities
and break each of them down as far as we like (by taking
parts, parts of parts, and so on), we always arrive at
some original entity that is contained in one but not the
99

°^ i<3 inal entities." [Nelson Goodman, A
of Individuals
Problems and Projects The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis (1972)
159
p
Hereafter: WI
In other words: "For a nominalistic
tW d stlnct things have the same atoms;
only
i
? atoms
from different
can different things be generated*
all non-identities between things are
reducible to nontl S be een thSir atoms *" WI
P. 161.] Ontologies
?
that V,
violate
this principle are not well made, and so
the
ontology of sets and sets of sets, which is clearly
presupposed by Tarski's account of truth, is not well
made. It is important to note that it is not that
per se are bad, instead it is sets of sets that aresets
source of trouble. Goodman writes: "One may use the the
sign
e
and speak of classes and yet have a nominalistic
system if severe restrictions upon the admitted classes
are observed." [WI, p. 171.] The aforementioned trouble
arises because of the possibility, which nominalism rules
out, of there being different entities that are composed
of the same entities. For example, imagine an ontology
according to which there are four atoms: a, b, c, and d.
And, imagine that there are two sets, K and L. Let
K= a b
and let L={ {a,c} {b,d}
c d
According to
standard set theoretic principles, K and L are two
things. Since K and L are composed on the same atoms,
they should not, on nominalist scruples, count as two,
and so any ontology according to which they do count as
two is a defective ontology. This could be a reason to
doubting the veracity of Tarski's account of truth.
Putting this issue aside, however, Goodman's critique of
worldmaking should not depend on an account of truth that
presupposes an ontology that is, by its own standards,
badly made. Moreover, if Goodman's critique of
worldmaking is, in some manner, committed to the ontology
of Tarski's conception of truth, it cannot provide an
impartial analysis of an actual world where this ontology
doesn't obtain. Goodman's critique of worldmaking would
then seem to be incapable of accounting for the
nominalist ontologies that he himself favors. If,
however, that Goodman's critique of worldmaking
presupposes his form of nominalism, platonistic
ontologies would then be badly made. So, if Goodman's
account of worldmaking presupposes either nominalism or
platonism, one or the other will be ruled out, in a less
than fair manner, as ill made, and so it will be
incapable of accounting for worlds that are clearly
actual. Thus, an analysis of worldmaking that presupposes
Goodman's nominalism rules out platonistic ontologies on
the ground that they contain too many entities, and an
analysis of worldmaking that presupposes platonism rules
out nominalist ontologies on the ground that they contain
too few entities. This is, I think, why Goodman writes:
"...in this general discussion of worldmaking I do not
,
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If there are many actual worlds,

and there is one total

truth for each world, then Goodman would
seem to have
provided an account of how there can be many
total

truths. However, for Goodman, since a world
is what

answers to a manifold of true or right
representations,
and there are many such manifolds, the plurality
of

truths is a premise, not a conclusion.
As with the work of Whorf and Quine, Goodman's

work is neither irrelevant to mine, nor does it do
mine.
It provides moral support for those of us who think

monstrous thoughts about pluralities of actual worlds,
but there are a number of reasons why his work does not
do mine. First, there seems to be an irresolvable

ambiguity in the midst of Goodman's metaphysical vision.
In his The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman,

Israel Scheffler

points out that in Goodman's work, there are two
impose nominalistic restrictions, for I want to allow for
some difference of opinion as to what actual worlds there
are." [WW, p. 95.] Goodman's critique of worldmaking must
not presuppose nominalism, since this would beg the
question against platonism; and it must not presuppose
the platonism that is presupposed by Tarski's account of
truth. So, Goodman's investigation of worldmaking should
not invoke Tarski here or anywhere. And, so, one should
resist the temptation to write that Goodman thinks that
truth is primary, and that the objects, the sets and the
sets of sets, et cetera, which constitute the ontologies
of the manifold of actual worlds, are derivative. One
should say that Goodman thinks that: truth is primary,
and that ontology - of whatever strain, nominalist or
platonist — is derivative. If Goodman can't invoke
Tarski, however, how are we to understand his use of
true ? Moreover, how are we to understand his invocation
of Tarski's T sentences ? These sorts of questions fall
far beyond the scope of this essay, and so I will bracket
them here.
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conflicting interpretations of the word world.
On the one
hand, there is a versional interpretation.
Here,
a

is,

in Schef f ler ' s words,

world

"...a true (or right) world-

version...." 30 Goodman seems to have the versional

interpretation in mind, when he asks "(i)n what sense
are... there many worlds?" and he answers that
"...many

different world versions are of independent interest
and
importance.

—

31 Moreover,

he also seems to have the

versional interpretation in mind, when he writes that
"...the world [is] displaced by worlds that are but

versions...." 32 Here, the pivotal idea is that a world
should be equated with an ideally completable and true
description. This very formulation leaves open, however,
the possibility that there is some sphere or domain of

objects that such a description might fail to get right,
and this brings one to the second possible interpretation
of the word world. So, there is, on the other hand, an

objectual interpretation. In Schef f ler 's words, a world
is "...a realm of things (versions or non-versions)

referred to or described by...

right world-version.

1,33

Goodman seems to have the objectual interpretation in
mind, when he writes that "(t)he multiple worlds

I

30 Israel Schef f ler, The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman,
Synthese, vol. 45 (1980) p. 201. Hereafter: WWG.
31 WW,

p.

4

32 WW,

p.

7.

33 WWG,

p.

The parenthetic addition is due to me.

201.
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countenance are just the actual worlds
made by and
answering to true or right versions." 34
Scheffler's
distinction makes it seem that worlds

are one thing, and

versions are another. Perhaps it should be
said that this
makes it seem that worlds are concatenations
of things,

and versions are not, but

I

will prescind from this issue

here
With Scheffler's distinction in hand,

a

realist

might object to Goodman's metaphysical vision on
the
grounds that it is ambiguous between
true versions

,

(1)

there are many

and (2) there are, in the above described

ob jectual sense, many worlds. Such a realist might

reluctantly accept the first thesis, and adamantly reject
the second thesis on the grounds that it is simply

confused. If so, the metaphysical realist is then

obligated to say exactly what the confusion is. What
could her explanation be except

a

reiteration of the

claim that there is the world, there are our
representations, the world is independent of our

representations, and so the world and our representations
are distinct? In other words, to what could such an

explanation amount, if not a reiteration of the

distinction between the objectual and the versional
interpretations of the word world? This is,
insufficient
34 WW,

p.

94.

103

I

think,

Someone who has embraced the
aforementioned
ontological shift, that is, who
thinks that the limit of
the world and the limits of
representation somehow
coincide, that is, who thinks that to
be is
to be

representable, would not, or should not,
accept
Schef f ler ' s distinction. Goodman
acknowledges

that:

...a right version and its world are
different. A version saying that there is
a star up there is not itself
bright or
far off, and the star is not made up of
letters 35

However, he would add that:
...saying that there is a star up there
and saying that the statement 'There is a
star up there is true amount, trivially,
to much the same thing, even though the
one seems to talk about the star and the
other to talk about a statement. What is
more important, we cannot find any worldfeature independent of all versions.
Whatever can be said truly of a world is
dependent on the saying - not that
whatever we say is true but that whatever
we say truly (or otherwise present
rightly) is nevertheless informed by and
relative to the language or other symbol
system we use. 36
'

To what, then, does the distinction between the objectual

and the versional interpretations of the word world

amount? Goodman does not offer

clear answer to this

a

question, but he suggests that this is entirely

illegitimate: "No firm line can be drawn between world-

35 Nelson Goodman, On Starmaking
(1980), p. 212. Hereafter: OS.
36 OS,

p.

212.
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,

Synthese, vol

.

45

features that are discourse dependent and
those that are
not 1,37
This last point is closely related to a
second

deficiency in Goodman's metaphysical vision, namely,
there is the highly dubious character of Goodman's
premise: where nothing can be said, there is nothing,
it
should be noted that Goodman is neither alone, nor
should
his premise seem so alien as to also seem plainly

wrongheaded. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Ludwig Wittgenstein similarly affirmed that "(t)he limits
of my language mean the limits of my world." 38 Although
he opposed this premise, in his The View from Nowhere,

and in a somewhat different idiom, Thomas Nagel has more

recently written:
.what there is is what we can think
about or conceive of... the idea of
something that we could not think about or
conceive of makes no sense. 39
.

.

Within the framework of metaphysical realism, however,
Goodman's premise is, irrespective of idiom, plainly
wrong. If the world is a world of representation-

independent objects, it is possible for there to be

something that cannot be represented. As Nagel writes:
What there is and what we, in virtue of
our nature, can think about are different
37 OS,
38 TLP,

p.
p.

212.
115, section 5.6.

39 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford University
Press, New York (1986) p. 90. Hereafter: TVFN
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things, and the latter may be smaller
than
the former.
In other words,

if there is a world of representation-

independent objects, it is possible for there
to be
something about which nothing can be said.
This vitiates
Goodman ' s argument for adopting the ontological
shift

discusses above.
If what there is is some sort of ideal
sum of what

can be represented by the manifold of true, or
right,

representations, then Goodman's premise is far more
plausible, if not obviously right. If the sphere of what

there is and the sphere of what can be represented by
some manifold of right or true representations are co-

extensive, then it is trivially true that where no

representation can be produced , there is nothing. Recall
the point of Goodman's argument: he wants to motivate the

above described ontological inversion, which seems to be
a

pivotal premise in the argument that there are many

actual worlds. Also recall that this ontological

inversion amounts to the thesis that the sphere of being
and the sphere of the rightly or truly representable are

identical. Moreover, recall that Goodman's strategy is to

argue that realism is intolerably enigmatic. His argument

presupposes this premise: where there is nothing to say,
there is nothing. This premise is totally unacceptable to
the realist, and it presupposes that the sphere of being
40 TVFN

,

p.

91.
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and the sphere of the representable
are identical, so,
Goodman s argument is circular, in short,
Goodman argues
that since realism is an enigma, the
ontological
'

inversion must be accepted, but his argument
for thinking
that realism is an enigma rests on the
premise that where
nothing can be said , there is nothing, which
only
seems

acceptable in the context of the very ontological
inversion that Goodman seeks to motivate. This is
important, since the circularity of Goodman's argument

leaves unfulfilled the task of explaining why the

aforementioned ontological inversion ought to be
embraced, and without such an explanation, there is,

I

think, little hope of explaining why there are a

plurality of actual worlds.
There is a third problem with Goodman's

metaphysical vision, which also concerns his defense of
this ontological shift. As

I

noted above, in his

argument, Goodman assumes that one may generalize from a

thesis about frames of reference, that is, just one of

many systems of description, to

a

thesis about all

systems of description, but it is not clear what
justifies this. Conceptual schemes are systems of

description, and if they are like frames of reference in
that they are not part of the world, then Goodman may
well be able to press the above described argument. But,

although it may be obvious that frames of reference are
not part of the world, it is not at all obvious that
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conceptual schemes are in no way

Moreover

a

part of the world.

recall that it is essential to
metaphysical
realism that independently of both
our actual
,

representations, and our capacity to
represent, there is
an unique order of objects that
possess various
properties, and that these properties are
also

independent of both our actual representations
and our
capacities to represent, in other words, there
are

objects that are distinct by virtue of the
properties
that they possess, or fail to possess,
independently of

whatever lexicon of predicates we may happen to
possess.
Indeed, as G.H. Merrill has pointed out:
...the world must be represented not
simply as a set, but as a set together
with a class of relations among the
members of that set. To describe the world
is to describe the entities (or kinds of
entities) in it and their relations to one
another .... it is this stronger position
that the realist traditionally r?l
41
holds

David Lewis has made a similar point:
...realism needs realism. That is: the
realism that recognizes a non-trivial
enterprise of discovering the truth about
the world [which is guaranteed by the
uniqueness and independence of the world,
which is a principal motivation for
accepting realism] needs the traditional
[?] realism that recognizes objective
sameness and difference, joints in the

G.H. Merrill, The Model-Theoretic Argument Against
Realism, Philosophy of Science, vol. 47 (1980) p. 72. The
parenthetic question mark is due to me.
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world, discriminatory classifications
not
of our own making. 4 2
So,

since it is not clear whether the
argument about
frames of reference can be legitimately
extended to
include conceptual schemes, Goodman's
argument may not
only move too quickly, but it may beg
some important

questions
In the foregoing,

adopting

a

I

considered Goodman's proof for

certain ontological shift, and

I

noted that

his proof followed one of two strategies that
were

advanced by Kant. Its basic idea was that since
realism
is intolerably enigmatic, that is,

in an antinomy,

an essential premise

it is necessary to both reject it, and

shift to some version of antirealism or idealism, or even
irrealism, as Goodman entitles his position. 43 in short,
his proof didn't work, and so it is, within the context
of this work, still necessary to motivate this sort of

shift, not to mention the necessity of resolving the

myriad of other problems that have arisen up to this
point. In this section,

I

will investigate Hilary

Putnam's proof for the necessity of embracing this type
of shift, a proof which follows the second Kantian

strategy

42 David Lewis, Putnam's Paradox
Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, vol 62 (1984) p. 228. The parenthetic
remarks are due to me.
,

.

43 WW,

p.

x.
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In his Prolegomena, Kant wrote
that "...my

remembering David Hume [to wit: his skepticism]
was the
very thing which many years ago first
interrupted
my

dogmatic slumber [to wit: his realism]...." 44
There is
discernible and definite strategy here: the basic

a

idea is

that since realism entails skepticism, and
skepticism is
intolerable — as intolerable as any antinomy — we
should

shift to some other metaphysical view. Be this as it
may,
it must be acknowledged that realist intuitions
have

great power. So, if one's objection to realism is that it
entails skepticism, one is obligated to establish this
entailment, and one is prima facie obligated to provide
an equally powerful case against skepticism. For Kant, it

seems that scepticism is merely intolerable, and if his

ontological or transcendental turn dispels it, he takes
his turn to be ipso facto justified. The justification of

transcendental idealism, and so the repudiation of
transcendental realism, comes, in part, with the latter's
mere association with scepticism. In his Reason, Truth

and History, Hilary Putnam objects to realism for

a

similar reason. 45 Following, in its broadest outlines,

what

I

have described as the second Kantian strategy, he

44 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics

That Will Be Able To Come Forward As Science, translated
by Paul Carus, extensively revised by James W. Ellington,
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1977) p. 5. The
parenthetic remarks are due to me. Hereafter:
PROLEGOMENA
45 Compare RTH

,

chapter one.
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also argues that realism is
refuted by virtue of its
association with scepticism, but he,
unlike Kant, offers
us an ostensible refutation of
scepticism. Now,

that Putnam's argument were sound,
but
not. In this section,

I

I

I

wish

think that it is

will say what his argument is,

where he thinks it takes us, and

I

think it fails. In conclusion,

will explore the

I

will explain why

I

prospects of reconstructing his argument
in a way that
might lend support to the thesis that there
are many
actual worlds and truths.
Let us be clear about the theses involved.
Once
again, metaphysical realism, to use Putnam's
idiom,

includes the thesis that there is just one actual
world,

which consists of

a

multiplicity of representation

independent objects, and the way that the world is, or
the way that these objects are, is also representation

independent 46 This is essential. Additionally,
.

metaphysical realism includes the theses that there is
just one true and complete representation of this world,

and that truth is, more or less, a correspondence between

some representation and some segment of the world. As

Putnam understands it, metaphysical realism is, in short,
the view that:
46 I will ask my reader
to disregard putative
counterexamples such as representations, which are both
part of the world, and yet not representation
independent. There is, after all, a way - into the nature
of which I shall not here inguire — in which

representations are representation dependent.

Ill

•••[ 1
the world consists of a fixed
totality of mind-independent ob jects
there is exactly one true and complete 2
description of the way the world is
... [31
truth involves some sort of
47
correspondence
]

.

.

.

.

.

.

To what alternative metaphysical
picture does Putnam

think his argument takes us? Contrary to
the realist
thesis that there is just one actual world
that consists
of a multiplicity of representation
independent
objects,

after the shift, which Putnam's proof aims to
motivate,
"...what objects does the world consist of? is a
question
that only makes sense to ask within a theory or

description ." 48 Putnam illustrates this with an example
drawn from mereology - the axiomatic analysis of the

whole-part relation 49 Suppose that there are three
.

objects: x^, x 2

,

and X 3

.

He asks: how many objects are

there? The answer appears obvious: there are three.
However, suppose that for any two objects, there is a

third object that is their mereological sum. Given this
47 DIR,
p. 30. The parenthetic enumerations are due to
me. Compare RTH p. 49.
,

48 RTH,

49.

p.

49 Compare Hilary Putnam, Truth
and Convention: On

Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism
Dialectica vol. 41 (1987) pp. 69-77. Hereafter: TC.
Compare Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism: The
Paul Carus Lectures, Open Court, LaSalle (1987) pp. 1820. For an introductory discussion of mereology, see
Henry S. Leonard and Nelson Goodman, The Calculus of
Individuals and Its Uses, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 5 (1940) pp. 45-55. In addition, see Nelson Goodman,
The Structure of Appearance, third edition, with an
introduction by Geoffrey Heilman, D. Reidel Publishing
Company, Boston (1977) pp. 33-40.
,

,
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mereological principle, if there is
no null object, there
are then seven objects, to wit:
(

xx + X2

(4)

X3

So,

.

,

(5)

x-L

+ x3

,

(6)

1

)

Xl

X2 + X
3

,

(2)

x2

,

(

3

x3

)

,

and (7) x 3 + x , +

,

are there three objects or seven?
Or, more

generally, what is there? Putnam maintains
that the
answers to such questions are relative to
either some
method of counting, or some theory or system
of

description. According to metaphysical realism,
there is
an independent something that gets counted
differently,
but how may parts does this something have? This
question
can only be answered in a way that is dependent
on
some

method of counting, and on either the answer of three
or
seven,
a

"...we have not a neutral description, but rather

partisan description." 51 Putnam maintains, therefore,

that no theory or description independent answer can be

given to the question: what is there? Moreover, he denies
that there is just one true description of the world,
rather: "...there is more than one 'true' theory or

description of the world." 52 Along with this, he denies
that truth is correspondence, rather:

"

'Truth' ... is some

sort of (idealized) rational acceptability...." 53

50

and

I

will ignore such tacit presuppositions as: for all
+ Xj = Xj + x^.

j,

51 TC,
52 RTH

pp.

70-71.

,

p.

49.

53 RTH,

p.

49.
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i

Be this as it may, as

I

have noted, realist

intuitions are deeply entrenched, and so Putnam
is
obligated to motivate this alternative. Once again,

his

strategy is to argue that since metaphysical realism
entails scepticism, and scepticism is intolerable,
so is
metaphysical realism. What is this scepticism? Why is

it

so bad? Scepticism is, in this context, the thesis
that

any non-tautologous representation could be false, even
an ideal representation.

In other words, even a

representation that is consistent, maximally simple,
conservative, empirically adequate, and so on, could be
false. Given the foregoing explications, Putnam's claim

that metaphysical realism entails scepticism is

equivalent to the claim that if there is just one

representation independent actual world, and truth is,
more or less, the correspondence between some

representation and some segment of this unique world,
then any non-tautologous representation could be false,

even an ideal representation. Why should one think,
however, that metaphysical realism entails skepticism?
An essential part of metaphysical realism is that

the one and only actual world is representation

independent. As construed by the metaphysical realist,

representations constitute neither the being, nor the
quiddity of the world. Consequently, there is no

necessary connection between our representations and the
way the world is, even if the representation is ideal.
114

any ^presentation could fail
to correctly represent
the way the world is, that is, any
representation could
be false. This is even true of an
ideal representation.
One way in which a representation,
even if ideal, could
be false is this: every sentient being
could be a brain
in a vat whose afferent and efferent
nerve endings are
SO'

connected to

a

super computer that generates impulses

that make it seem to the bevatted brains that
the world
is the way it seems to be to us who have
presumed

ourselves to be unbevatted. This is

a

pantemporal claim:

every sentient being has been, is and will be such
brain. This is, of course,

a

a

cybernetic version of

Cartesian scepticism. Another way in which an ideal

representation could be false is that there could be
"...an evil genius, as clever and deceitful as he is

powerful, who has directed his entire effort to

misleading me." 54 As Putnam only focuses on the former
possibility, so will

I.

in this case, our world picture,

even if it were refined to the point of being ideal,

would be mostly wrong. What if the result of refining our
present world picture were to include the proposition
that every sentient being is a bevatted brain? It might
not seem to us that this could be the result of refining
our world picture to the point at which it is ideal, but
S4

Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy,
translated from the Latin by Donald A. Cress, Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis (1979) p. 16.
Hereafter: DESCARTES.
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we are entrenched.

I

will here ignore this sort of

problem, in any case, according to
Putnam's scenario,
although we would think of ourselves as
being justified
in believing that we possess pairs
of hands, and that we
walk, we would have no hands, and we
would not walk, it

would seem to us that we have hands, but
these hands
would only be computer-generated images, or
something

of

this sort.
The above point merits reiteration. The realist

maintains that both the existence of the world, and
the
way of the world are representation independent, it
follows that there is, at most, a contingent connection

between our representations and the existence or the
essence of the world. Although

I

may believe that

I

am

not a bevatted brain, given the contingency of the

relation between my representations and the being and way
of the world,

I

could be a bevatted brain. If our

representations constituted the way the world is, this
relation would be necessary, but realists adamantly
reject the thesis that our ideas either bring about the
being, or constitute the way of the world. In short,

metaphysical realism entails that we could all be brains
in vats. Or, metaphysical realism entails skepticism.

Putnam argues, however, that it is impossible for us all
to be brains in vats, and so metaphysical realism must be

rejected. How could Putnam possibly show that it can't be

that every sentient being is a bevatted brain? Doesn't it
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seem obvious that there is a possible
world where every
sentient being is a brain in vat?

Putnam summarizes his argument in the following

manner
...if we are brains in a vat, then 'We are
brains in a vat' is false. So it is
(necessarily) false. 55

As Gary Iseminger has pointed out, this argument

resembles the consequentia mirabilis of the mediaevals 56
In other words,
(i)

it seems to have this valid structure:

if p, then not-p

;

(ii)

therefore: not-p. On this

reading of its structure, Putnam's argument seems to be
the following:
(1) If all sentient beings are brains in a
vat, some sentient being is not a brain in
a vat
(2) Therefore: some
a brain in a vat.

sentient being is not

However, it is obvious from Putnam's
summary that his argument does not have
the form of the consequentia mirabilis
His argument is this:
.

(3) If all sentient beings are brains in a
vat, then All sentient beings are brains
in a vat is false.

(4) Therefore: All sentient beings are
brains in a vat is necessarily false.

However, the problem with this argument is that it is

fallacious. From the premise that (i) if p, x is false,
it does not follow that (ii) x is necessarily false. Or,
55 RTH

,

p.

15.

Compare RTH,

p.

8.

56 Gary Iseminger, Putnam's Miraculous Argument
Analysis, vol. 48 (1988) p. 191, footnote 2.
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,

more precisely, this version of
Putnam's argument has the
following invalid structure: (i) if
p , x is f aJse; (ii)
therefore: x is necessarily false. What,
then,
is to be

made of Putnam's argument?
It should be clear that Putnam desires
to show

that it can't be that all sentient beings
are bevatted
brains. As he sees things, if this were
forthcoming, then
so would the refutation of one seemingly
important

version of scepticism, and therewith would come
the
refutation of metaphysical realism. It might seem
evident
that only two things are needed for a valid argument

that

yields the conclusion that Putnam desires: one, the

premise of the last argument considered above, namely
(3)

and two, the additional and trivial premise that: it

must be that if All sentient beings are bevatted brains
is false,

some sentient being is not a bevatted brain. It

might also seem evident that this trivial premise is
justified by Tarski's semantic conception of truth, which
is itself trivial.

If we add this seemingly trivial

premise to the premise of the last version of Putnam's

argument above, we get the following:
(A) It must be that if all sentient beings
are bevatted brains, All sentient beings
are bevatted brains is false. [?]

(B) It must be that if All sentient beings
are bevatted brains is false, some
sentient being is not a bevatted brain.
Tarski?
[
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(C) it must be that if all
sentient
are bevatted brains, some sentient beinqs
beinq
is not a bevatted brain.
[A,B]

some sentient being must not be
bevatted brain. [C, consequentia
mirabilis b
(D)

a

'

Obviously, two questions may be asked about
this
argument. First: why premise (A)? Second:
why premise
(B)? in answering these questions,

I

shall argue for two

theses. One: the basic reason for (A) is
ironically also
a reason why Putnam's bevatted brains
scenario does not
depict a case in which most of our beliefs are
false,

in

fact, Putnam has unwittingly shown us that if we
were

bevatted brains, most of our beliefs would be true. Two
given the basic reason for (A),

(B)

:

is not a consequence

of Tarski's account of truth, and so the reason for
(B)

rests on a mistake.
A key premise of Putnam's argument for (A) may be

entitled the causal theory of reference

.

This is the

thesis that anyone who refers to an object must stand in
an appropriate causal relation with it. How are we to

render precise this notion of an appropriate causal

relation? As far as

I

can tell, no one has yet answered

57 Jane MacIntyre,
Putnam's Brains, Analysis, vol 44
(1984) pp. 59-61. This is essentially MacIntyre's
reconstruction. Hereafter: PB. Note that this version of
the argument employs a modalized version of the
.

consequentia mirabilis an argument whose premise has
this form: it must be that if p, then not-p, and whose
conclusion has this form: it must be that not-p, is
valid. This form of inference is justified by the
intuition that if a proposition of the form if p , then
not-p is true in all possible worlds, then a proposition
of the form not-p is also true in all possible worlds.
;
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this question. It's not that there
is a fully developed
theory that shows that reference
is a kind of causal
relation, and that specifies the
nature of this relation.
It seems that the causal theory
of reference is, at this
time, nothing more than a number of
intuitions about the

general manner in which a congeries of
philosophical
issues might be resolved. Michael Devitt
is as ardent
proponent of the causal theory of reference as

a

anyone,

but he writes of it in terms of hope and
optimism. 58

Within the context of Putnam's argument, however,
the
causal theory of reference doesn't need to be any
more

than this, and so this question does not need to be
answered. Our intuitive grasp of what such a theory
would

have to be like is,

I

suppose, all that is required. All

that is needed is the intuition that reference is, or
rests on, a causal relation, and the intuition that

certain causal relations are, and others are not

sufficient for reference.
Premise (A) is a consequence of these intuitions.
A bevatted brain would not stand in the sorts of causal

relations with vats, brains, etc., that are required for
it to successfully refer to them. A bevatted brain would
58 Compare DEVITT,

pp. 5, 27, 111, and 149. It must be
noted, however, that Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny have
attempted to more fully spell out the content of the
causal theory of reference. Compare their Language and
Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language,
The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1987). I will here bracket
their attempt.
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be causally related to the computer,
the vat, the

nutrients, etc., but not in a way that
is sufficient for
it to be able to refer to them.
Similarly,
if the

bevatted brains hypothesis is momentarily
put aside, it
can be seen that although Karl may be
causally related to
the oxygen that he breaths when he says
Fido is a dog,
his words do not thereby refer to that
oxygen. The

intuition is that the causal relations that

a

bevatted

brain would bear to the computer, vat, etc.,
would not be
sufficient for its representations, or sentences,
to

refer to the computer, vat, etc.
Suppose, however, that the bevatted brains

prevailed in referring. To what then would they refer?
There are

a

number of options here. Putnam writes that:

...when the brain in a vat (in the world
where every sentient being is and always
was a brain in a vat) thinks [or: says?]
'There is a tree in front of me', his
thought [or: sentence?] does not refer to
[1] actual trees.... it might refer to [2]
trees in the [computer generated] image,
or to the [3] electronic impulses that
cause tree experiences, or to [4] features
of the program that are responsible for
those electronic impulses. 5 ^
Thus, Putnam presents four possibilities. Assuming that

bevatted brain would be capable of referring, it might
refer to:
images,

(1)

(3)

actual trees,

(2)

computer generated

the impulses that cause these images, or (4)

features of the computer's program that produce these
SQ

RTH

,

p.

14.

The parenthetic enumerations are due to

me
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a

impulses

Since the bevatted brains would not,
given our
supposed intuitions, stand in the sorts of
causal
.

relations that are necessary for their successful

reference to actual trees, they obviously would
not be
referring to actual trees. Putnam and others have
assumed
that bevatted brains would refer, if they prevailed
in

referring at all, to computer generated images. Jane

McIntyre writes, "...a brain in

a

vat could only refer to

images of brains and images of vats...." 60 Carol A. Van
writes,

"

.

.

.if the

[bevatted] hypothesis were true,

'vat' would refer not to actual vats but to 'vats in the

image'...." 61 Thomas Tymoczko writes, "...we should

interpret the brains' word [sic: phrase?] 'elm trees' as

referring to trees-in-the-image [sic: elm-trees-in-theimage?]...." 62 To borrow

a

phrase that is currently in

the air, if a bevatted brain refers, it refers to the

virtual reality, or virtual objects, generated by the
super computer. In more philosophical words, were

a

bevatted brain to be capable of reference, it would refer
to some phenomenal reality, or phenomenal objects —

perhaps: phenomenological reality or phenomenological

objects — generated by the computer. It has also been
60 PB, p.

60.

61 Carol A. Van Kirk, Kant's Reply to Putnam
Studies, vol 14 (1984) p. 14.

,

Idealistic

.

62 Thomas Tymoczko,

In Defense of Putnam's Brains,
Philosophical Studies, vol. 57 (1989) p. 293.
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assumed that nothing depends on
this, and I will here
work within the confines of this
assumption.
If a bevatted brain prevailed
in referring,

would,

it

here assume, refer to computer generated
images,
or, in other words, it would refer to
computer generated
virtual objects. Now, suppose that a bevatted
brain asks,
Could I be bevatted? or Am I bevatted? To what
would its
I

words then refer? Putnam has put the answer
quite simply:
...if... we are really brains in a vat,
then what we now mean by 'we are brains in
a vat' is that we are brains in a vat in
the image .... 63

This is the key to (A). Ex hypothesi, in the computer

generated image, we would not be bevatted brains. In
other words, our virtual or phenomenal reality would not
be one in which we are brains in

a vat.

It is, however,

exactly the way of the elements of this virtual reality
that figure in the evaluation of the truth and falsity of
the beliefs or representations of the bevatted brains.
For example, The cat is on the mat is true in the

language of the bevatted brains just when the computer

generated cat image bears the computer generated on
relation to the computer generated mat image. Therefore,
if we are all brains in a vat, then All sentient beings

are brains in a vat is false. As Putnam writes, this is
false because:

63 RTH, p.

15.
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...part of the hypothesis that we
brains in a vat is that we aren't are
brains
the image (i.e. what we are
'hallucinating' isn't that we are
brains
in a vat). So, if we are brains
in a vat,
then the sentence 'We are brains in
a vat'
says something false (if it says
anything), in short, if we are brains
in a
vat, then 'We are brains in a vat'
is
(necessarily) false 64

m

.

If we are bevatted, then We are
bevatted is true if and

only if our virtual reality is one in which
we are
bevatted. Our virtual reality would, if we were
bevatted
brains, be identical to our de facto
phenomenological
reality, that is, everything would seem the same.
Our de
facto phenomenological reality is not one in which
we are

bevatted brains, however. So, if we are bevatted
brains,
then since our virtual reality is not one in which we
are

bevatted brains, We are bevatted brains is false. Thus:
if we are bevatted brains, We are bevatted brains is

false. This, in short, is Putnam's justification for (A).

Before

I

proceed to my discussion of Putnam's

argument for (B)

I

should note that there is reason to

doubt that Putnam's justification for premise

(A)

is

consistent with his implicit assumption that the bevatted
brain scenario is one that illustrates the sceptical

thesis that any representation could be false. How could
this be? How could it be, for example, that my present

perceptual representation that

I

possess two hands is

false? Putnam answers that it would be false, and so it
64 RTH

,

p

.

15.

124

could be false, if every sentient
being were a brain in a
vat. He argues that this scenario
just could not obtain,
but for the moment, let us bracket
the question of
whether or not his argument succeeds.
Instead, let us

consider whether or not the bevatted brains
scenario is
one according to which my present perceptual

representation that

am possessed of two hands is false.

I

Putnam argues that if we are bevatted, and the
causal theory of reference holds, then We are
bevatted is
true just when our virtual reality is one in which

we are

bevatted. Since this computer generated virtual reality
is qualitatively identical with what we would
experience

were we to be unbevatted or embodied brains, and since we
don't experience ourselves as bevatted, our virtual

reality is not one in which we are bevatted. Therefore,
We are bevatted is false. This way of thinking about the
content, or reference, of a bevatted brain's beliefs

provides a powerful reason for saying that were

I

bevatted, my representation of myself as possessed of two

hands would not be false, and that it would be true. An

essential part of Putnam's story is that if we were
bevatted, the vast majority of such perceptual and

doxastic representations would be false. It would seem
that

I

possess a pair of hands, but since there are, ex

hypothesi

no hands,

,

I

would be deceived. But, Putnam

himself tells us why this analysis is wrong: if we are
bevatted,

I

possess two hands is true just when our
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virtual reality is one in which the
virtual me virtually
possesses a virtual pair of hands. Ex
hypothesi our
virtual reality, were we to be bevatted
brains, would be
qualitatively identical with the phenomenological
reality
of embodied brains. Since we would
experience me
as

possessing

a

one in which

pair of hands, our virtual reality would
be
I

would possess two hands, and so

two hands would be true. Putnam himself makes

I

a

possess
similar

point
.the brain is right, not wrong in
thinking 'There is a tree in front of me.'
Given what 'tree' refers to... and what 'in
front of' refers to... then the truth
conditions for 'There is a tree in front
of me' when it occurs... are simply that a
tree in the image be 'in front of' the
'me' in question ... .And these truthconditions are certainly fulfilled. 65
.

.

Is my perceptual representation of myself as possessed of

two hands false according to the bevatted brain scenario?
No,

since its truth conditions would concern the elements

of a virtual reality that would, ex hypothesi, obtain.
So,
I

Putnam's scenario doesn't do the work he wants. Now,

shall not rest my criticism of Putnam's argument on

65 RTH, p.

14.
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this, and so
(B

I

will now turn to the question of
premise

66
)

As

noted above, it might appear that the
only
additional thing that is needed for a valid
argument that
yields, or at least appears to yield, the
conclusion that
Putnam desires is the trivial premise that:
it must
I

be

that if All sentient beings are brains in a vat
is false,
some sentient being is not a brain in a vat.
I also noted
that it might appear that this premise is provided
by

Tarski's account of truth. The idea turns on

a

consequence of Tarski's account of truth, namely, that
it
entail biconditionals such as: it must be that Snow
is white is true in some language just when snow is

white, and it must be that Snow is white is not true, or
false, in some language just when some snow isn't white -

leaving the quantification implicit. It would seem that

Tarski's account would also entail that if All sentient

beings are bevatted is false in some language, some

sentient being must not be bevatted. This is wrong.

Reflection on this additional premise will show that and

how this supplemented version of Putnam's argument fails.

66 It seems obvious that in some
worlds, reference is a
causal relation, and in others, it is not. So, the causal
theory of reference is clearly contingent. Consequently,
it is unclear how it could be the pivotal reason why it
must be that if all of us are bevatted, All of us are
bevatted is false. I will ignore this sort of problem

here
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Here, it is,

I

think, necessary to enter into
the

details of Tarski's account of truth,
since it
constitutes an important part of the
background of the
preceding reconstruction of Putnam's

argument, and these

details, although often mentioned, are
rarely

articulated. Tarski's account of truth is an
account of
truth for a very special kind of language,
namely, a

formalized language. Let me first give an example
of such
a language, and then show how Tarski
defines truth
for

it.

I

will call this language Q.^ 7

Like all languages, Q has what might be thought
of
as an alphabet. Here, this is a list of the
primitive

symbols from which all the other symbols of
Q are
constructed. In addition to the positive integers

primitive symbols of Q include:
).

F,

x,

~,

n,

(,

and

Among these, we have the five following symbols:
(1)

logical connectives

(2)

universal quantifier: n, and

(

fi

a,

the

,

3

)

brackets

:

(

and

~

and

)

7

In this account, I more or less follow the excellent
exposition provided by Geoffrey Hunter in his Metalogic:
An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order
Logic, University of California Press, Berkeley (1973).
One notable exception is that I omit function symbols
from Q. I have also drawn much from Elliott Mendelson,
Introduction to Mathematical Logic, third edition,
Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole Advanced Books and Software,
Pacific Grove, California (1987).
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Other symbols of Q, which are
constructed from the
elements of this list of primitive symbols,
where i is
positive integer, include the following:
(4)

constants: a^,

(5)

variables

:

(6) predicates:

and

Xj_,

Fi

a

.

What do these symbols mean? Although this question
will
receive a more detailed answer, the following
should
serve as a rough guide. The logical connectives
work

almost exactly like the words not and if

then. The

universal quantifier is similar to all in ordinary
language. Moreover, the brackets function as punctuation.
Now, the individual constants function like names, e.g.,

Fido. The individual variables are like the pronoun it,

except that there are infinitely many of them. - Note
that together the constants and the variables are the
terms. - The predicate symbols work like ordinary n-place

predicates, e.g., the one-place predicate is

a dog.

Among the non-primitive symbols of Q, there are
the well-formed formulas, or wffs. These are, simply put,
the declarative sentences.
If F| is an n-place predicate symbol,
are n terms, then
Fi^-i r • • • r t n is a wff, and it is an atomic
(1)

and

wf f

(2) If A is a wff, and x^ is the i-th
variable, then nx^A is a wff.

(3)

If A is a wff, then -A is a wff.
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wff
(5)

If A and B are Wffs

Nothing else is

'

then (A

-*•

B)

is a

a wff.

This only concerns syntax, and so this
leaves open the
question of what these symbols mean, that
is, it leaves
open the question of their interpretation.
Although these
symbols are subject to the rough sort of
characterization

given above, in the context of a formalized
language, an
interpretation is a quite specific kind of thing.
There
are two parts to an interpretation of a language
such as
Q.

The first part consists of a non-empty set, D.
This is

the domain of the interpretation. For example, D might
be

the set of positive integers, and if it is, talk in
Q

will be interpreted, so to speak, as talk about the

positive integers. The second part is

roughly

,

a

function,

I.

Very

this function determines the elements of D about

which the various symbols of Q talk. On the one hand,

I

assigns to each individual constant some member of

For

D.

example, it might be that I(a 1 )=l. in this case, a is,
1

very roughly, taken to talk about the number one. On the

other hand,

I

subset of D11

,

assigns to each n-place predicate symbol

a

that is, a subset of the n-th Cartesian

product of D, where D 1 is, for example, the set of ltuples of the elements of D. For example, it could be
that I(F 1 )={<y>: y is an even number}. In this case, F x
is,

once again very roughly, taken to talk about the even

numbers.

I

will merely note that the connectives are

given their usual truth-functional meanings.
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The notion that

I

am out to render more precise
is

the notion of truth in Q relative
to an interpretation.
But, there are three preliminaries,
to wit, (l) the
notion of satisfaction, ( 2 ), the notion
of a denumerable
sequence of elements of D, and
(3) the notion of a star
function relative to a given denumerable
sequence
of

elements of D.
A sequence is a function from some subset
of the

positive integers to some set of objects. For any
two
sequences,

s

and t, s=t just when s =t
i
i

,

for all

other words, s=t just when the i-th term of

term of t, for all

i.

in

i.

s is the i-th

The sequences that are relevant

here are infinite sequences of elements of the domain
of
some interpretation, that is, functions from the entire
set of positive integers, which is, after all,

subset

a

of itself, to the domain of the relevant interpretation.

Were the domain of interpretation to be the set of

positive integers, such
...),

a

sequence could be (l,

and another could be (1,

another could be (1,

1,

l,

2,

l,

l,

i,

2,

3,

4

,

...), and yet

...). We are now in a

position to define the notion of a star function relative
to a given denumerable sequence of elements of D.

Let s be an arbitrary denumerable sequence of

elements of D. Now, for each interpretation,
a star function,

s*

,

I,

there is

whose domain is the set of terms of

Q — the union of the constants and the variables of Q —
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and whose range is D. Now, s* is defined
as follows.
There are two cases:
in the case of an individual constant
(ai)=I(a i ), that is, s*( ai ) is the
element of D that I assigns to a
if
1

)

ai

'

(

s

and
(2) in the
s ( x i =S /
2
term of s,

case of a variable, x if
that is, s*(x^) is the i-th
which is an element of D.

For example, suppose three things:

question is a 2
...)• Then,

,

l( 3l )=2,

(2)

(1)

the term in

and (3) s is (l,

3,

5,

7,

s*(a 1 )=I(a 1 )=2. Or, suppose, for example,

that (1) the term in question is x
3

,

and (2) s is as

before, then s*(x 3 )=s 3 =5. Now, satisfaction can be

recursively defined.
It is well formed formulas that are, or are not,

satisfied by the infinite sequences of elements of the
domain of some interpretation, and there are four cases
to be defined:
(1) the case where the formula in question
has the form F^-l,
,t n
where
is an
n-place predicate symbol, and where
t lf
,t n are evidently n terms,
,

(2) the case in which the formula has the
form nxjA, where A is itself a well formed
formula, and where x^ is obviously the ith variable,

(3) the case where the formula has the
form ~A, where A is itself a well formed
formula

and finally
(4) the case in which the formula has the
form (A -* B) where A and B are themselves
well formed formulas.
,
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In the first case,

s

satisfies the relevant formula
just

when the n-tuple <s*( tl
that is

I (F i)'

/

s*(t n )> is an element of

)

this n-tuple is an element of the
set of

n-tuples of D of

I

that

assigns to

I

F^ 68

m

the second

case, s satisfies the formula in question
just when every

denumerable sequence of elements of D that
differs from
in at most the i-th term satisfies A.
in the third

s

case,

s

satisfies this formula just when

s

does not satisfy a.

In the last case, s satisfies this formula
just when s

does not satisfy A or s satisfies B.
It is helpful to have examples. Let I(a )=5,
and
1

let I(Fj)={<y>: y is an even number}. Moreover, let
s be
(1,

3,

5,

7,

...); one can suppose that s^ is the i-th

odd integer. Then: s satisfies

F^

just when <s*(a x )> is

an element of ICFj), and so s satisfies
F-^-l just when
is an even number

not satisfy

.

F^a-^.

Since

5

is not an even number, s does

Does s satisfy F 3 x 3 ? Once again, s

satisfies F 2 X 3 just when <s*(x 3

)>

is an element of I(F
1

Since

s

and

is not an even number, s does not satisfy f x
1 3

5

(x 3 )=s 3 =5,

5

).

and I(F 1 )={<y>: y is an even number},
.

Does s satisfy nx 2 (F 1 x 2 )? Recall that s satisfies

nx 2 (Fi x 2 ) just when every denumerable sequence of

elements of D that differs from
fi ft

s in at

most the second

Note that this is a formal exposition of the intuition
that lies behind the string theory of truth, and that
strings are the metaphorical representatives of the
relations that constitute Tarski's interpretation
function

133

term satisfies F^x^ Now, let t be

(

1

,

7,5

7

)

that is, let t be a denumerable sequence of
elements of d
that differs from s in at most the second term.
Given the
above account of satisfaction, t satisfies F x
x 2 just when
< t*(x
> is an element of
2
1^), and so t satisfies
)

just when

fxx2

7

is an even number.

Since t*(x 2 )=t 2 =7, and

is not an even number, t does not satisfy

F-^, and

7

so s

does not satisfy nx (F x ). Since the remaining two cases
2
1 2
are more or less self-evident,

I

will now pass on to the

notion of truth in Q relative to an interpretation

I.

What Tarski said, and what the reconstruction of

Putnam's argument, which is being considered here,
appropriates, is essentially this:

a

formula of Q is true

for a given interpretation I of Q just when every

denumerable sequence of members of the domain of
satisfies it.^ 9

relative to

a

jn

I

other words, a sentence is true

given language and its interpretation just

when every denumerable sequence of members of the domain
of the interpretation satisfies it. Similarly, a formula

of Q is false for a given interpretation

I

of Q just when

no denumerable sequence of members of the domain of

I

satisfies it. The pivotal point here is that this is the

69 Compare Alfred Tarski, The Concept of Truth in
Formalized Languages, in Logic, Semantics,

Metamathematics, second edition, edited and introduced by
John Corcoran, translated by J.H. Woodger, Hackett
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1983) p. 195.
Hereafter: CTFL.
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notion of truth that is operative in the
reconstruction
of Putnam's argument that is being
considered
here.

As a first step toward making clearer the
role

that Tarski's account of truth plays in this

reconstruction of Putnam's argument,

will establish an

I

instance of what Tarski demanded from

a

theory truth,

namely, Convention T, or what Tarski referred to as the

test of the material adequacy for an account of truth 70
.

According to Tarski,

a

materially adequate account of

truth must entail all the biconditionals of the form:
is true in Q (for an interpretation I)

where

§ is a

$

if and only if p,

structural descriptive name of

a

sentence in

the object language, and p is a translation of § into

a

sentence of the metalanguage, that is, the language in

which the definition of true in Q is given. Convention T
is,

it is instructive to note, analogous to the

requirement that any definition of an ordered pair be
such that if <a,b>=<x,y>, then a=x and b=y. Tarski's
famous example is: snow is white is true if and only if

snow is white.
Be this as it may, a much simpler example of

Convention T is: Fido is a dog is true in some language,
which is presumably English, just when Fido is a dog.

Fido is a dog is not

a

well formed formula of Q, but

I

will pretend, for the sake of illustration, that this can
70 Compare CTFL, pp.

187-188.
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be ignored. Moreover, since I'm only
explaining this for
the sake of illustration, it too can be
ignored. In any
case, if Fido is a dog could be represented
in Q,

would be represented as
and I(a 1 )=I(Fido)

.

F^,

it

where I(F 1 )=l(is a dog),

For the same reason, also suppose that

I(F 1 )={<y>: y is a dog}, and I(a )=Fido. Let me show
how
1

Tarski's account of truth for Q relative to this

interpretation function entails my example.
(1) Suppose that it's not that Fido is a
dog is true just when Fido is a dog, that
is, suppose that it's not that
is
true just when Fido is a dog.

F^

(2) From (1) it follows that either (a)
F 1 a 1 is true and Fido is not a dog, or (b)
F l a l is not true and Fido is a dog.
(3) Suppose that F 1 a 1 is true and Fido is
not a dog.
(4) From (3) and Tarski's account of
truth, it follows, in short, that every
sequence of elements satisfies F-^a-j^
Specifically, s satisfies F 1 a 1
.

(5) Given (4) and the definition of
satisfaction, <s*(a 1 )> is an element of
I (F]_

)

•

(6) Given (5), since I(F 1 )={<y>: y is a
dog}, <s (a x )> is an element of <y> y is
a dog}, and so s*(a 1
is a dog.
{

:

)

(7) Given (6) and the above account of a
star function relative to a sequence,
s (a 1 )=I(a 1 ), and since I(a 1 )=Fido, Fido
is a dog, which contradicts (3). So, the
supposition at (3) must be rejected.

that is,
(8) From (7) and (2), (b)
is not true and Fido is a dog.
,

(9)

(8),

F^!

Given Tarski's account of truth, and
it follows, it short, that no
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sequence satisfies
doesn't satisfy F a
1

.

1

Specifically,

s

.

(10) From the above account of
satisfaction, and (9), it follows that
<s (ai)> is not an element of I(F
).
1

(11) Since (10), and since I(F )={<y>
y
1
is a dog}, <s (a-j_)> is not an element
of
<y> Y is a dog}, and so s*(a-,) is not a
x
dog.
:

{

:

(12) Given (11) and the above account of
star function relative to a sequence,
s (a 1 )=l(a ), and since I(a-,)=Fido, Fido
1
is not a dog, which contradicts (8). So,
the assumption at (1) must be wrong, and
so: Fido is a dog is true just when Fido

is a dog.

a

(Q.E.D.

Tarski's idea is that a materially adequate account of
truth for

a

formal language must entail this sort of

biconditional for every sentence of the language in
question. The point of going through this example is to
get my reader to clearly understand how the mechanism of

Tarski's account of truth works. The pivotal question is:
What role does Tarski's account of truth play in the

present reconstruction of Putnam's argument? Roughly put,
it is supposed to provide the link between: all sentient

beings are bevatted, and: some sentient being must not be
bevatted. More specifically, it is supposed to provide
the premise that: if all sentient beings are bevatted is
false, it must be that some sentient being is not

bevatted. My claim is that Tarski's account of truth

provides neither this link, nor this premise.
With Putnam, let us suppose four things. First: we
are brains in a vat. Second: the causal theory of
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reference. Third: our language is sufficiently
like Q to
give an interpretation of it. So, there
will be a
set of

individual constants, which will be mapped onto
the
elements of some set, D. There will be a set of
n-place
predicates, which get mapped onto subsets of D n
.

Et

cetera. Putnam's fourth and pivotal supposition
is that

our intuitions about the intimate relation between

causality and reference imply that every element of D
is

something like a computer generated image. In short,
every element of D is

a

computer generated virtual

entity. Putnam suggests that the contents of D might be

computer generated images, or electronic impulses that
cause these images, or features of the computer program
that generate such electronic impulses. As

I

have noted,

it doesn't matter whether the domain of the

interpretation is a set of images, electronic impulses,
or facets of the machine's program;

I

believe that the

present reconstruction of Putnam's argument fails on all
three construals of the contents of D, but

I

will focus,

as does Putnam, on the construal according to which the

elements of D are computer generated images.
I

have developed the foregoing account of Q and

its interpretation for the sake of being able to show

that and how the current revision of Putnam's argument
fails. What

I

propose to do is go through the mechanics

required to show that Tarski's account of truth does not
give Putnam the premise that it must be that if all
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sentient beings are brains in a vat is
false, some
sentient being is not a brain in a vat. I
claim that all
it gives him is the premise that it must
be that if
all

sentient beings are brains in a vat is false,
some
computer generated image of a sentient being is
not

computer generated image of
is not obvious,

a

a

bevatted brain. If my claim

it can be established in the following

manner. If the elements of D are computer generated
images, then: I(is a sentient being)=I(F )= {<y>:
y is
1

computer generated image of

a

sentient being}, and

brain in a vat)=l(F 2 )={<y>: y is

a

I

a

(is a

computer generated

image of a brain in a vat}. Given this, let us see what

Tarski's account of truth entails. Once again, Putnam
needs it to entail that: it must be that if All sentient

beings are brains in a vat is false, some sentient being
is not a brain in a vat.

But this is quite different from

what it does entail. Once again, although All sentient

beings are brains in a vat is not a sentence of Q,

I

will

pretend, for the purpose of explication, that this can be
ignored. Here are the required mechanics:
(1) Suppose that All sentient beings are
brains in a vat is false, that is, suppose
that nx 1 (F 1 x 1 -* F 2 x-]_) is false. Moreover,
given the causal theory of reference,
every element of D of I is a computer
generated image, and so it must be that
I(F 1 )={<z>: z is a computer generated
image of a sentient being} and I(F 2 )={<z>:
z is a computer generated image of a brain
in a vat
}
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(2)

m

By Tarski s account of truth
no sequence satisfies nxqCFqX-, -* and
f 10 Xi1 )
and so s does not satisfy it.

(3). By the definition of satisfaction
s
satisfies nx-LfFjX-L - F x-l just when
every
2
sequence that differs from s in at
the first place satisfies F x -» f most
X
1 1
2

1

•

By ( 2
and 3
some sequence that
ers
f rom s in at most the first
f^
place
fails to satisfy F lXl - F x
Let it be t.
(

<

4

)

(

)

^1

2

x

.

(5) By the definition of satisfaction, t
satisfies F^x^
^ 2 X 1 just when t doesn't
satisfy F 1 x 1 or t satisfies
f x
-*•

,

2

(6) By (4) and (5), t satisfies
t doesn't satisfy F x
2 1

1

.

F-iX-,,

and

.

By the definition of satisfaction, and
x i)> is an element of I(F ), and
<t (x x )> is not an element of I(F 1).
(7)
(

6 2'

(

2

and (7), t*(x^) is a computer
(8) By
1
qenerated imaqe of a sentient beinq, and
t (x x
is not a computer qenerated imaqe
of a brain in a vat.
(

)

)

(9) By (8), some computer qenerated imaqe
of a sentient beinq is not a computer
qenerated imaqe of a brain in a vat.

(10) By (1) throuqh (9), if All sentient
beings are brains in a vat is false, then
some computer generated image of a
sentient being is not a computer generated
image of a brain in a vat. (Q.E.D.)

NOTA BENE: This conclusion is not the premise that the
reconstruction of Putnam's argument needs. In other
words, this conclusion is not premise (B) of the above

version of his argument.
If we add what was supposed to be a trivial

premise to the premise of my initial version of Putnam's
argument, namely (3), that is, add the above result of
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Tarski 's account of truth,
we get an argument that
runs
as follows:
I
11 S ® ti nt beings are
brains in a
?
f
ai ? sentient
iat All
vat,
beings are brains in a
[The CaUSal The -y <*
1

Referenced
A

1

sentlent

beings are brains in
1
a vat is ^
false,
then it must be that some
computer generated image of a
sentient
being is not a computer generated
image of
a bram
a vat. [Tarski: the
conclusion
of the mechanics articulated

m

above.]

(c;) It must be that if all
sentient
beings are brains in a vat, then some
computer generated image of a sentient
eing is not a computer generated
image of
a brain in a vat. [A,B']
(D) Not all sentient beings must
be brains
in a vat. [???] 71

To work, this reconstruction of
Putnam's argument needs

a

premise with an antecedent that is the
same as the
consequent of (A), and with a consequent that
contradicts
the antecedent of (A). If he could get
this, (C) could
be:

if all sentient beings are brains in
a vat,

sentient being must not be
could get

brain in a vat. Then, Putnam

But, Tarski's account of truth cannot

(D)

provide such

a

some

a

premise. It can only provide (B'), and

this is not sufficient. So, even when Putnam's
argument

assumes the form of what seems to be its best
reconstruction, it is not a version of the consequentia

mirabilis

.

Instead, it is a non sequitur.

71 Compare
PB.
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Th ls technical point can
be expressed in terms
of

what

have above entitled the
string theory of truth,
which is an image of what it
is for a sentence to be
true
that preserves, I think, the
intuitions of the
correspondence theory of truth. The
basic idea can be
explained in terms of the example
of what it is for Fido
is a dog to be true. First,
let there be an object and
a
name, let the latter be: Fido.
Now, take some string, tie
one end of the string to the name,
and tie the other end
to the object. Second, let there
be a property and a
predicate, let the latter be: is a dog.
Now, take some
more string tie one end of the string
to the predicate,
and tie the other end to the set of
all the objects that
have the property. - I'll leave aside
the incisive
I

,

question of how a string can be tied to

a set.

- The idea

is that Fido is a dog is true just when
the object tied

to Fido is an element of the set tied to
is a dog 72 This
idea can be used to show that the above
reconstruction of
.

Putnam's argument doesn't work.

Note that strings are metaphorical substitutes for
the
relations that correspond to the interpretation function
of Tarski s account of truth. If it seems ludicrous
to
account for truth in terms of something as physical as
string, it is a wonder why it doesn't seem as ludicrous
to account for truth, even if it is truth relative to
a
formal language, in terms of something as abstract, and
therefore as intangible, as a function. I have wondered
why the string theory of truth doesn't constitute,
therefore, a reductio ad absurdum of Tarski's semantic
conception of truth, but this is yet another guestion
that I will leave aside in this work.
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The first premise of the above
reconstruction of
Putnam's argument is that: (A) if
„ e are bevatted, We are
bevatted brains must be false. Given
the causal theory
of

reference, if we were bevatted, our
strings could only be
tied, so to speak, to either computer
generated

phenomenal objects, or sets of computer
generated
phenomenal objects. So, roughly put, the
objects tied to
we would be computer generated images
of us, and the set

tied to are bevatted brains would be the
set of computer
generated images of bevatted brains. Moreover,
We are
bevatted brains would be true just when the
objects tied
to we were elements of the set tied to are
bevatted
brains. Now, the assumption of Putnam's thought

experiment is that the computer generated phenomenal
world of the bevatted brains is gualitatively
identical
with the phenomenal world of those of us who have
presumed ourselves to be unbevatted, and that in our
phenomenal world, it doesn't seem to us that we are
brains in vats. So, even if we were bevatted, it wouldn't
seem to us that we were. In other words, the computer

generated images of us would not be members of the set of
computer generated images of bevatted brains. It follows,
and this is the important point, that We are bevatted

brains would not be true, that is, it would be false,
which gives us Putnam's first premise.
All would be well with the above reconstruction of

Putnam's argument, if its second premise were:
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(B)

if We

are bevatted brains is false,
it must be that one of
us
is not a bevatted brain. But,
this premise is not
available to Putnam. Given the reasons
for his first
premise, the only available premise
is this: (b') if we
are bevatted brains is false, it
must be that some
computer generated image of one of us
is not a computer
generated image of a bevatted brain. Since,
according to
the causal theory of reference, our
strings can only be
tied to computer generated phenomenal
objects, or sets of
computer generated phenomenal objects, We
are bevatted
brains is true just when the objects tied to
we are

elements of the set tied to are bevatted brains.
So, if
We are bevatted brains is false, or not true,
it must be
that some computer generated image of one of us
is not a

computer generated image of

a

bevatted brain. Of the two

premises discussed here, namely,

(B)

and (B'), this is,

once again, the only one available to Putnam, and even
if
it is conjoined with his first premise, namely,

(A),

it

doesn't deliver the conclusion that he desires: some of
us must be unbevatted. So, Putnam has refuted neither

scepticism, nor metaphysical realism.
At this juncture, there are two pivotal questions.
One: Can Putnam's argument for internal realism be

successfully reconstructed? In short,

I

think not. Two

What can be appropriated from my reconstruction of
Putnam's argument that will further the task of making
sense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds and
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truths? Suspend this question
for now; the answer will
emerge from an investigation
into the first question.
Recall the basic structure of
Putnam's argument for his
internal realism. There are three
basic premises. First
metaphysical realism and internal
realism are mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive.
Putnam neither states
this, nor does he argue for it,
but it is implicit, and
although this is dubious, I won't
question it here.
Second, metaphysical realism entails
scepticism. This
seems clear enough. Third, scepticism
is incoherent.

Putnam's argument for this premise is,
as

I

have argued,

flawed, but what if it isn't necessary
to provide an

argument for it? Recall that for Kant, scepticism
is
merely intolerable, and if his ontological or
transcendental turn dispels it, his turn is ipso
facto
justified. The justification of transcendental
idealism,

and the repudiation of transcendental realism, comes,
in
part, with the former's seeming capacity to dispel

scepticism, and the latter's association with it. In any
case, from these premises, it follows that metaphysical

realism is false, and so Putnam's internal realism is
vindicated.
Again, the problem with Putnam's argument is

located in his ostensible refutation of scepticism. In

addition to its being formally flawed, it is, as it seems
to me, confused in that it presupposes both that a

substantive philosophical thesis, to wit, scepticism, can
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be refuted by means of
trivial, and perhaps merely
formal, premises about
truth and reference, and
that a
substantive and deeply rooted
philosophical thesis, to

metaphysical realism, can be
likewise refuted. This
can't be. No substantive
thesis follows from a formal
thesis, and no formal thesis
contradicts any substantive
thesis. So, if there is a
successful reconstruction of
Putnam's argument, it must
contain at least one
substantive premise. It is difficult
to see what this
premise could be. It can't be
Putnam's internal realism,
that is, his thesis that "...what
objects does the world
consist of? is a question that only
makes sense to ask
within a theory or description ." 73
Because, internal
realism would then be a premise in
an argument to

establish internal realism, and this
would be evidently
circular. Or, because, internal realism
would then be a
premise in an argument to establish the
incoherence of
scepticism, the supposition of this incoherence
would be
a premise in an argument to establish
internal
realism,

and so such a reconstruction of Putnam's
argument would
again be irremediably circular. Allegations
of

circularity aside, it should not be this, because
the
metaphysical realist's intuition that the world consists
of representation independent objects is deeply
rooted,

and its legitimate displacement requires a philosophical
73 RTH,

p.

49.
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argument based on

substantive and equally
intuitive
premise, and internal realism
does not fill
a

the bill, a
clue to the identity of the
needed premise lies in this:
the intuition that scepticism
is wrongheaded is at
least
as deeply rooted as the
metaphysical realist's intuition
that the world consists of
representation independent
objects, isn't internal realism
prima facie justified, if
metaphysical realism entails scepticism,
and internal
realism entails that it is a deep
mistake? More to the
point of the thesis that there are many
actual worlds and
many truths, isn't an ontological shift
that supports
this thesis prima facie justified,
if without it, we face
scepticism, and with it, we escape it? But,
I get ahead
of myself.

Putnam's argument could begin with the thesis
that
scepticism is, so to speak, false. On the one
hand, since
metaphysical realism entails scepticism, it is
ruled out.

Moreover, given that it and internal realism are
mutually

exclusive and jointly exhaustive, internal realism
follows. On the other hand, if it should turn out
that

internal realism rules out scepticism, it is all the more

vindicated, since it gets that issue right, that is,
since it is, so to speak, epistemologically correct. In
short, let the substantive premise be that scepticism is

wrongheaded, or something of this sort, and internal
realism, or my hitherto elusive ontological shift, may be

vindicated. This obviously depends, however, on whether
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internal realism, or some
version of an ontological
shift, can be shown to be
epistemologically correct, and
this in turn depends on
what Putnam's doctrine, or
this
shift, and scepticism are.
will now focus on internal
realism, and I will
begin by contrasting it with
metaphysical realism, it
would make sense to ask for a
theory or description
independent answer to the question:
what objects does the
world consist of?, were there to
be just one actual world
that consisted of a multiplicity
of representation
independent objects. Representation
independent objects
would be distinct from one another
by virtue of the
properties that they possess, or fail
to possess,
I

independently of whatever concepts or
predicates we would
happen to possess. Roughly put, a complete
enumeration of
these representation-independent objects,
not to mention
all their representation-independent
properties, would
constitute an answer to the Putnam's question:
what
objects does the world consist of?, or, more
simply: what
is there?, that made sense independently
of theory
and

mode of description. It is irrelevant to object
that

since we could use different names or different
predicates, our description would thereby be theory or

description dependent. Any answer to Putnam's question
that employs names or predicates that do not match up

with the world's representation-independent objects and

properties must simply be wrong. Names and predicates
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that don't reflect the world's
objects and properties
can't be part of a correct answer
to Putnam's question.
Thus professes the metaphysical
realist. How does
internal realism differ from this?

Putnam tells us that there can be
no theory or
description independent answer to the
question: what is
there? Recall the illustration that
Putnam draws from
mereology which was discussed above:
If there are three
objects, how many objects are there? If
we don't count
,

mereological sums as objects, it is clear
that the answer
to this question is: there are three
objects; if,
however, for any two objects, there is a
third object
that is their mereological sum, and there
is no null
object, then the answer is: there are seven
objects. So,
are there three objects or seven? Obviously,
it depends
on how one counts

and so Putnam concludes that the

,

answers to such questions are relative to either some

method of counting

,

or some theory or system of

description. According to metaphysical realism, there is
a

representation independent something that gets counted

differently, but Putnam inquires: how may parts does this

something have? This question can only be answered in

a

way that depends on some method of counting, and on

either the answer of three or seven, "...we have not
neutral description, but rather
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a

partisan

a

description

.

74 Putnam
concludes,

and this is essential

to his internal realism, that no
theory or description
independent answer can be given to the
question: what is
there?
This would seem to entail that independently
of
theory or mode of description, there are
no objects of

which the world consists, in short: if
there were such
objects, there could be a theory or description
independent answer to Putnam's question, but since
there
can be no such answer, there can be no such
objects.

Moreover, since there is then little left to the
world as

construed by the metaphysical realist, there is no
theory
or description independent world either. But then

scepticism is thereby refuted, since it supposes that
there is such

a

world. This must be explained.

Putnam addresses himself to a form of scepticism

that was suggested by Descartes when he wrote that there

could be "...an evil genius, as clever and deceitful as
he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to

misleading me ." 75 The basic sceptical idea here: even if
objects were to cohere in a manner that is required for
them to be evidence for some picture of the world , it

would still be possible for these objects to be
74 TC,

pp. 70-71. But, how could a fact about a question
be relevant to the representation dependency or otherwise
of objects? I will return to this question.

75 DESCARTES,
p.

16.
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illusions , and for this picture to
be false 76 Putnam's
bevatted brains scenario is a
cybernetic version of the
Cartesian scenario of an omnipotent
and deceptive evil
genius, since it also shows how it
is possible
.

for

objects to cohere in

a

manner that is required for them

to be evidence for some picture
of the world, and yet be
such that they are illusory, while
the picture for which
they presumably provide evidence is
false. Putnam rightly
sees, I think, that both scenarios
presuppose some

version of metaphysical realism. It is
because what is
the case is independent of us and our
representations
that it is possible for objects or our
representations to
lack verisimilitude, that is, to be illusory
or false, no

matter what evidential virtues our representations
may
happen to possess. Now, one way to escape the
scepticism

suggested by these scenarios is to reject this very
presupposition. In other words, one alternative is to

maintain that what is the case somehow depends on our
representations

,

but in a way that closes, so to speak,

the gap that makes it possible for coherent objects to be
76 One might
object that objects are not evidence,

because sentences are evidence for other sentences, or
something of this sort. Moreover, one might object that
objects do not cohere, because coherence is only defined
for sentences. It is evident that I mean something like
this: an object is evidence for some world picture just
when a sentence about this object is evidence for the
picture in question. Moreover, it should also be evident
that I mean something such as this: some set of objects
is coherent just when some set of sentences about them is
coherent. Et cetera.
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evidence for some world picture,
and yet be such that
together, they are illusory or
false. Putnam thinks that
his internal realism achieves
this by establishing that
one ostensible side of this
gap is a fiction. In other
words, it does this by showing
that independently
of

theory or mode of description,
there are no objects of
which the world might consist,
and so there is no world
as construed by the metaphysical
realist. Consequently,
there is no world that we might fail
to correctly
represent, and so Cartesian scepticism,
in both its
demonic and cybernetic forms, is false.
As

I

noted above, the justification of internal

realism, and perhaps the justification of
an ontological
shift that would support the thesis that
there are many
actual worlds, could begin with the premise
that

scepticism is simply wrongheaded. This would rule
out
metaphysical realism, since it entails scepticism.
Thus,
were internal realism and it mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive, internal realism would be justified.

Since internal realism seems to rule out scepticism, it
is all the more vindicated, since it gets this issue

right. In short, by letting the substantive premise be

that scepticism is wrongheaded, internal realism is

vindicated. Or, is it? There is,

I

think, an error in

this reconstruction of Putnam's justification of internal
realism. To locate this error, recall that the success of

this reconstruction depends on whether internal realism
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IS epistemologically
correct,

and this, in turn, depends

on what scepticism is. There
is a form of scepticism
that
Putnam has not considered, however,
and its consideration
not only undermines the thesis
that internal realism gets
scepticism right, but it undermines
it by bringing
us to

see that internal realism and
metaphysical realism share
essentially the same conception of
what it is to be an
object.
Query: does internal realism entail
that

scepticism simpliciter is false? No, and
so,

I

think,

internal realism doesn't amount to a
fundamental

ontological shift that supplants the metaphysical

realist's intuitions about what it is to be
an object.
For the time being, I will place aside
the question of
this consequence, and

I

will focus on this negative

answer. To justify this answer, it is necessary
to

distinguish Cartesian scepticism from another form of

scepticism that was suggested by Hume when he wrote that
"...it implies no contradiction that the course of nature

may change, and that an object, seemingly like those

which we have experienced, may be attended with different
or contrary effects." 77 For example, it is, as Hume

noted, possible for

"

.

.

.a body,

falling from the clouds,

and which, in all other respects, resembles snow... [to
77 HUME,

p.

35.
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have]... the taste of salt or
feeling of fire
"78 0r
it is, again as Hume noted,
possible for "...all the
trees... [to]... flourish in
December and January, and
decay in May and June.... "79
0r> as Kant
worrie(J;

it

.

_

£

possible for "...the country on
the longest day... [to
be]... sometimes covered with
fruit, sometimes with ice
"8°
and snow
The Humean sceptic maintains that
the
behavior of objects could go awry in
any of these ways.
More generally, the basic sceptical
idea here is that the
behavior of objects might fail to cohere
in a manner that
is necessary for them to be evidence
for any world
picture. Even if internal realism and
Cartesian

scepticism are incompatible, because internal
realism
rules out the gap that makes this scepticism

possible,

there is still Humean scepticism, and so to
answer the
above query, it is necessary to ask whether
internal

realism rules out Humean scepticism.
Cartesian scepticism presupposes that what there
is in no way depends on our representations.
So, there
is,

in a manner of speaking, a gap between our

representations and what there is, and so any

representation might be false, even if it is ideal.

According to Putnam, since there is no theory or
78 HUME,

p.

35.

The parenthetic addition is due to me.

79 HUME,

p.

35.

The parenthetic addition is due to me.

80 CRITIQUE,
p.
is due to me.

132, A100-101. The parenthetic addition

154

description independent answer to the
question: what is
there?, there are no representation
independent
objects

of which the world might consist,
and so there is no

world as construed by the metaphysical
realist. But,
then, Cartesian scepticism is wrongheaded,
since there is
no world that we are constantly in danger
of having

misrepresented. Now, there is, in Humean scepticism,

something analogous to the gap of Cartesian scepticism,
and the question for internal realism is whether
it is

capable of closing it. This gap consists of the fact
that
the past course of nature does not necessitate its
future
course, or the past behavior of objects does not

necessitate their future behavior, or the content of our
past experience does not necessitate that of our future

experience. So, our experiences, or their objects, might
fail to cohere in a manner that is necessary for either
of them to evidentially support, or for there to be, any

world picture. Now, to justify

a

negative answer to the

query of the last paragraph, it is necessary to show that
internal realism does not rule out Humean scepticism.
I

will proceed by contrast once more. According to

metaphysical realism, objects do not depend on our
representations, but this doesn't entail that the past

behavior of objects must cohere with their future
behavior, and so it does not entail that the behavior of

objects must cohere in a way that is necessary for them
or the things they do to be evidence for some picture of
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the world. This may be put in
another way. Like Cartesian
scepticism, Humean scepticism
presupposes a kind of gap,
to wit, a gap between the past
and future behavior of
objects. Because of this gap, it is
possible for objects
to fail to cohere, and so they
may not be able to

evidentially support any vision of the
world. This gap is
not closed, even if, as the metaphysical
realist
maintains, the world is as objective as it
can be. Put

shortly, the objectivity of the world
does not ensure the
coherence of objects. So, even if metaphysical
realism is

granted, Humean scepticism is not thereby
refuted.
The situation is similar for internal realism.

Even if no theory independent answer can be
given to the

question: what is there?, it doesn't follow that the
past

behavior of objects necessitates their future behavior,
and so they may fail to cohere. This too may be put in

another way. The gap of Humean scepticism is not closed,
even if, as the internal realist maintains, the question:
what is there? has no theory independent answer. The

dependency of all possible answers to some question on
some theory or other does not ensure, by itself at least,

that objects will behave coherently. So, and this is

a

pivotal point, internal realism is compatible with Humean
scepticism. Even if, as Putnam maintains, truth were some
sort of idealized rational acceptability, this

rationality would only be ideal, and so this wouldn't
rule out the possibility that objects might be so
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incoherent that no world
picture would be acceptable,
if
Putnam built coherence into
truth in a way that
guaranteed that objects would
be able to provide evidence
for some world picture,
he would have then ruled
out
Humean scepticism by fiat.
Internal realism would rule
out Humean scepticism because
it would be so defined that
the ideal of coherent objects
evidentially supporting
some world picture would necessarily
be realized, and a
substantial result would then rest
on a gratuitous
definition. So, since internal realism
does not rule out
Humean scepticism, it does not rule
out scepticism
simpliciter, and this shows, I think,
that Putnam's view
doesn't amount to a fundamental
ontological shift that
supplants the metaphysical realist's
intuitions about
what it is to be an object. Why?
Do internal realism and metaphysical
realism

embrace essentially different conceptions
of what it is
to be an object? As far as I can
ascertain, there
is,

in

Putnam's exposition of internal realism, no
explicit

explanation of what it is to be an object, but such
an
explanation is implicit. Internal realism might fail

to

get Humean scepticism right, because its conception
of

what it is to be an object is not essentially different
from that of metaphysical realism. In which case, one is

entitled to suspect that internal realism and

metaphysical realism are essentially the same. In this
regard, recall, once again, Putnam's mereological
157

example, and note that any
answer to the question: how
many objects? is always
relative to some method of
counting, but given a specific
method of counting, the
answer to this question is
completely determinate. This
is an ambiguous fact, if
it is indeed a fact. On the
one
hand, this might be because
a method of counting somehow
constitutes the objects counted.
In this case, since
objects would then depend on such
a method, they would be
theory or mode of description
dependent, and so internal
realism and metaphysical realism
would embrace

essentially different conceptions of
what it is to be an
object. On the other hand however,
this might be because
there are objects that are independent
of all methods of
counting, and that somehow necessitate
a specific and
,

determinate answer. Note well, however, that
in this
case, objects are independent of us and
our

representations. The important point is that there
is,
then, reason to suspect that on the issue
of what it is

to be an object, Putnam's internal realism
does not

essentially differ from metaphysical realism.
Does it follow from the supposition that neither

internal realism nor metaphysical realism is, with

respect to Humean scepticism, epistemologically correct,
that they contain essentially the same conception of what
it is to be an object? Yes, because,

in essence, they

both get Humean scepticism wrong for the same reason,
namely, it is because objects are independent of our
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representations that they need not
cohere, in other
words, internal realism doesn't
get Humean scepticism
right, because although it
differs from metaphysical
realism on the issue of whether
there can be a theory or
description independent answer to the
question: what is
there?, it doesn't essentially
differ from metaphysical
realism on the question of what it is
to be an object.

This must be explained. Internal
realism and metaphysical
realism are both compatible with Humean
scepticism.
For

internal realism, this means that although
there can be
no representation independent answer
to the question:
what is there?, there is still a gap between
the past and
the future. Even though there is, according
to internal
realism, a way in which objects are representation

dependent, objects are independent in that they may
still

behave in ways that make them unrepresentable, that
is,
they may still behave in ways that makes it impossible

to

coherently represent them. So, even given internal
realism, there is a way in which objects are independent
of our representations. For metaphysical realism, objects

are representation independent; this is essential to it.

Therefore

,

for both metaphysical realism and internal

realism, objects are representation independent, and so

they don't embody essentially different conceptions of

what it is to be an object.
What if Putnam offered the following? Suppose that
if internal realism and Humean scepticism are compatible,
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objects are representation
independent. Objects are not
representation independent. Why?
Because, there are no
theory or description
independent answers to Putnam's
question: what is there? if
there were representation
independent objects, there could
be a theory or
description independent answer
to Putnam's question, but
since there can be no such
answer, there can be no such
objects. Therefore, internal
realism and Humean
scepticism are incompatible, since
internal realism is,
so to speak, true, that is,
since there are no theory or
description independent answers to
the question: what is
there?, Humean scepticism is
wrongheaded, if Putnam did
offer this, he would then seem to
have undermined the
claim that internal realism and
metaphysical realism
embrace essentially the same conception
of what it is to
be an object, since this claim itself
rests on the

premise that internal realism is, with
respect to Humean
scepticism, epistemologically incorrect.
Putnam's dormant
offering rests, however, on his dubious
inference from
the premise that no theory or description
independent

answer can be given to the question: what is
there?, to
the conclusion that objects are somehow theory,

description or representation dependent. How could
about

a

a

fact

question be relevant to the representation

dependency or otherwise of objects? Isn't is evident that
even if all the possible answers to some question about
some set of objects depends on some theory or other, it
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doesn't follow that these objects
depend on some theory?
To suppose that it does follow
is to have already
embraced the sort of ontological
turn that I am out to
clarify.
This brings me back to a pivotal
question raised
above: Can Putnam's argument for
internal realism
be

successfully reconstructed?

I

think not, because given

that internal realism is compatible
with Humean
scepticism, it is also compatible with at
least a modicum
of representation independence on
the part of objects,
and this is compatible with Cartesian
scepticism,
and so

Putnam's argument, or all of its reconstructions,
must
fail, why? Because the essential point
(premise?) is that
internal realism is, relative to Cartesian
scepticism,

epistemologically correct, but given the above, this
is
just plain wrong. If internal realism and Humean
scepticism are compatible, objects are representation
independent. But, if objects do not depend on our
re P reseri tations

,

there is a gap between what is the case

and what we represent it to be, that is, our

representations do not constitute the being or essence of
objects. Given this gap, however, any non-tautologous

representation might fail to represent the way things
are, and so any could be false, and so the scenarios

described in both the demonic and the cybernetic forms of
Cartesian scepticism could obtain. But, then, internal
realism and Cartesian scepticism are compatible.
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Therefore, since

a

conceptual keystone of Putnam's

argument is that internal
realism is, with respect
to
Cartesian scepticism,
epistemologically correct, if
a

reconstruction of Putnam's argument
is an argument that
rests on this keystone, there
cannot be a successful
reconstruction of Putnam's argument.
This brings me back to another
pivotal guestion:
What can be appropriated from
my reconstruction of
Putnam's argument that will further
the task of making
sense of the thesis that there are
many actual worlds and
truths? The lesson is this: the way
to justify
an

ontological turn, which will explain
the thesis that
there are many actual worlds and
truths, is to show that
it gets both Cartesian and Humean
scepticism right. This
constitutes a test for any such turn, is
there an

ontological turn that evades these forms
of scepticism?
If there is, it involves a much more
radical turn than
Putnam's internal realism, who himself seems
to be in

need of an awakening from his own dogmatic
slumbers, if
there is an escape from scepticism, it involves
returning
to Kant's primordial articulation of the very
ontological
turn that Protagoras, Whorf

,

Quine, Goodman and Putnam

have either failed to see, or have failed to get right.
Or, this is what

hand,

I

I

will argue. So, with the above test in

now turn to Kant to attempt to extract

a

viable

version of an ontological shift that will support the
thesis that there are many actual worlds and truths.
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CHAPTER

4

QUIDDITY: KANT

My project is, once again, to
determine whether any
sense can be made of the theses
that there are many
actual worlds, and that there are
many truths. At this
stage, the proposal under consideration
is that the
ontological shift of Kant's Copernican
revolution can be
appropriated to bring this project to
completion. How? in
his The World Well Lost Richard Rorty
suggests the
following:
,

Since Kant, we find it almost impossible
not to think of [1] the mind as divided
into active and passive faculties, the
former using concepts to "interpret" what
"the world" imposes on the latter. We also
find it difficult not to [2] distinguish
between those concepts which the mind
could hardly get along without and those
which it can take or leave alone — and we
think of truths about the former concepts
as "necessary" in the most proper and
paradigmatic sense of the term. But as
soon as we have this picture of the mind
in focus, it occurs to us, as it did to
Hegel, that [3] those all important a
priori concepts, those which determine
what our experience or our morals will be,
might have been different. We cannot, of
course, imagine what an experience or
practice that different would be like, but
we can abstractly suggest that [4] the men
of the Golden Age, or the inhabitants of
the Fortunate Isles, or the mad, might
shape the intuitions that are our common
property in different molds, and [5] might
thus be conscious of a different "world" 1
1

Richard Rorty, The World Well Lost, The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 69 (1972) pp. 649-650. Emphasis and
parenthetic enumerations are due to me. Hereafter: WWL.
Compare A.C. Genova, Kant and Alternative Conceptual
Frameworks in Akten des 4. Internationalen KantKongresses, vol. 2 (1974) pp. 834-841. Also compare
,
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The basic idea is,

surmise, this. Suppose that
we both
think and intuit, and that
thinking is casting what is
intuitively given into conceptual
molds. Moreover,
suppose that experience is a
product of this casting, and
that a world is an ideal sum
of what can be experienced.
the one hand, if there can
be only one repertoire of
conceptual molds, there can be only
one world. Or, this
is what Kant seems to have
thought. On the other hand, if
there can be many essentially
different sets of
I

conceptual molds, and the intuitively
given can be cast
into them, so that different
experiences result, then
there can be many actual worlds.
Furthermore, if each
actual world were to have a complete
description, there

would be, in the sense that

I

have explained above, many

truths

Rorty's suggestion involves
suppositions. Now,

I

a

number of dubious

don't find it difficult to suppose

that we both think and intuit.

think that no one thinks, but

I
I

know that some thinkers

won't pursue this issue

here. There is, however, some difficulty in supposing

that thinking is casting the intuitively given into

conceptual molds. The basic problem is that since the

casting metaphor is far less perspicuous than the
intuitions of metaphysical realism, and an essential part
of the aim of Rorty's suggestion, which is supported by

Patrick Gardiner, German Philosophy and the Rise of
Relativism The Monist, vol 64 (1981) pp. 138-154.
.
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the metaphor that thought
is casting, is to
supplant
these intuitions, the unclear
supplants the clear. The
same can be said about the
notion that experience is a
product of the conceptual molding
of the intuitively
given. Additionally, if what
it is to be a world is

characterized in terms of ideal sums
and experience, it
is still an open question
whether a world is
the ideal

sum of (i) what is experienced,

(ii) what is and can be

experienced, or (iii) what is and can
be experienced plus
whatever may be connected by rules to
what
is and can be

experienced. Also note that the word
world is ambiguous
in another way, since it can mean
(i) that which imposes
on the passive faculty of sensuous
intuition, and it can
mean (11) that of which we are supposed
to be conscious
after the active faculty of thought has
interpreted what
the world, in the just mentioned sense,
has imposed on
the passive faculty of intuition. These issues
aside,

there is also the dubious supposition that not
only can
there be essentially different sets of conceptual

molds,

but the given can be cast into them.

I

have already noted

Davidson's objections to the former, and the metaphysical
realist might object to the latter on the grounds that
since the given is

a

representation of what is itself

representation independent, that is, since the
intuitively given is, or involves, the sensuous presence
of what is itself representation independent, it comes

structured, and so it cannot be cast into alternative
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conceptual molds. To suppose that
the given can be cast
in many ways is to beg an
important ontological guestion.
Rorty himself objects to this account
of world and
truth multiplicity because he thinks
that the Kantian
picture upon which it depends itself
depends on

a pair of

distinctions that ought to be rejected. One
is the
distinction between the given and the
conceptual, and the
other is the distinction between the analytic
and the

synthetic. With respect to the former, Rorty
focuses on
the intuitively given, and he offers a dilemma:

Insofar as

a Kantian intuition is effable,
it is just a perceptual judgment, and thus
not merely ^intuitive'. Insofar as it is
ineffable, it is incapable of having an

explanatory function.^

This needs to be elucidated. The intuitively given
is

either characterless or not. On the assumption of the
i a t"ter,

the intuitively given possesses some character,

and so it is already conceptually molded. - If possessing

determinate features is essentially different from being

conceptually molded, as the metaphysical realist might
maintain, this is a non sequitur.

I

will disregard this

issue here. — But, then, since it is exactly the given

that is supposed to be conceptually molded, the given is
not the given. But, this can't be, and so the former must
be assumed, that is, it must be that the intuitively

given is characterless.
2

WWL

,

p.

650.
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If the given is characterless,

it is more like

Aristotelian matter, or primary matter,
than like any
determinate object, for example, this

man or that horse.

For Aristotle, matter is supposed
to be the stuff that
underlies change from one kind of thing
into another kind
of thing, for example, the change
of an apple into a man
by digestion. Aristotle asserts: "
'Matter '... is to be

identified with the substratum which is
receptive of
coming-to-be and passing-away
" 3
Consequently, matter
can be neither apple nor man, but it is
what
can be

anything. So, it can't, in and by itself, be
anything
specific. If it were something specific, it would
be

limited in what it can become. That Aristotle
maintained
this is evidenced by his having written that:

When all else is stripped off [a thing or
substance] evidently nothing but matter
remains .... By matter I mean that which in
itself is neither a particular thing nor
of a certain quantity nor assigned to any
other of the categories by which being is
determined .... the ultimate substratum is
of itself neither a particular thing nor
of a particular quantity nor otherwise
positively characterized .. 4
.

Aristotle, De Generatione et Corrupt ione translated by
Harold H. Joachim, in The Basic Works of Aristotle,
edited with an introduction by Richard McKeon, Random
House, New York (1941) p. 485, 320al-2 (book i, chapter
,

4)

.

4

Aristotle, Metaphysica translated by W.D. Ross, in The
Basic Works of Aristotle, edited with an introduction by
Richard McKeon, Random House, New York (1941) p. 785,
1029all-26 (book vii, chapter 3). Parenthetic remarks and
emphasis are due to me.
,
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Although explanation is

a

quite complicated thing, it

seems clear that in giving an
explanation, one tells a
story about something that makes
it clear why the thing
to be explained is the way that
it happens to be. But,

telling

story about something involves
asserting that
something has certain characteristics,
which are somehow
related to the thing to be explained.
This could
a

be

unraveled further, but the point is that
if the
Aristotelian conception of matter is to have

any

explanatory power, it must entail that this
matter has at
least some character. So, if matter is,
according
to the

Aristotelian conception, characterless, it can't
explain
anything, including coming-to-be and passing away.
George Berkeley argued not only that the

conception of

a

characterless something could do no

explanatory work, but that

a

characterless stuff would be

nothing. With respect to the former, he put the point
well, when he wrote that:
It is said extension is a mode or accident
of matter, and that matter is the

substratum that supports it. Now I desire
that you would explain what is meant by
matter's supporting extension: say you, I
have no idea of matter, and therefore
cannot explain it. I answer, though you
have no positive, yet if you have any
meaning at all, you must at least have a
relative idea of matter; though you know
not what it is, yet you must be supposed
to know what relation it bears to
accidents, and what is meant by its
supporting them. It is evident support
cannot be taken here as taken in its usual
or literal sense, as when we say that
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pillars support a building: in what
sense
therefore must it be taken? 5
On the one hand

,

matter is supposed to be characterless,

but then no sense can be given to
the claims that it
supports various characteristics, and
that it is the

substratum that persists through coming-to-be
and
passing-away On the other hand matter is
supposed to
support various characteristics, or to be
the substratum
that persists through coming-to-be and
passing-away,
.

,

but

since supporting things have

a

certain character, as do

persisting things, whatever sense can be given to
these
suppositions must conflict with the view that matter
is

characterless. So, not only can't such

a

conception of

matter explain coming-to-be and passing away, or
such
characteristics with which we are acquainted, it can't
explain anything.
Moreover, with respect the point that a

characterless stuff would be nothing, Berkeley thought
that he could show that all the features that matter is

supposed to have in itself are subjective, and so they
are not possessed by matter in itself. He concludes that

since matter is then characterless, it is nothing.

Suspend the point about all the supposed features of

5

George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, in
The Works of George Berkeley: Bishop of Cloyne, vol. 2,
edited by A. A. Luce and T.E. Jessop, Thomas Nelson and
Sons Ltd, London (1949) p. 47 (section 16). Hereafter:
PHK
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matter being demonstrably
subjective; it is this last
inference that is important here.
Berkeley writes:

*;^ at

if we ;-- assert... that matter
is an
somewhat neither substance nor
accident.
.you may... use the word
matter in the same sense, that
other men
[sic] use nothing, and so make
those terms
th S
what appears to me
to be the result of that definition,
the
parts of whereof when I consider
with
attention, either collectively, or
separate from each other, I do not
that there is any kind of effect or find
impression made on my mind, different
what is excited by the term nothing 6 from
;
unknown

,

’

*

*

*

'''

.

His point is somewhat obvious: the
characterless is
equivalent to nothing. Moreover, this
excursus should
make Rorty's point clearer: if the intuitively
given were

characterless, its conception could do no
explanatory
work, and it would be nothing. Now, Rorty's
dilemma may
be put as follows. The intuitively given
is either

characterless or not. If the given were to possess
some
character, it would already be conceptually molded.
But,
then, since the given is what gets conceptually
molded,

the given is not the given. This can't be. So, it
must be

that the intuitively given is characterless, but its

conception would be, to repeat the point just made,
incapable of doing any explanatory work, and it would be
nothing. Rorty concludes that the very idea of the given

must be rejected, and so must the distinction between the
given and the conceptual. More importantly, he concludes
PHK

,

p.

75

(section 80).
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that "...the suggestion
that our concepts shape
neutral
material no longer makes sense
once there is nothing to
serve as this material. "7 But,
then/ the suggestion
alternative concepts might shape
some neutral material in
alternative ways, and the whole
Kantian based suggestion
about how there can be many
actual worlds and truths,
which were delineated above,
also fail to make

^

sense.

Rorty's dilemma would lack force,
if he had
somehow misallocated the Kantian
picture, in other words,
his dilemma wouldn't be so pointed,
if there were no
textual justification for thinking
that Kant himself
maintained that experience is a product
of thought
shaping or molding some conceptually
neutral material
delivered by sensuous intuition. However,
on the very
first page of the first edition of the
Critique of Pure
Reason, Kant wrote that: "Experience is,
beyond
all

doubt, the first product to which our
understanding gives
rise, in working up the raw material of
sensible

impressions

.

"8

Moreover, on the very first page of the

second edition of that work, he wrote:
...objects affecting our senses partly of
themselves produce representations, partly
arouse the activity of our understanding
to compare these representations, and, by
combining or separating them, work up the
raw material of the sensible impressions

7
8

WWL

,

p.

650.

CRITIQUE, p. 41, Al. Emphasis is due to me.
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knowled 9 e of objects which is
ent^ti^ experience....
entitled
9
So, there can be no doubt
that Kant thought, at least

sometimes, that the understanding,
that is, the faculty
of thought, produces experience
by working up the
conceptually raw material of sensible
impressions. There
is, therefore, some reason
to think that Rorty's
suggestion doesn't involve any
misallocation of the
Kantian picture. If there were some
misallocation, there
might then be a reconstruction of his
suggestion that is
based on an alternative reading of
the Kantian picture,
and that successfully avoids his dilemma.
Theodore W.
Schick, in his Rorty and Davidson on
Alternate Conceptual
Schemes has suggested another way to
understand the
,

Kantian picture, and so, it is an open question
whether
Rorty's suggestion can be successfully reconstructed. 10
Schick proposes an account of the given that he

claims avoids the dilemma associated with the apparently

inevitable opposition between characterless or
conceptualized. He writes:

Consider .. .the perception of an ambiguous
figure like the duck-rabbit. What we see
that figure as will be determined by what
concepts we use to organize our visual
experience But we cannot use any concepts
whatsoever. We cannot, for example, see
the duck-rabbit as an octopus. The best
explanation of this fact is that our
.

^

CRITIQUE, p. 41, B1

.

Emphasis is due to me.

10 Theodore W.

Schick, Rorty and Davidson on Alternate
Conceptual Schemes The Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, vol. 1 (1987) pp. 291-303. Hereafter: RDACS
,
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visual experience of the
figure has
certain qualities which serve
to delimit
the ways
which we can see it. 11

m

The point is simple: the only
explanation for the fact
that the duck-rabbit can't
be seen as an octopus is
that
the given is not characterless.
But, as Schick writes,
"...to say that it [the given]
has properties
is not to

say that it is [or] has been
conceptualized.

Therefore

,,3

2

the given is neither characterless
nor

,

conceptualized, if the possession of
determinate features
is essentially different from
being conceptually

molded,
as the metaphysical realist
might maintain, then, as I
noted above, one branch of Rorty's
dilemma is a non

sequitur. On the basis of this, Schick
rejects the
premise of Rorty's dilemma, to wit: the
given is either
characterless or not, and if not, then it
is

conceptualized
It is unclear how Schick would make
sense of the

Kantian text where it is written that "...the
combination
conjunctio of the manifold in general can never
(

come to

)

us through the senses

here.

" 13

I

will not pursue this issue

It is more important to explain why Schick's
exit

from Rorty's dilemma can't be appropriated here.

Basically, it is because it is incompatible with Rorty's

suggestion about how there can be many actual worlds and
11

RDACS

Emphasis is due to me.

,

p.

295.

12 RDACS,

p.

296. Emendations are due to me.

13 CRITIQUE,

p.

151, B129
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truths. Suppose that the given
is neither characterless
nor conceptualized, or that it
is, in other words,

conceptually neutral without being
formless. According to
Rorty's suggestion, thinking is casting
what is
intuitively given into conceptual molds.
Moreover,
experience is supposed to be a product of
this casting,
and a world is supposed to be an ideal
sum of what can be
experienced. If there were many essentially
different
sets of conceptual molds, and the
intuitively given could
be cast into them, so that different
experiences
result,

then there would be many actual worlds. However,
even if
the given can be conceptualized in many ways,
and the

result is a plurality of experiences, and so a
plurality
of worlds, the given will, according to Schick's
claim,

possess features that will be common to all worlds,
that
is, worlds as understood in the context of Rorty's

suggestion. So, there won't be

actual worlds, not to mention

a
a

plurality of distinct
plurality of truths.

It is still an open question, therefore, whether

Rorty's suggestion can assume

a

form that is not subject

to his dilemma. A clue to an adequate reconstruction of

Rorty's suggestion lies in an ambiguity in Schick's
phrase visual experience. It may mean

(1)

of someone's visual experience, e.g.

the ambiguous

,

the reference

figure, or it may mean (2) the visual experience itself

qua episode in someone's stream of consciousness. Recall

that Kant thought, at least sometimes, that the
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understanding produces experience by
working up the
conceptually raw material of sensible

impressions. Or, is

it that the understanding
produces experience by working

up the raw material of the sensible
impressions

themselves? There is a significant
difference here, since
there is a significant distinction
between providing raw
material and being raw material. In
the first edition of
the Critique, sensible impressions
seem to provide the
raw material upon which the understanding
works. In other
words, the idea seems to be that sensible
impressions
deliver some conceptually neutral, and perhaps
featureless, stuff that the understanding works
up into

experience. In the second edition, however, sensible

impressions themselves seem to be the raw material,
the

conceptually neutral stuff, upon which the understanding
works. The idea seems to be that the understanding
works
up sensible impressions themselves, but in the sense
that

the understanding compares, combines and separates them,

and where experience just is the concatenation of

impressions that have thereby been ordered.
So, Rorty and Schick share,

I

think, an

assumption. They both maintain that the given is

something other than our sensible impressions themselves.
They both believe, perhaps mistakenly, that the given is
what is delivered by our sensible impressions. In another
idiom, one might say that they both believe that the

given is the reference of our sensible impressions. Rorty
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believes, contrary to Schick,
that the given cannot be
conceptually neutral without also
being characterless,
and that this leads to paradox.
Schick believes, contrary
to Rorty, that the given can
conceptually neutral without
being characterless, and so Rorty
's dilemma can be
avoided. But, the assumption remains:
the given is the
object of our sensible impressions,
albeit not an object
in the everyday sense of this man
or that horse.

Kant himself suggested that the given,
or the raw
material of the sensible impressions, is
the manifold of
sensible impressions themselves. He also
suggested that
to say that the material of sensible
impressions is raw
is to say something like this: the sensible
impressions

themselves are uncompared, uncombined and unseparated,
and so they are unordered. Examples of this are

commonplace. For example, Socrates suspects that he has
seen Theaetetus, but he isn't sure since it may have
been

Theodorus, or the whole episode may have been some sort
of illusion. This episode is a sort of raw material,

since it is uncompared, uncombined and unseparated, and
so it is unordered. In other words, this episode is raw,

because it neither fits with the rest of Socrates'
experience, nor does it fail to so fit. If this episode

can't be fit into the stream of Socrates' experience, it
will be illusory; if this episode can be so fit, then not

only did Socrates really see Theaetetus, what was once
raw material will be an experience. This anticipates what
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IS to come, however. The
pivotal point is that this
nay
provide an alternative to Rorty's

and Schick's

interpretations of the Kantian picture
that itself nay
provide an exit fron Rorty's dilenna,
and that nay also
support his suggestion about how to
nake sense of the
thesis that there are nany actual
worlds and truths. The
idea turns on the distinction between
providing raw
material and being raw material. Let
the given be the

manifold of sensible impressions themselves,
and let
their being raw be equivalent to their
being

uncompared,

uncombined and unseparated, and consequently
unordered.
Then, the given could then be conceptually
neutral

without being characterless. So, Rorty's dilemma
would be
obviated, since conceptual neutrality would be
compatible
possession of a determinate character. But, does
this alternative account of the Kantian picture
support

reconstruction of Rorty's suggestion about how there can
be many actual worlds and truths?

suspend this question, and

I

I

will temporarily

will turn to Rorty's claim

that his suggested account of the multiplicity of actual

worlds and truths fails because the Kantian picture upon

which it depends itself depends on the untenable

distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.
With respect to the distinction between analytic
and synthetic, Rorty writes that:
...[the] suggestion that [1] the
difference between a priori and empirical
truth is merely that between the
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a

relatively difficult to give
relatively easy brings in its up and the
train the
notion that [2] there is no
clear
distinction to be drawn between
questions
ea lng and qilestions of
fact^This,
in
t^rn ?
turn,
leaves us... with 3 no
distinction
between questions about alternative
3
6 10" 8 3b° Ut alte ™ative
'frameiorks
[

]

"^^ ^

The efficacy of Rorty's remarks
clearly depends on the
power of Quine's criticism of
the analytic-synthetic
distinction. Although Quine proffers
many criticisms of
this distinction, one important
and fundamental reproach
is this. If statements could
be divided into the mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive classes
of analytic and
synthetic, there would be statements
that are true no
matter what happens. Every statement
is, according to
Quine, revisable: "...no statement is
immune to

revision." 15 So, no statement is analytic,
and the
distinction lacks point. How does this undercut
Rorty's
suggestion about how there can be many actual
worlds and
truths? Quine's point about the analytic and
the

synthetic can be made, mutatis mutandis

,

about the a

priori and the empirical. If statements could be
divided
into the mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive

classes of those known a priori and those known through
empirical means, there would be statements that are true
no matter what course the stream of experience happened
14 WWL

,

15 TDE

,

p. 651. Emphasis, emendations and parenthetic
enumerations are due to me.

p.

43.
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to take.

In short, every statement
is revisable. So, no
statement is known a priori, and
this

distinction also

lacks point.
As Rorty understands Quine,
although the analytic-

synthetic distinction can't be made
in terms of the
impossibility and possibility of
revision, it can be made
in terms of the degree to
which it is difficult, or

easy,
to revise a statement. An
analytic statement is one that
is difficult to revise, and a
synthetic statement is one
that is easy to revise. Within the
context of fixing

belief, the distinction between a
priori and empirical
statements can be made in a similar manner.
A statement
knowable a priori is one that is difficult
to revise, and
an empirical statement is one that is
easy to revise. So,

criteria of objectivity or ostensible logical
truths are
a priori
because they are difficult to revise; any
,

presumed empirical truth, such as the cat is on
the mat,
is empirical, because it is easy to revise.
Moreover,

if

statements could be divided into the mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive classes of statements true
by

virtue of meaning and those true by virtue of facts,
there would be statements that are true no matter what
happens. Since every statement is revisable, no statement
is true by virtue of meaning. The distinction between

statements true by virtue of meaning and statements true
by virtue of facts is, according to Rorty, also that

between what is difficult and what is easy to revise, and
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the same sorts of examples apply.
Rort y concludes that
there is no distinction between
questions about
alternative theories and questions about
alternative
conceptual frameworks. What does this
mean? How is this
relevant to Rorty's suggestion?

Rorty takes his own suggestion to rest
on the
premise that there can be many essentially
different
conceptual schemes. The basic idea of his
objection is
that the question whether one conceptual
scheme is the
same as, or different than, another scheme
doesn't make
sense without the notion of analyticity, or truth
by

virtue of meaning. Suppose that there were alternative
conceptual schemes. There would then be at least two
conceptual schemes, and so there would be at least two
concepts, one drawn from each scheme. Consequently,
there

would be at least two expressions that didn't mean the
same thing. Let these expressions be a and 8. So, there

would be an analytic truth, to wit, a is not

B,

or

something like this. Moreover, this would be a statement
that is immune from revision, but Rorty maintains, with
Quine, that no statement is immune from revision.

Therefore, there can be no alternative conceptual
schemes, and so Rorty 's suggestion fails.
Is Rorty right to take his own suggestion to rest

on the premise that there can be many essentially

different conceptual schemes? Is the notion of a
conceptual scheme really the one that is operative in his
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suggestion?

I

have discussed his suggestion in terms
of

the distinction between the empirical and
the a
priori, (2) the distinction between the intuitively
(1)

given

and conceptual molds, and (3) the distinction
between the
manifold of sensible intuitions and ways of ordering
this

manifold. Thus, Rorty's suggestion could be taken to
rest
on anyone of the following three premises:

(1)

there can

be alternative a priorities by means of which the

empirical can be understood,

(2)

there can be many

essentially different sets of conceptual molds into which
the intuitively given can be cast, and (3) there can be

alternative ways to order the manifold of sensible
impressions. But, does Rorty's objection apply to his

suggestion when it is construed as based on any of these
three different premises?
In the first case, does the question whether one a

priori is the same as, or different than, another

a

priori make sense without the notion of analyticity? If

there were an alternative a priori
least two a priorities

,

,

there would be at

but would there be at least two

expressions that didn't mean the same thing? This depends
on how one construes a priori. If an a priori is

construed as a repertoire of concepts, there would be at
least two expressions that didn't mean the same thing. In
the second case, does the question whether one repertoire
of conceptual molds is the same as, or different than,

another such repertoire make sense without the notion of
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analyticity? If there were
alternative repertoires of
conceptual molds, there would
be at least two conceptual
molds, but would there be at
least two expressions
that

didn't mean the same thing?
This depends on how one
construes the conceptual mold
metaphor. For what could it
be a metaphor, if not a
metaphor for a conceptual scheme?
But, then, if there were
alternative repertoires of
conceptual molds, there would be at
least two conceptual
schemes, and so there would be at
least two expressions
that didn't mean the same thing,
in the third case, does
the question whether one way of
ordering the manifold

is

the same as, or different than,
another way make sense
without the notion of analyticity? Would
there be at

least two expressions that didn't mean
the same thing, if
there were alternative ways of ordering
the manifold?
This depends on what a way of ordering the
manifold is.

Although this anticipates what its to be
developed below,
a way of ordering the manifold is
equivalent to
an

assortment of concepts. So, if there were alternative
ways of ordering the manifold, there would be at
least
two such ways, and so there would be at least two

expressions that didn't mean the same thing.
Thus, for each way of construing Rorty's

suggestion, there are at least two expressions that don't
mean the same thing, and so the rest of Rorty's objection
applies. Let these expressions be a and B. Et cetera. No

matter the manner of its construal, it seems that Quine's
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criticism of the analytic-synthetic
distinction shows,
mutatis mutandis, that Rorty's
suggestion

fails. This is

not the case.

think that the Quinean criticism
is far
from undermining Rorty's suggestion.
The basic idea here
is that the Quinean criticism
supports Rorty's suggestion
by showing us that Kant was
wrong to think that there can
only be one way to order the
manifold, and by showing us
how there can be many essentially
different ways. To see
this, suppose that the given is the
manifold of sensible
impressions themselves, and that their being
raw is their
being uncompared, uncombined and unseparated,
and
I

consequently unordered. Or, in short, suppose
that the
given is the manifold of sensible impressions,

and that

their being raw is their being unordered.
Then, Rorty's

suggestion is this. There can be alternative ways
of
ordering the manifold of sensible impressions, and
that

experience is a product of this ordering. For each way
of
ordering the manifold, there is a different experience,
and that a world is an ideal sum of what can be

experienced. So, there can be many actual worlds. Et
cetera. Given Rorty's objection, a pivotal problem is to

show that it is possible for there to be alternative ways
to order the manifold of sensible impressions. To

paraphrase Quine, nothing is immune to revision in the
face of a recalcitrant manifold of sensible impressions,

and so it is possible to adopt alternative ways of

ordering the manifold. Kant would have said that our ways
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Of ordering the manifold
are not subject to revision,
and
it is, therefore, impossible
to adopt different ways.
But, according to Quine's
criticism, even our ways of

ordering the manifold are subject
to revision, and so it
is possible for there to be
alternative ways of ordering
the manifold. Quine's point is
that if the right sensible
impressions came along, we might revise
our ways
of

ordering the manifold. So, Rorty has,

I

think,

misconstrued the import of the Quinean
criticism of the
analytic-synthetic distinction; it doesn't show
that

Rorty 's suggestion fails, instead it shows
why one of its
pivotal premises is correct.
What, then, about Rorty's objection to his
own

suggestion? Once again, here is his objection.
Suppose
that (1) there were alternative conceptual
schemes.

Thus,

(2)

there would then be at least two conceptual schemes,

and so (3) there would be at least two concepts, one

drawn from each scheme. Consequently,

(4)

there would be

at least two expressions that didn't mean the same
thing.
(5)

Let these expressions be a and 8. So,

be an analytic truth, to wit, a is not 6
like this. Moreover,

(7)

,

(6)

there would

or something

this would be a statement that

is immune from revision, but Rorty maintains, with Quine,

that (8) no statement is immune from revision. Therefore,
(9)

there can be no alternative conceptual schemes, and

so (10) Rorty's suggestion fails. Where does this fail?

One place it fails,

I

think, is in the inference from (5)
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to (6). Doesn't this move
beg the question? Part of
the
point of saying that there are
alternative conceptual
schemes is that concepts drawn
from different schemes
can't be constituents of the
same judgments, and so a
sentence such as a is not 6 is not
meaningful. Just

because one can write

or

is not 6 doesn't mean that one

has written something that is
either meaningful or
grammatical
If Rorty's Kantian suggestion
doesn't succumb to

his own objections, what of its other
defects? Recall the
questions that might be asked. Do we really
intuit and
think? There are questions that arise from
the

metaphorical character of some of the elements
of Rorty's
suggestion. What is to be made of the metaphorical

characterization of thinking as the casting the
intuitively given into conceptual molds? Or the

metaphorical characterization of experience as

a

product

of the conceptual molding of the intuitively given?
There

are questions that arise from an ambiguity in the word

world. Is a world an ideal sum of (i) what is

experienced, or (ii) what is and can be experienced, or
(iii) what is and can be experienced plus whatever may be

connected by rules to what is and can be experienced? Is
a

world (i) that which imposes on the passive faculty of

sensuous intuition, or (ii) that of which we are supposed
to be conscious after the active faculty of thought has

interpreted what the world, in the just mentioned sense,
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has imposed on the passive faculty
of intuition? There
are questions that arise from some
of the substantive

assumptions of Rorty's suggestion. What
reason is there
for thinking that there can be
essentially different sets
of conceptual molds? Why should
one think that the given
can be cast into these molds? Lastly,
there is a

metaphilosophical question: By what means are the
answers
to such questions to be uncovered? The
uncovering process
will be, to some extent, arbitrary. I will
begin by
recalling, and reflecting on, the Protagorean vision.
My
aim is to uncover, and perhaps justify, a number
of

theses that are central to the Kantian world picture,
and
my method is to show that these theses emerge from

a

number of criticisms of the Protagorean world vision.

Protagoras maintained that the world of Socrates
is the aggregate of whatever appears to him, and since

perception is the principal mode of appearance, his world
is the aggregate of what he perceives. More generally,

the aggregate of what is perceived by an individual, or
the aggregate of what appears to an individual, is her
world. Since there are many perceiving individuals, there
are many worlds. All of this is, or should be, familiar,

but there is an additional dimension. According to

Plato's reconstruction of the Protagorean vision,

perception depends on the senses in such

a

way that what

appears through perception is partitioned on the basis of
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an alignment between the senses
and the proper objects of
the senses. Plato writes:

SOCRATES: And will you be willing to
agree
that if you perceive something by
means of
one power, it's impossible to perceive
that same thing by means of another?
For
instance, you can't perceive by means of
sight what you perceive by means of
hearing, or perceive by means of hearing
what you perceive by means of sight?
THEAETETUS: Of course. 16
In other words, the ideal sum of
perceptual appearances,

which constitute

a

Protagorean world, is partitioned into

the seen, the heard, et cetera. On the one
hand, some

characteristics, such as being red, stay within certain
perceptual partitions, and other characteristics, such
as
the darker than relation, only seem to involve
elements
that themselves stay within the confines of specific

partitions

.

In other words,

not only does red lie within

the perceptual partition of the seen, but if one thing is

darker than another, these two things also lie within the
perceptual partition of the seen. On the other hand, it
is important to note that not only are some seen things

different from other seen things, but some heard things
are different from some seen things, and, of course, vice
versa. The seen and the heard belong, according to the

Protagorean hypothesis, to different partitions, but in
this case, difference involves elements belonging to more

than one partition. Thus, some characteristics, or
16 THEAETETUS,

pp.

66-67, 184e9-185a3.
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features of a perceptual world, cross,
so to speak,
partitions. Moreover, there is a
distinction between two
types of characteristic to be made
here: (l) there are
the well-behaved characteristics,
viz., those that do not
cross perceptual partitions, and
(2) there are
the ill-

behaved characteristics, viz., those that
do cross
perceptual partitions. The pivotal question
is:

behaved characteristics have

a

Do ill-

place in a Protagorean

world?
The answer to this last question must be,

I

think,

negative. The reason is that if a Protagorean
world is an
ideal sum of what is perceived by some individual,
and
the perceived is partitioned into the seen, the
heard, et
cetera, then there could be no ill-behaved

characteristics. This is an important criticism of the

Protagorean vision.

I

also think that this implication

shows that there is something missing from the

Protagorean picture, and what is missing is an essential
element of the Kantian picture that

I

am attempting to

articulate in a manner that will enable me to me make
sense of the theses that there are many actual worlds and
truths
•Focus on the incompatibility that Plato noted,

when he wrote the following:
SOCRATES: Now take a sound and a colour.
First of all, you think just this about
them: that they both are ?
THEAETETUS Yes.
:
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S: An
at Sach is different from
th?^h
n the same
the other and
as itself ?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: And that both together
are two
and each is one ?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that too.
SOCRATES: And you're able to raise the
question whether they're like or unlike
each other?
THEAETETUS: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: Well now, by means of what do
you think all those things about them?
Because it's impossible to get hold of
what they have in common either by means
of hearing or by means of sight. Besides,
here's another proof of the point we're
talking about. If it were possible to
raise the question whether both are salty
or not, of course you'll be able to say
what you'd investigate it with: it would
clearly be neither sight nor hearing, but
something else.
THEAETETUS: Yes, of course: the power
that's exercised by means of the tongue.
SOCRATES: Good. But what about the power
which makes clear to you that which is
common to everything including these
things: that to which you apply the words
'is', 'is not', and the others we used in
our questions about them just now? What is
that power exercised by means of? What
sort of instruments are you going to
assign to all those things , by means of
which the perceiving element in us
perceives each of them?
THEAETETUS: You mean being and not being,
likeness and unlikeness, the same and
different and also one and any other
number applied to them. And it's clear
that your question is also about odd and
even, and everything else that goes with
those. What you're asking is by means of
what part of the body we perceive them
with our minds.
SOCRATES: You follow me perfectly
Theaetetus. That's exactly what I'm
asking.
THEAETETUS: Well, good heavens, Socrates,
I couldn't say; except that I think there
simply isn't any instrument of that kind
peculiar to those things, as there is in
the case of those others. On the contrary,
it seems to me that the mind itself , by

^

,

,
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mea/is of itself , considers the
things
which apply in common to everything 17
.

Theaetetus is confused in

a

way that Socrates - or

Plato? - either doesn't notice, or doesn't
note. A sound,
a colour and a taste are presumably
apprehended by three
different modes of perception, namely, those
respectively

associated with the ear, the eye and the tongue.
These
three characteristics are well-behaved, that
is, they
don t cross perceptual partitions. Consequently,
the

tongue can taste neither the colour, nor the sound,
but
then it can't be used to determine whether they
are
salty. So, when Theaetetus asserts that it is by means
of

the tongue that he would investigate whether a colour
and
a

sound are salty or not, he has erred. But, this is an

important error, since it shows that there are elements
in a Protagorean world for which the Protagoreans cannot

account
Here are just three instances. First: there are

relations that the elements of two partitions bear to an
element of a third partition: neither colour nor sound is
salty. Second

there are relations that the elements of

two partitions bear to each other: sound and colour are

different. Third: there are characteristics that belong
to all partitions: both colors and sounds are, that is,
exist. There is, of course, the question of the possible

permutations, but
17 THEAETETUS,

pp

I

.

will not consider it here. Instead,
67-68, 185a7-e4. Emphasis is due to

me
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I

Will merely note that although

a

Protagorean would not,

i

assume, want to deny any of this,
it is, on Protagorean
principles, unintelligible. Js, isn't
difference
,

sameness
likeness

,

,

otherness

identity

,

unlikeness

,

,

et cetera

oneness, twoness
,

,

,

are, it would seem, part

of any world, and so they are part of
every Protagorean

world. Perception - understood as dependent
on the senses
in such a way that what appears through
perception is

partitioned on the basis of an alignment between
the
senses and the proper objects of the senses - can't

have

any of these characteristics as its objects.

Consequently, if Protagorean worlds are ideal sums of

what is, or can be, perceived by some individual, then
not only are they incomplete, but perception can't be
the

only world constituting representation. Another sort of

representation is required to account for ill-behaved
characteristics

,

but Plato's Theaetetus does not contain

an account of the required sort of representation. 18
1

8

Perhaps the following remarks are in order. My
discussion of Protagoras has depended heavily on Plato's
text. Now, not only have I avoided the immensely
complicated problems of its interpretation, but I have
also avoided the equally complicated problem of
extracting Plato's views from his account of Protagoras.
Plato is hardly a disinterested reporter of the
Protagorean vision. It is difficult to forget that Plato
maintains that some untruths are necessary. Compare
Plato, Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1974) p. 82, 414c. So,
it might be that Plato's presentation of Protagoras is
twisted, and that he thought that this misrepresentation
is just one of a number of necessary untruths. I don't
wish to deny that philosophically interesting readings
may sometimes depend on certain twists of the text, and I
would note that a philosophically important
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In sum, Protagoras
thought that for each sentient

individual, there is a manifold
of perceptions, and that
the sum of the objects of
these perceptions is a world.
He concluded that since there
are many sentient
individuals, there must also be
many worlds. The problem
is that a Protagorean world
evidently contains more than
what can be given through, or
constituted by, perception.
So, these worlds must be
incomplete, and there must be,
if a complete world is even
possible, another kind of
world constituting representation,
in short, to return to
the leit motif of Rorty's suggestion,
it must be that we
both perceive and think. This raises
familiar questions.
What is thought? How can thought
constitute what

perception cannot? Are many repertoires of
world
constituting thoughts possible? it is also
necessary to
say how it is that thought can constitute
any segment of
a world,

what a world is, and what an object is.

I

think

that Kant explains how thought or conception
can be world
constituting, and that he gives an account of what
an

object must consequently be. It might be better to say
that he gives us an account of objectivity, but there
will be more on this in the sequel.

I

also maintain that

reconstruction of the Protagorean thing may itself
require a certain metatwisting of the Platonic texts.
Indeed, my readings of Whorf, et alia, have been, so to
speak, systematically misleading readings, but this has
been in the service of the development of both a
philosophically interesting reading, and the development
of my own views. I'll not enter into these issues here.
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his story can be appropriated
to show that there are many
actual worlds. So, it is to Kant's
views on these matters

that

I

must now turn.
There is

thesis that the foregoing critigue
of
Protagoras renders discernible, and that
is essential to
the Kantian picture of what it is
to be a world, what is
this thesis? in short, it is this: if
a manifold of
a

perceptions has an object, it must also have
a certain
unity, and this unity cannot be given
through perception.
Kant thinks that the fact of this unity
entails that
every event follows another event according

to a rule,

and so on. Bracket this.

I

propose to follow up Rorty's

suggestion, and to use the Kantian story of this unity
to
explain, and to argue for, the thesis that there
are many
actual worlds. So the pivotal question is: what is
this

unity?
In a way reminiscent of the just discussed

Platonic criticism of Protagoras, Franz Brentano remarks
that many of us definitely recognize that sound and color
are different, and so many of us are clearly capable of

comparing color and sound. He inquires: "How would this
presentation of their difference be possible if the

presentations of color and sound belonged to
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a

different

reality?” 19 it can't be that one simply
looks, since this
would exclude the sound that is to be
compared with what
is seen.

It can't be that one merely listens,
since this

would exclude the color that is to be
compared with what
is heard.

It can't be that one employs some third

perceptual modality, since this would exclude both
the
color and the sound that are to be compared,

unless, of

course, they one's auditory and visual perceptions
were

somehow united in it. This is the first hint of the
unity
that I seek to explicate.
In order to make the nature of this unity clearer,

Brentano points out that this unity of visual and

auditory perception is not at all like that of the mere
juxtaposition of the auditory perceptions of
and the visual perceptions of

a

a

blind man

deaf man. No matter how

the two men may be juxtaposed, they cannot be aware of
the relation between color and sound. Brentano thinks

that
...the cognition which compares them [to
wit: sound and color] is a real objective
unity, but when we combine the acts of the
blind and the deaf man, we always get a
mere collective and never a unitary real

thing 20
.

He continues:
19 Franz Brentano,

Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint, edited by Oskar Kraus, English edition edited
by Linda L. McAlister, translated by Antos C. Rancurello,
D.B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister, Humanities Press,
New York (1973) p. 159. Hereafter: PES.
on

PES, p.

159.

.

.

Parenthetic emendation is due to me.
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makes no difference
the blind man and the deaf man are whether
far
apart or near one another, if they
lived
together permanently in the same house
indeed, even if they had grown up
together
as inseparably as Siamese twins or
even
more so it would not increase the
possibility of the hypothesis one bit.
Only if sound and color are presented
jointly, in one and the same reality, is
it conceivable that they can be compared
with one another. 21
An important point here is that our ability
to compare

such mundane things as colors and sounds, and
our ability
to be aware that they are different, both
rest on some
sort of unity of our visual and auditory perceptions.

Moreover, an egually important point is that this
unity
is not that of the blind man and the deaf man in
mere

juxtaposition. Together, they do not form, or constitute,
a unitary real thing,

collective
there is

a

but instead they form a mere

Although Brentano may have shown us that
unity that needs to be explained, and that

such a unity is importantly different from the mere

collectivity illustrated by the juxtaposition of the
blind man and the deaf man, he has not himself provided,
at least in the passage under consideration, such an

explanation. So, there remains the question of what this

unity is.
The existence and essence of this unity is further

illustrated by a thought experiment that was presented by

William James. He wrote:
21 PES,

p.

159.
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Take a sentence of a dozen words,
and
welve men and tell to each one word. take
stand the men in a row or jam them in Then
a
bunch, and let each think of his word
as
intently as he will; nowhere will there be
a consciousness of the whole
sentence.
It is unfortunate that James does
not say more about this

thought experiment, but one point is clear:
James' twelve
men are importantly analogous to Brentano's
blind man and
deaf man. Just as Brentano's pair can't be
conscious
of

the relation between color and sound, James' dozen
can't
be conscious of the whole sentence in question. If
there

were, in addition to Brentano's two men, a third man
who

could both hear and see, he would presumably be conscious
of at least one relation between sound and color, namely,

that color is not sound. The sounds that a blind man

hears cannot be compared to the colors that

a

deaf man

sees, because their perceptions do not, and presumably

cannot, possess the unity of the visual and auditory

perceptions of someone who both sees and hears.
Analogously, if there were, in addition to James' dozen
men, a thirteenth man who was told the entire dozen word

sentence, he would presumably be conscious of the
22 William James, The Principles
of Psychology, vol.
Dover Publications, New York (1950) p. 160. Compare

l,

Norman Kemp-Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of
Pure Reason', second edition, revised and enlarged, The
MacMillan Press, Ltd., (1979) p. 459, footnote 1.
Hereafter: NKS Also compare Robert Paul Wolff, in his
Kant's Theory of Mental Activity: A Commentary on the
Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1963) pp. 105-109.
Hereafter: KTMA
.
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complete sentence of the thought experiment.
A thirteenth
man would be capable of being conscious of
something of
which the dozen were incapable of being
conscious. The

point of James

7

thought experiment is to get us to

understand that the dozen word perceptions of the
man who
has perceived the whole sentence are essentially

different from the dozen word perceptions of the
twelve
men who have not perceived the whole sentence. The

former

possess the unity required of perceptions through
which
sentence — or, more generally, an object — may

a

appear,

whereas the latter do not. The dozen men can't go
through , take up, and connect into a single consciousness
of a single sentence their dozen individual perceptions
of one of a dozen words, since these perceptions fail to

possess the unity of the perceptions of the man who has

perceived the whole sentence. 23
Brentano and James have proffered importantly

different thought experiments, however. Brentano's point
is that different perceptual modalities must be somehow

united, if we are to be capable of comparing their

contents. So, for example, our visual and auditory

perceptions must somehow be united, if we are to be
capable of comparing sounds and colors, and recognizing
that sound is not color. James makes a similar and
perhaps deeper point: even perceptions within the same
23 Compare CRITIQUE,

p.

Ill; A77=B102. Also compare

CRITIQUE, p. 131; A99
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modality must somehow be united, if one is
to be capable
of being aware of objects that have parts
that
are

serially presented by means of these perceptions
is,

I

This

think, what Kant meant, when he wrote: "It is only

when we have ... produced synthetic unity in the
manifold
of intuition that we are in a position to say that
we

know the object

.

24 j n other
words,

even perceptions

within the same modality must somehow be united, if one
is to be capable of being aware of an object that is

composed of parts that are thereby perceived. So, for
example, a dozen perceptions of a dozen words must

somehow be united, if one is to be capable of being aware
of a sentence that is composed of these words.
In the context of James' point that even

perceptions within the same modality must possess some
sort of unity, if one is to be capable of being aware of

objects that are composed of parts that are serially

presented by means of these perceptions

,

reconsider the

above criticism of the Protagorean vision. A Protagorean

world contains more than what can be given through, or

constituted by, perception, namely, relations among the
objects of different perceptual modalities. So, such

worlds must be incomplete. Et cetera. This makes it seem,
however, that a Protagorean world could still contain the

objects of the individual perceptual modalities, but in
24 CRITIQUE,

p.

135, A105.
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the light of James' thought experiment,
this can be seen
to be mistaken. The basic reason is that
everything
is,

for the Protagorean, given through perception,
but the

unity of the manifold of perceptions can never be
perceived, that is, can never be given through

perception. As Kant wrote in an important passage of his
first Critique: "...the combination ... of the manifold
in

general can never come to us through the senses .... "25

jn

other words, the unity of the manifold of perceptions can

never be given through perception. The fundamental

mistake is that if every element of a Protagorean world
comes through perception, and the unity in question can't
be given through, or constituted by, perception

,

then the

unity that is necessary for there to be any awareness of
objects must be absent, and so there can't be any

awareness of objects.
For example, even a Protagorean would admit,

I

think, that there is, and so there can be, an awareness
of such objects as twelve word sentences, but the problem
is that this is, on Protagorean principles,

Protagorean has

a

impossible. A

place for a dozen perceptions of a

dozen words, but he has no place for the unity that these

perceptions must possess if there is to be an awareness
of a twelve word sentence, and so she can't account for

what is obvious: not only is such an awareness possible,
25 CRITIQUE, p.

151, B129.
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It is actual.

Indeed, since we are actually aware
of

objects such as twelve word sentences,
it must be
possible for us to be aware of them. More
generally, even
the perceptions of a particular modality
must possess a
unity, which is as yet unexplained, if there

is to be any

awareness of objects. So, the Protagorean must
tell us
that we can't be conscious of the sentence of
James'

thought experiment, and consequently we can't be
aware of
certain sorts of object of which we are certainly
aware,

but this would seem to refute it. In the light of
James'

thought experiment, it can be seen that

a

Protagorean

world can't even contain the objects of the individual
perceptual modalities, and this too would seem to refute
it.

The Protagorean vision is refuted because

perceptions, if they are to be perceptions of objects,

require a unity that cannot come through perception. And,
so,

a

Protagorean world depends on, if it is to contain

such objects, a unity that its own defining principles

deny it.
There are a pair of problems here, and I'm not
sure what to say about them. First, if knowledge is to be

intersub jective, and solipsism is to be avoided, must not

what seem to be separate minds be unified in some way?
Just as

I

can only know that color and sound are

different if my visual and auditory perceptions are
somehow unified,

I

can only know that your visual

perceptions are different from my auditory perceptions if
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your visual perceptions and my auditory
perceptions are
somehow unified. What is wrong with this? This
quickly
leads to the conclusion that there is only one

mind, or

does it? Second

,

why can't unity be given through

perception? Why can't the unity of the manifold of

perceptions be perceived? Perhaps there is some

unattested Protagorean doctrine according to which
perception is able to constitute much more than is
usually supposed. A contemporary neo-Protagorean

Merleau-Ponty

,

did. He writes:

,

Maurice

seems to find more in perception than Kant
"One sees the hardness and brittleness of

glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this

sound is conveyed by the visible glass." 26

I

will bracket

these issues here.
Not only are the above described thought

experiments the basis of

a

number of powerful criticisms

of the Protagorean vision, but they also establish the

necessity of the unity of consciousness, and they provide
a

glimpse into what this unity is. However, they don't

explain this unity, and they don't establish what follows
from the fact of this unity. On the one hand, Kant

attempted to both explain it, and divine its
consequences. On the other hand, my aim is to show that
the Kantian world picture, of which it is an essential
26 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception,

translated by Colin Smith, The Humanities Press, New York
(1962) p.

229.
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element

supports the theses that there are
many actual
worlds, and that there are many
truths. This is not a use
to which Kant would happily see
his vision
,

put,

I

think,

since some things that Kant writes
in his first Critique
suggest that he thought that the fact
of the unity
insinuated above entails that there is
just one actual
world. For example, Kant thinks that
since the

world, or

nature, is merely an aggregate of
appearances

,

and not a

thing in itself, the fact of its conformity
to law is
entailed by the fact of the unity that I have
been
discussing, which Kant entitles the transcendental
unity
of apperception. It can, according to Kant,
be known a
priori both that the events, of which the world
is
composed, must conform to law, and that the world
must be
unitary, that is, unitary in the sense that the law
to

which its events conform imposes a unifying structure
on
them, and thereby on it. In is in this context that
Kant

writes about the necessary interconnection of events, and
the universal unity of the world, or nature. 27 It is,

moreover, difficult to understand how Kant could write in

this manner, if he did not believe that the

transcendental unity of apperception, which is, at this
point, little more than a title, necessitates that there
be one and only one actual world or nature.

27 Compare CRITIQUE,
p.

140, A114.
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The thesis that there are many
actual worlds is
not utterly alien to Kant's
thought, however. At one
point in his Inaugural Dissertation,
however, Kant writes
that "...a plurality of actual worlds
outside one another
is not impossible by its very
concept .... "28 what I hope
to show is that the a more articulated
account of the
unity hinted at above can be used to
define world the
basic idea is that a world is something
like a sum of all
;

that can be represented through the
representations that
can possess this unity. Moreover, there
are many actual
worlds just when there are many sums of things
that can
be represented by many manifolds of representations
each
of which can possess this hitherto elusive
unity.
Let me elaborate this by using Kant's terms to

give a rough account of the point of Davidson's polemic

against conceptual relativism. Davidson's insight might
be paraphrased in the following manner: were there to be
a

conceptual scheme that is alternative to ours, there

would be representations that could not be united with
our representations. These alternative representations

would stand to ours as the blind man's auditory
perceptions stand to the deaf man's visual perceptions.
Just as the blind man's auditory perceptions can be
?D

Immanuel Kant, On the Form and Principles of the
Sensible and the Intelligible World (Inaugural
Dissertation) in Kant's Latin Writings, edited and
translated by Lewis White Beck, et alia, Peter Lang, New
York (1986) p. 174.
,
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nothing to the deaf man, or just
as the deaf man's visual
perceptions can be nothing to the blind
man, the

representations, which are associated with
an alternative
conceptual scheme, can be nothing to us.
Moreover, just
as the sounds exhibited by means
of the blind man's
auditory perceptions can be nothing to
the deaf man, or
just as the colors exhibited by means
of the deaf man's

visual perceptions can be nothing to the
blind man, the
objects exhibited by means of the representations,
which
are associated with an alternative conceptual
scheme, can
be nothing to us. Consequently, the world
of objects

exhibited by means of alternative representations
is
different from the world of objects exhibited by means
of
our representations, and so not only can't we know
it,

but we must also conclude that it is unreal. Presumably,
a

conceptual relativist wants to say both that

(1)

there

are other, and therefore different, worlds of objects,
and that (2) somehow they can be represented. Davidson's

point is that these two theses can't be put together.

Simply put, the intuition that underlies his point is
that any object that we can represent can't belong to

a

world other than our own. The conceptual relativist must
show, therefore, how it is that worlds of objects can be

both different and something to us. Moreover, there is
the altogether different requirement that she show that

there are worlds of objects that are both different and

something to us.
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An adequate answer to Davidson's
objection, and an
adequate explication of the thesis that
there are many
actual worlds and truths, require, I
think, an

alternative conception of what it is to be an
object.
Protagoras offers us a paradigm of such an
alternative
conception. Faced with the fact of conflict betwixt
his
peers, Protagoras conjectured that they perceive
^ eren ^-

objects. If, for example, Socrates and

Theaetetus are opposed over the character of the wind,
they must be, according to Protagoras, perceiving

different winds. If Socrates and Theaetetus perceive
different winds, however, they can't be perceiving the
wind as it is in itself. What, then, are they perceiving?
The Protagorean answer to this question depends on a

reconceptualization of what it is to be an object. About
this alternative conceptualization, Plato wrote:
...black, white, or any other colour will
turn out to have come into being, from the
collision of the eyes with the appropriate
motion. What we say a given colour is will
be neither the thing which collides, not
the thing it collides with, but something
which has come into being between them;
something peculiar to each one. 29

Perception involves, according to Protagoras, two
elements. In the case of visual perception, these are

(1)

the eyes, and (2) something that Protagoras - or: Plato?

— entitles motion. Color is constituted by the collision,
or interaction, of these two elements. Consequently,
29 THEAETETUS, p.19,

154a.
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color itself is neither in the
motion, nor in the eyes.
As Plato puts it, color is something

that is constituted,

or comes into being, between the
eyes and the motion. For
each pair of eyes, therefore, there
is a distinct point

that is between then and the motion,
and so there is a
distinct color. So, color is peculiar to
each pair of
eyes, or, in other words, color is
peculiar to each
percipient. Moreover, I presume that this story

applies,

mutatis mutandis

,

to any other perceptible object, for

example, tastes, sounds or textures.

With this story, Protagoras provides us with
an

alternative conception of what it is to be an object.
He
also provides us with the key to explain what it
means to
say that objects are appearances, to wit: objects
are

neither merely subjective — in the eyes, for example —
nor things in themselves — for example, some sort of

motion in itself. To say that an object is an appearance
is to say that it is between the merely subjective and

things in themselves. One could object that this notion
of being between the subjective and things in themselves
is vague, but one could make the stronger objection that

there is a way in which this story depends on essentially
anti Protagorean presuppositions: it depends on the

supposition that there are eyes and motion that are
themselves not between some eyes and motion, that is,
eyes and motion in themselves. In other words, this story

depends on the supposition of things of which man is not
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the measure. There is sense in
the suggestion that man is
the measure of all those things
that are between eyes in
themselves and motion in itself, since
there is sense in
the idea that eyes in themselves
have some role in the
constitution of this somewhat mysterious
middle region.
However, eyes in themselves do not, at
least within the
context of the story in question, have any
role in their
own constitution. If man were the measure
of all things,
he would be the measure of eyes and motion,
and so they

would seem to need to be between yet further eyes
and
motion. The Protagorean would seem to face, therefore,
either an infinite regress, or entities for which he
cannot account.
Let me place this problem aside, since it is not

clear whether it is the result of authentic Protagorean
doctrines, or Protagorean doctrines tainted with Platonic
poison. Although it fails, Protagoras offers us a

paradigm of an alternative conception of what it is to be
an object. A Protagorean object is somehow between

subject and object in itself, but

world picture would,

I

a

purified Protagorean

presume, eliminate all things in

themselves, whether they be subjects - eyes - or objects

— motions. But, on the supposition of such

a purge,

what

would things - subjects or objects - then be? One might

continue to talk in the manner of the old story, and say
that things would then be appearances

,

but this wouldn't

explain their curious status. To what, in the absence of
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the old story about eyes and
motions, does saying that a
thing is an appearance amount? An
answer to this question
is contained in the Protagorean
thesis that the world of
Theaetetus is the aggregate of whatever
appears to him,
and since perception is the principal
mode of appearance,
his world is the aggregate of what he
perceives.

According to Protagoras,

I

think, to say that objects are

appearances is to say that objects are nothing
more than
objects of perception. However, as I have
indicated over
the course of the last several pages, there
are several

ways in which these aspects of the Protagorean
vision are
defective. So, it can't be followed here. In other
words,

although Protagoras offers us

a

paradigm of an

alternative manner of conceiving what it is to be an
object, since his alternative is based on a defective

vision, we can't decline or conjugate our Kantian

alternative on the basis of his paradigm. The Kantian
alternative has

a

grammar that is specific to it.

According to the Kantian world picture, what is it
to be an object? The essential idea is that an object is
an object of some representation that is somehow unified

with other representations. Since it is not clear what
this unity is, this idea is, at best, a suggestion about

how to proceed, and it is, therefore, necessary to

rethink what it is to be an object. Kant said as much as
this, when he said that "...we must make clear to

ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object of
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representations '."30 one finds confirmation
of Kant's
intention in his claim that:
...it is a question for deeper enquiry
what the word 'object' ouqht to signify
in
respect of appearances when these are
viewed not in so far as they are (as
representations) objects, but only in so
far as they stand for an object. 33
-

By reflecting on Kant,

I

hope to sift out an account of

what it is for object to be an appearance,
and an account
of the representations that constitute
what perception
cannot.
be,

I

will begin this question: what must an object

if there are to be many actual worlds?

Kant's conception of what it is to be an object,

which

I

want to appropriate for my cause, is part of his

account a priori knowledge. For example, he wanted to
explain how, and show that, we can know a priori that
every event must follow another event according to

a

Bracket this aspect of his world picture. In

a

ru3 e
-

*

conceptually revolutionary passage, Kant wrote:
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our
knowledge must conform to objects. But all
attempts to extend our knowledge of
objects by establishing something in
regard to them a priori, by means of
concepts, have, on this assumption, ended
in failure. We must therefore make trial
whether we may not have more success in
the task of metaphysics, if we suppose
that objects must conform to our
knowledge. This would agree better with
what is desired, namely, that it should be
possible to have knowledge of objects a
30 CRITIQUE,

p.

134, A104

31 CRITIQUE,

p.

219,

B234-235=A189-190
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priori, determining something in regard
to
them prior to their being given. 3 ^

Kant's explanation and argument begins with
what he takes
to be two mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive

possibilities: either (1) knowledge conforms to
its
object, or (2) objects somehow conform to knowledge

As

I

have noted above, he thought that the former option

entails scepticism. If knowledge conforms to its object,
then there is an object that exists in itself, and

knowing involves correctly representing this object as
it
is in itself. As he wrote in his Prolegomena:

"Should

nature signify the existence of things in themselves, we
could never cognize it either a priori or a

posteriori

.

"

33

if knowledge is supposed to conform to a

distinct and representation independent object, it must
be possible for knowledge to fail to conform, and it is

exactly this that is scepticism. Therefore, one must
choose between an intuition about the essence of

knowledge - namely, that it somehow conforms to preexistent objects in themselves - and an intuition about

scepticism - namely, that it is utterly wrongheaded. Kant
rejected scepticism, and so he opted to abandon the
intuition that knowledge somehow conforms to pre-existent
objects in themselves. Kant prefers to reject scepticism,
even if he must then affirm that in some manner objects
32 CRITIQUE,

p.

22,

Bxvi-xvii. The emphasis is added by

me
33 PROLEGOMENA,

p.

38.
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conform to knowledge. What, then, are
objects? The desire
for a priori knowledge, not to mention
knowledge
simpliciter, can only be satisfied by renouncing
the
intuition that knowledge conforms to its object,

and the

affirming that objects somehow conform to
knowledge. The
idea is not that there is first an object, and
then

there

is someone who knows, and finally the object
changes so

as to conform to this person's knowledge. For
example,

the idea is not that there is first an apple, and
then

Socrates knows that it is an orange, and finally the
apple changes into an orange so as to conform to
Socrates' knowledge. But, then, what is the idea? What
can it possibly mean to say that objects conform to

knowledge ? What is Kant's conception of what it is to be
an object?

There are

a

number of sites where Kant works out

the details of his alternative conception of what it is
to be an object. In my attempt to appropriate this

conception,

I

will mainly draw from the Transcendental

Deduction in A, or, more specifically, the Subjective
Deduction

,

although

I

will also consider, in an

incidental manner, the Second Analogy 34 On the reading
.

34 The project of articulating Kant's
account of what it
is to be an object could be immense. To avoid the obvious

problems, not only will I focus on an account that can be
found in the above mentioned texts, but I will work, more
or less without question, within the framework of the
reading provided by Robert Paul Wolff in his KTMA.
Compare pp. 100-134, 154-164, and 260-280.
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taken up here, these two sites contain
Kant's

justification for the thesis that, in the
words of the
Subjective Deduction "...all appearances
stand in a
,

thoroughgoing connection according to necessary
laws...." 35 or, in the words of the principle
of the
first edition version of the Second Analogy:
"Everything

that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes

something upon which it follows according to

a

rule." 35

More generally, the conclusion of Kant's argument is
that
if there is a consciousness that possesses the
unity

described above, it must be possible for there to be
authentic empirical knowledge. In other words, the

conclusion is that the unity of consciousness is

a

sufficient condition for both the possibility and the

actuality of empirical knowledge of objects in space and
time. For my purposes, what is important about this

argument is that it is intertwined with an account of
what it is to be an object — or more accurately perhaps,
an account of objectivity - and this is exactly what

hope to appropriate from Kant. In the following,

I

I

will

attempt to disentangle the elements of his conception of
what it is to be an object, and put them together in

way that

I

a

think supports the thesis that there are many

actual worlds and truths. How do
35 CRITIQUE,

p.

36 CRITIQUE, p.

140, A113-114.
218, A189.
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I

plan to do this?

The elements of Kant's conception
of what it is to
be an object, not to mention
the justification of this

conception, are mostly to be found in
the Subjective
Deduction. This text is, or appears to
be, an

inconsistent muddle, however. One conjecture
that has
been offered to explain this is the
historical thesis
that Kant more or less capriciously
arranged four groups
of his writings — each of which
dates from a different
period, and each of which is incompatible
with the other
three — into the Subjective Deduction. This
is, of
course, the famous patchwork thesis. 37 Whereas
the

patchwork thesis explains the apparent muddle of the

Transcendental Deduction by means of a thesis that
concerns the manner of its composition, Wolff explains
the ostensible disarray of Kant's text with a thesis
that

concerns the manner of its exposition. His idea is that
sine-® Kant

couldn't be sure that the readers of the first

Critique would have read his previous works, it was

necessary for him to explain at least three previous
stages of his thought. In other words, his strategy for

explaining the doctrines of the Subjective Deduction was
to begin by explaining a number of earlier accounts of

the transcendental unity of apperception that he had

considered, but rejected. It is only in the Second
Analogy, which forms, so to speak, a fifth stage, that
37 Compare NKS

,

pp.

202-234.
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Kant presents his most fully developed
position. For my
purposes, what is important is that each
of these five
stages is intertwined with an account of
what it is to be
an object; and it is this account that

I

hope to

appropriate in order to make sense of the theses
that
there are many actual worlds, and that there are
many
truths. Moreover, an important feature of the
last

four

stages is that each includes a criticism of the
doctrines, including the various conceptions of what it
is to be an object, upon which the analysis of the

preceding stage depends. By the fifth and last stage,
namely, the Second Analogy, Kant has provided both an

alternative conception of what it is to be an object, and
a justification of this conception.

Such a justification

is obviously essential to any attempt to make sense of

the theses that there are many actual worlds, and that

there are many truths. So, an important part of the task
of making sense of these two theses can be accomplished

by following Kant through the argument of the Subjective

Deduction

,

and subsidiarily, the Second Analogy.

Although it might seem that good sense would now
counsel me to turn to a discussion of the doctrines and

argument of stage one,

a

preparatory discussion of two

further premises of Kant's argument is necessary, that
is,

premises in addition to the already discussed premise

that consciousness possesses the unity described in
James' thought experiment. The first premise is that
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representations have two importantly different
aspects.
On the one hand a representation is an
episode in
someone's conscious life. For example, my perception
of
cat is an episode in my conscious life. As such,

a

it has a

date, and it has a place in a sequence of other
such

episodes. For example, it might be that
cat at 10:06 AM, on September

be that

I

and that
So,

I

6,

I

perceived the

1993. Moreover,

it might

perceived the tree before

I

perceived the cat,

perceived the cat before

I

perceived the dog.

I

first perceived the tree, then secondly the cat,

and finally the dog. On the other hand, representations

refer to, or represent, objects that are not themselves
representations. For example, my perception of

refers to, or represents,

a cat

a cat

that is not itself a

perception. As Kant wrote in the Subjective Deduction:
"All representations have, as representations, their

object...." 38 Wolff glosses this fragment of

a

passage in

the following manner:
...this referential function [of
representations] exists whether or not
there really is some object to be
represented. It is precisely because the
concept of a unicorn purports to represent
that we can call it fictitious. 39

Mutatis mutandis, Hamlet's perception of his father's
ghost has a referential function, even if his father's
ghost fails to exist; it is precisely because Hamlet's
38 CRITIQUE, p.
39 KTMA, p.

109.

137, A108.

Emendation is due to me.
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perception of his father's ghost purports
to represent
that we can all it an illusion. But, Hamlet's
perception
does not purport. People purport, not their
perceptions.

So,

although it might be that Hamlet purports, his

perceptions do not. Moreover, it is far less than
felicitous to say that there is something that is the

object of Hamlet's perception, but it doesn't exist.

Although this can't be made precise at this point
in my discussion, there are good reasons to think
that it
is incorrect to say, as Wolff says that Kant says, that

representations function ref erentially

,

when there is no

object to be represented. First, this runs counter to the
intuition that it is deeply wrongheaded to say that there
is something that is the object of Hamlet's perception,

but it doesn't exist. Second, it runs counter to

a

distinction that Kant is at pains to make in the Second

Analogy

to wit, the distinction between subjective

representations

which don't function ref erentially

objective representations

,

and

which do so function. Note,

however, that there is an intuition behind Wolff's gloss:
it is precisely because Hamlet's perception seems to be a

perception of his father's ghost that it can be said that
it is an illusion.

In other words,

if Hamlet didn't

visually perceive anything at all, there would be little
point to saying that he had been the victim of an
illusion, as opposed to being unconscious. Perhaps this

merely means that Hamlet's perception has
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a sense,

but no

reference

,

although this would require rethinking the

notion of reference. So, when Kant claims that every

representation has its object, this need mean no more
than every representation, qua representation, has a
sense. There is, then, no need to be saddled with the

completely infelicitous thesis that there is something
that is the object of Hamlet's perception, but it doesn't
exist. A paradigm might be this: although the word

unicorn has a sense, it has no reference. So, one can
say, on Kant's behalf, that although Hamlet's perception

has a sense, it has no reference. Moreover, this

preserves the distinction, which is made in the Second

Analogy

,

between subjective representations and objective

representations

.

Both subjective and objective

representations have a sense, but only the latter have

a

reference. The important Kantian move is to explain

objective representations in terms of

a

certain sort of

relation among representations, instead of a relation
between a representation and a utterly distinct object.
Thus, in addition to the premise that consciousness must

possess the unity illustrated by James' thought
experiment, there is this first important premise:

representations have two aspects:

(1)

they are episodes

in our conscious lives, and (2) they have, qua

representations, a sense. 40
40 There is a problem with this, however. An essential
Kantian thesis is that the manifold possesses the unity
illustrated by James' though experiment because its
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The second premise concerns an
essential feature
of knowledge, it is an answer
to the question: What
characteristic distinguishes knowledge
from imagination?
In short, the pertinent characteristic
is, according to
Kant, necessity. Now, there are a
number of analyses of
the relevant form of necessity, but
let me prescind from
them here. The premise in question only
concerns the deep
relation between knowledge, imagination and
necessity,

not the nature of this necessity. The basic
intuition

here is that since not all assertions are true,
if

assert something,

I

have not ipso facto asserted

something true. Similarly, if

I

assert something,

not ipso facto assert something that
if

I

I

I

I

do

know. For example,

assert that the cat is blue, it is not ipso facto

true that the cat is blue; similarly, if
the cat is blue,

I

assert that

do not ipso facto know that the cat is

I

blue. This is related to, if not the same as, the belief

constraint

,

which

I

have discussed above: to say or

believe something is not ipso facto to say or believe

something true. In imagining

a cat,

there is a certain

elements are subsumable under rules. If the distinction
between an objective and a subjective representation is
the distinction between a representation that can and one
that cannot be subsumed under rules that connect it with
other representations, then only a fragment, that is, a
proper subset, of the elements of the manifold is
subsumable under rules, else all representations are
objective. So, the explanation of the unity of
consciousness can't be that the elements of the manifold
are subsumable under rules. I'm not sure what to say
about this, and so I will, in this work, suspend the
questions that it raises.
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amount of free play.

I

can imagine a black cat, but

also imagine a blue cat, a green cat, and
even

a

I

can

grue

cat, which would be a cool cat indeed.
This free play and

the necessity in question here are opposites.
There is
little, if anything at all, about an imagined
cat that

constrains the imaginative ascription of color to it;
in
the case of a real cat, however, there is something

that

constrains the true and faithful ascription of color to
it,

namely, the cat itself, or so one might presume. In

the latter case, the act of forming a true judgment about
the cat, or knowing the cat, would seem to be constrained
by the existence and essence of the cat. This begs an

important question, however, to wit; how is the necessity
or constraint in question here to be explained? To

describe such

a

necessity in terms of the existence and

essence of some cat in itself is to foreclose the

possibility of describing and explaining it in terms of
something else, for example, some relation among
representations. This latter explanation can only be,
however,

a

forethought of what is to come. The point,

which needs to be made at this juncture, is that an
essential characteristic of knowledge is necessity or
constraint, but it is also important to prescind from any

specific explanation of this necessity. In other words,
at this point, it is necessary to prescind from

explaining or describing this necessity in terms of some
relation between the relevant representations and some
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m

object

itself, or in terms of some relation
among

representations simpliciter
Before

I

proceed to my discussion of the first

stage of the Subjective Deduction
and why

I

,

I

will first note that

have articulated the second premise in a way

that is partly different from the manner in which
Wolff
has put it. He writes:

What is the defining mark of knowledge
that sets it off from mere subjective
fancy? The answer... is necessity.
Knowledge is the assertion of a necessary
between the subject and the predicate of a
judgment .... [When I
know] ... I ... [assert ].. .that there is an
objective connection among these
properties [which are presumably denoted
by the aforementioned subject and
predicate], such that I must connect them
in my judgment. 41
I

presume that Wolff would also want to assert that there

are cases in which when one knows, one asserts that there
is an objective connection between some thing and some

property; for example, when
I

I

know that the cat is black,

assert that there is an objective connection between

the cat and the property of being black. Be this as it
may, this is somewhat misleading. It is important to note

that this necessity, or this must, is not the necessity
of analyticity.

In other words,

it is not necessary to

connect the relevant subject with the relevant predicate
because there is some sort of logical or semantic
41 KTMA,

pp.

112-113. Parenthetic emendations are due to

me
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connection between them. Moreover, in this
case, the
necessity in question cannot be explicated in

terms of

truth in all possible worlds. For example, given

a

black

cat, the necessity of connecting the cat with
is black is

not to be understood in terms of the cat's being
black in
all possible worlds. This is a mistake; the cat's
being

black is -

I

suppose - a contingent matter. So,

I

suspect

that Wolff has made the point of the second premise in a

somewhat misleading way, that is, misleading relative to
an audience that is euphoric with a certain view of

necessity. In sum, the second premise might be put this
way: when

I

know, not only must

I

assert that there is a

connection among certain properties, or among some thing
and some property, et cetera, but this connection must be

such that

I

must connect them in my judgment. However,

the second premise might also be put this way: to assert

something is not ipso facto to assert something that one
knows. With these two premises in hand, it is now

possible to turn to stage one of the Subjective

Deduction

.

Kant desires to show that empirical knowledge of

objects in space and time is not only

a

possibility, but

it is an actuality. One version of Kant's argument rests

on the premise that a manifold of perceptions of objects

must possess the unity depicted in the above thought
experiments, especially that of James. It is, moreover,

mixed with an account of this unity. His strategy is to
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explain the nature of this unity by
explaining why it is
that the manifold of perceptions possess
it. At this

stage of things, the conjecture is that
the manifold of
perceptions is unified because each perception
is

directed to a unitary object that is both distinct
from,
and independent of, perception. In the case of
James'

thought experiment, for example, the reader's dozen

perceptions of a dozen words are unified because each
perception is also directed to

a

unitary and distinct

sentence. However, a perception that is directed to an

object cannot fail to be empirical knowledge. There are
two reasons for this. First, a perception that fails to
be directed to an object also fails to be knowledge. In

the case of James' thought experiment, any perception

that is directed to the sentence in question is

inevitably an empirical knowledge of it. Second, since a

representation that is directed to an object is

constrained or necessitated by this object, it is
knowledge. Recall that

a

pivotal premise of Kant's

argument is that an essential characteristic of knowledge
is necessity or constraint. When one knows, not only must

one assert that there is a connection among certain

properties, or among some thing and some property, et
cetera, but this connection must be such that one must

connect them in one's judgment. In sum, a representation
that is directed to

a

constraining object is ipso facto

knowledge. Therefore, given the premise that the manifold
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of perceptions possesses the unity
described in Janes'

thought experiments, and given the above described

explanation of this unity, it follows that empirical

knowledge is actual, and so it is possible

.

The essential

idea here is that the mere fact of the unity of

consciousness implies that the contents of consciousness
are directed to objects, which itself implies both the

actuality and the possibility of empirical knowledge.
Prescinding from the guestion of the merits of
this argument, it is clear that it is intertwined with an

account of what it is to be an object. Since this account
rests on the assumption that there is

a

distinct and

unique object that is representation independent, it is

obviously inconsistent with the thesis that there are
many actual worlds, and so it is obviously not useful to
the advocate of this sort of plurality. Notwithstanding,

this account has a problem that is independent of the

thesis that there are many actual worlds, and that an

advocate of this plurality can exploit to motivate Kant's

conception of an object, which he must do, since he can't
appeal, as Kant does, to the presumably desirable result
of a unique a priori knowledge. As Kant himself points

out
...it is easily seen that this object must
be thought only as something in general =
x, since outside our knowledge we have

223

nothing which we could set over against
this knowledge as corresponding to it. 42
The explanandum is the unity of our
perceptions, and the
explanans is, at least at this stage of things,
the

distinct, unitary and perception independent object
of
these perceptions. 43 The essential point of the

aforementioned problem is that if it should turn out
that
no content can be given to the concept of this
object
,

it

will be unable to play any role in the suggested

explanation of the unity of consciousness. Now, this is
exactly what Kant, not to mention this advocate of

a

multiplicity of actual worlds, thinks: "...this object
must be thought only as something in general = x...." 44
It is thought that the concept of a distinct and

representation independent object, that is, an object =
x,

must remain contentless, but why think this? Because,

Kant answers, "...outside our knowledge we have nothing

which we could set over against this knowledge as

corresponding to it." 45 It might seem that Kant's answer
here is the mere tautology that we know nothing outside
of what we know that is (1) other than what we know, and
42 CRITIQUE, p.

134, A104.

43 To avoid the repetitive use of the prolix phrase

unique , distinct and representation independent object,
or any one of a number of equally prolix phrases, I shall
often make use of much more compact phrases such as
unique object, distinct object, utterly distinct object,
independent object, et cetera.
44 CRITIQUE, p.

134, A104.

45 CRITIQUE, p.

134, A104.
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(2)

could be the object =

x.

Of course, we know nothing

outside of what we know, not to mention that we
know

nothing that is both outside of what we know, and
that
has any specifiable feature whatsoever, including
these
two. What, then, is the point of this tautology?
Does

Kant think that the above discussed account of the unity
of consciousness is, in some manner, incompatible with

this tautology? Does he think that this tautology is

incompatible with the conception of what it is to be an
object that is concomitant with this account? In what

manner is this tautology related to the pivotal thesis
that this conception of what it is to be an object is

necessarily empty? Does Kant even think that the last
quoted remark is a tautology? In short, why think that
the concept of a distinct and representation independent

object is necessarily empty?
The essential point here is that if the concept of
the utterly distinct object, or the object = x, must be
empty, then one can't explain the unity of

representations by virtue of their directedness to such
an object. Why this conditional? Because if no content

can be given to the concept of something, there is

nothing to be said about it, and so it can't figure in
any explanation of anything. Once again, in giving an

explanation, one tells

a

story about something that makes

it clear why the thing to be explained is the way that it

happens to be; telling a story about something involves
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asserting that something has certain
characteristics,
which are somehow related to the
thing to be

explained.

So,

if the concept of this thing
is to have any

explanatory power, it must not be necessarily
empty. So,
if the concept of the object =
x must be empty,

it can't

explain anything. Although written in the
context of his
discussion of private languages, this is,
think,

I

Wittgenstein's point, when he wrote: "Here

I

should like

to say: a wheel that can be turned
though nothing else

moves with it, is not part of the mechanism ." 46
Be this
as it may, Kant's reason for this antecedent —
the

concept of the utterly distinct object must be empty —
is,

at best, cryptically expressed. He wrote:

...outside our knowledge we have nothing
which we could set over against this
knowledge as corresponding to it 47
.

.we have to deal only with the manifold
of our representations .... 48
.

.

...that x (the object) which corresponds
to them [our representations] is nothing
to us [that is, has none of the properties
of a knowable object] - being, as it is,
something that has to be distinct from all
our representations .... 49

46 Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, the
English text of the third edition, translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York (1958)
p- 95e, section 271.

47 CRITIQUE,
p.

134, A104

.

48 CRITIQUE,

p.

135, A105

.

49 CRITIQUE,
p.

135, A105

.

Emendations are due to me.
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It is unclear how any of this
gets one to the conclusion

that the concept of a distinct and
perception unifying
object is necessarily empty. The fundamental
idea is,

i

am conjecturing, this: if it were
possible to give

content to the conception of the object =
x, it would be
possible to compare a situation in which some
instance of
this conception is represented with a
situation in which
some instance of this conception is not
represented.
And,

it is clearly impossible to make this sort
of comparison.

In other words, to give content to this concept,
one must

compare situations in which the distinct object is
and is
not represented, but it is impossible to do this.
Ralph Barton Perry has expressed this point better
than any other thinker that

I

know. He wrote:

To determine roughly whether a is a
function of Jb, it is convenient
[necessary?] to. .compare situations in
which b is and is not present. But where b
is 'I know,' it is evidently impossible to
obtain a situation in which it is not
present without destroying the conditions
of observation. 50
.

To give content to the conception of the object = x, that

the conception of the distinct and representation

is,

independent object that unifies the manifold of
consciousness, it must be possible to compare the

represented object with the unrepresented object. This is
impossible, since comparison is a form of representation.
50 Ralph Barton Perry, The Ego-Centric Predicament

The
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods,
vol 7 (1910) p. 8. Emendation is due to me.
.
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,

Suppose that Socrates wants to compare

a

which some stone is represented with

situation in which

a

situation in

the stone in question is not represented.
So, he sets up
the following three step experiment. First, he
sets up a

situation in which the stone is represented. Perhaps
he
gives it an intent stare. Second, he sets up a situation
in which the stone is not represented. Perhaps he
locks
it away in a box that is impervious to even the stares
of

the gods. Third, he compares the stone in the first

situation with the stone in the second situation. On the
one hand, because of the design of the experiment, to
wit, the second step, the stone in the second situation

cannot be, and so is not, represented

.

On the other hand,

because of the design of the experiment, to wit, the
third step, the stone in the second situation must be,
and so is, represented

.

In other words, according to the

third step of the experiment, Socrates compares the stone
in the first situation with the stone in the second

situation; thus, the stone in the second situation is
compared, and so it is represented. Thus, the design of
the experiment is contradictory, and so Socrates can't

get what he wants. In other words, it shows that it is

impossible to compare an object qua represented with the
same object qua unrepresented, and so it is impossible to

give content to the concept of a utterly distinct object.
The conception of the unique and distinct object to which
all of our representations are directed, and which is
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supposed to explain the unity of consciousness,
is,
therefore, necessarily empty, it can only be
the concept
of an object = x. There is a necessary
incompleteness,

emptiness or vacuity here, since it is, so to
speak,
impossible to solve for x. Recall that if the concept
of
the utterly distinct object, or the object = x,
must be
empty, the transcendental unity of apperception can't
be

explained by means of the supposition that every act of
consciousness — perceptual or otherwise — is directed to
a unitary

,

distinct and representation independent

object. Consequently, such a conception can't explain the

unity of consciousness.
There is another way to make this point about the

necessary emptiness of the concept of the unique and

representation independent object. Henry

E.

contrived the idea of an epistemic condition

Allison has
,

which he

defines as a condition that is "...necessary for the

representation of an object or an objective state of
affairs." 51 To extend Allison's idea, let me define an

epistemic property as a property that is necessitated by

representability

.

So,

the set of epistemic properties may

be defined as the set of all properties, F, such that it

must be the case that if x is representable, or knowable,
x has F.

I

suspect that this is the sort of idea that

51 Henry E.

Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An
Interpretation and Defense, Yale University Press, New
Haven (1983) p. 10. Emendation is due to me.
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Kant was attempting to bring to his reader's
attention,
when he wrote that "...the representation is
a priori

determinate of an object, if it be the case that
only
through the representation is it possible to know
anything as an object." 52 The idea here is,

I

think, that

it can be known a priori that something has some

property, F, just when it is necessarily the case that if
it is knowable
a

,

or representable, it has F. Suppose that

knowable or representable object must be capable of

being both intuited and thought. Then, it can be known
priori that something has some property,

F,

a

if it is

necessarily the case that if it can be intuited or
thought, it has F. For example, Kant maintains that since

every outwardly intuitable object must have location in
space, and since Euclid's geometry describes the

structure of space, it can be known a priori that its
axioms must describe all outwardly intuitable objects. 53
52 CRITIQUE,
pp.

125-126, A92=B125.

53 It is doubtful whether Kant's
most thought out
position is that it can be known a priori that the
structure of space is Euclidean. It is true that Kant
writes as if it is aim to show that certain geometric
principles, for example, ".. .there ...[ is ].. .only one

straight line between two points...," are strictly
universal and necessary. CRITIQUE, p. 69, A24. However,
it is only in the first edition of the Critique that Kant
proffers the argument that geometry is a priori because
such principles are necessary. It is as if Kant realized
that such an argument goes further than transcendental
reflection is permitted to go, and that the truly
critical doctrine only shows how there can be a priori
knowledge of space, not that some specific geometric
principle is an instance of such knowledge. Similarly,
Kant only intends to show that every event follows
another event according to a rule, not that this event
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For similar reasons, we can know
a priori that every

intuitable object will be temporal, and
we can know
priori that every event must follow another
event
according to a rule. This is what Kant desired

a

to show,

but it follows, moreover, that the concept
of the

distinct object, to which representations are
assumed to
correspond, is necessarily contentless and this is
,

I

what

desire to show.
In the light of this idea of an epistemic

property, a distinct and representation independent

object may be defined as

a

knowable or representable

object minus its epistemic properties. Now, the pivotal
point is that the concept of such an object must be
empty. Since a utterly distinct object doesn't possess

the properties necessary for its representation, it is

obviously unrepresentable. It is, however, only by

representing an object that

I

can give content to its

concept. Therefore, the concept of the utterly distinct
object, that is, the concept of the object minus its

epistemic properties, must be empty. In other words, the
follows that event according to this specific rule. He
doesn't think that it is possible to show, for example,
that lung cancer follows smoking according to a rule that
is far beyond my ability to state. In The Transcendental
Exposition of the Concept of Space, Kant writes as if his
only aim is to show how there can be strictly universal
and necessary truths about space. He wrote that the
concept or a priori intuition of space is "...a principle
from which the possibility of other a priori synthetic
knowledge can be understood." CRITIQUE, p. 70, B40. I
will ignore this issue here.
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concept of the unique and distinct object
to which all my
representations correspond, and by which they
are

unified, must remain empty, therefore. So,
since the

concept of a utterly distinct object must be
contentless,
it can play no explanatory role in accounting
for
the

unity of consciousness.
Let me put this pivotal point in yet

a

third

manner. The essence of the idea of the essential

emptiness of the concept of the distinct and

representation independent object appears to be made

manifest by an intuitive metaphor for the Kantian world
picture. As H.J. Paton has written:
It is impossible to invent any exact
parallel for this revolutionary doctrine
[that is, the doctrine that space and time
are imposed on objects by the nature of
our sensibility], but if we looked at
everything through blue spectacles, we
could say that the blueness of things, as
they appeared to us, was due, not to the
things, but to our spectacles. In that

case the spectacles offer a very rough
analogy to human sensibility in Kant's
doctrine 54
A C
.

.

Ewing approvingly cites this metaphor. He writes:
Space and time... are those factors in our
sense-experience which are due to
ourselves and not to things-in-themselves
acting on us. Because they are contributed
by ourselves we can tell a priori that all
objects which we experience will conform
to them, just as when we use blue
spectacles we can tell a priori that
everything we see will look blue. This

54 H.J.

Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, volume
one, Humanities Press Inc., New York (1936), p. 166.
Emendation is due to me. Hereafter: KME
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account of the a priori carries with it
the implication that we can have a
priori
knowledge only of appearances not of
reality, just as from the premiss that I
wear blue spectacles I could infer not
that all the physical objects I see really
will be blue, but that they will look blue
to me. 30
If this were a good metaphor,

it would certainly help to

make sense of the thesis that there are many actual

worlds and truths. If there were many pairs of

differently colored spectacles, and an actual world were
some sort of sum of all the things that could be seen

through such

a

pair of spectacles, then there would be

many actual worlds. Moreover, if each had

a

complete

description, there would be many truths. There are,
however, a number of ways in which the blue spectacles

metaphor fails. Here are four. It falsely presupposes
that (1) the only sense is sight, and that (2) blueness
is as universal as space or time.

It also wrongly

presupposes that just as it is impossible to imagine

something that is neither spatial nor temporal,

(3)

it

must be impossible to imagine something that fails to be
at least some shade of blue. Moreover, it mistakenly

55 A C

Ewing, A short Commentary on Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
(1938) p. 30. Compare Richard E. Aquila, Representational
Mind: A Study of Kant's Theory of Knowledge, Indiana
University Press, Bloomington (1983) pp. 68-69. It is
remarkable that Wolff nowhere mentions the metaphor of
the blue tinted spectacles, given his unequivocal remark
that: "A serious philosophical argument cannot be based
on a metaphorical premise." KTMA p. 101.
.

.

,
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presupposes that (4) it must be, in effect,
impossible to
remove the blue tinted spectacles.
[

1

]

Paton also thinks that the blue tinted spectacles

metaphor fails. He continues:
By abstraction we could think the concept
of blueness, but we could never intuit the
one infinite blue of which all blues are
necessarily parts; yet unless we can do
so, blue is not really analogous to
space.
.We could see no necessity why
every blue area as such should be a part
of a wider blue area. We could indeed see
the necessity why every area should be
part of a wider area, but this would have
nothing to do with its blueness. 56
.

.

What is Paton's criticism here? An essential premise of
Kant's argument for the conclusion that space is an

a

priori intuition is the thesis that what we might take to
be diverse spaces are necessarily parts of one all

encompassing space. In the case of the blue tinted
spectacles, however, what we might take to be diverse

patches of blue are not necessarily parts of one all

encompassing blue. This is another way in which the
metaphor of the blue tinted spectacles falters. It fails
to snare the quiddity of the Kantian analysis of a priori

concepts such as the category of causality. Since space
and time are, in the Kantian scheme of things,

intuitions, space and time are passive, and so it takes
no cognitive effort, such as judgment, to impose them on

the manifold. So, they are much like the blue tint of the
56 KME

,

p.

169.
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spectacles, that is, the blue tint is imposed on the

manifold without any effort — cognitive or otherwise —
of
the subject who wears them. To be imposed on the
f old

,

a category,

such as causality, does reguire

cognitive effort on the part of the subject, that is,

a

subject must judge. So, even if the blue spectacles

metaphor did capture the Kantian doctrines about space
and time, it would get something quite wrong about the

categorial contribution of the subject. Now,

I

pursue none of these criticisms here. Instead,
suspend the disanalogies

,

and

I

will
I

will

will attempt to show that

the concept of the unique, utterly distinct and

representation independent object is, on the weak and
fragile understanding provided by this metaphor,

necessarily empty.
As

I

have already noted, if the blue tinted

spectacles metaphor is to have any force, sight must be
the only sense. Moreover, since it must be impossible to

remove the blue spectacles, blueness must be universal as
space or time. Such suppositions are, however, false, but

suspend this. Focus instead on the fact that the force of
the blue spectacles metaphor also depends on the concept
of the far side object, that is, the concept of the

object on the eyeless side of the blue spectacles

In

other words, the force of the blue spectacles metaphor

depends on there being

independent object.

I

a

distinct and spectacles

can imagine the actuality of the
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just cited conditions, but

I

cannot imagine this without

there being a far side object, or, in other
words,

cannot imagine this without there being

a

I

distinct and

spectacles independent object. Within the context
of this
metaphor, however, it can be seen that it is conseguently
impossible to give any content to the concept of the far
side object, or the concept of the distinct and

spectacles independent object. To be able to give content
to the concept of the far side object, it must be

possible to remove the blue spectacles. Ex hypothesi

,

however, it is impossible to remove the blue spectacles,
and no content can be given, therefore, to the concept of
the far side object. In short, the concept of the far

side object, that is, the concept of the distinct and the

spectacles independent object, is necessarily empty. So,
to the extent that the blue spectacles metaphor captures

the essence of the Kantian world picture, it is clear

that the concept of the distinct and representation

independent object is itself necessarily empty, and

therefore incapable of explaining the unity of

consciousness
According to the Kantian world picture, our
representational capacities are our only paths to what
there is, and these capacities are necessarily invariant.
In terms of the metaphor of the blue tinted spectacles,
it is only by means of, or through, such spectacles that

we have access to what there is, and they are invariant
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in the sense that they can't,
by assumption, be removed.
Objects must, according to Kant, be
representable, and

the world is an ideal sum of
representable objects. As
Kant expressed this idea in a work
subsequent to his
first Critique, "...'nature' [or: the
world] is... the sum
total of all things insofar as they can
be objects of our
senses and hence objects of experience
» 57
To extend
the metaphor, the world is the sum of all
things insofar
as they can be seen through the blue tinted
spectacles.

Moreover, every representable object must be, if
it is to
be represented, represented through such capacities.

There are, consequently, strictly universal and necessary
features of every representable object, namely, the

epistemic properties, and so it is impossible to know or
r ®P^ e sent an object that did not possess these epistemic

properties. To extend the metaphor further, every visible

object must be, if it is to be seen, seen through the
blue tinted spectacles. There is, consequently,

a

strictly universal and necessary feature of every visible
object, namely, being some shade of blue, which is

analogous to any one of the epistemic properties, and so
it is impossible to see an object that is not blue. Thus,

the parallel between the blue spectacles and the Kantian
57 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural

Science, translated James W. Ellington, Hackett
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1985) p. 3. The
emphasis and the emendation are due to me, and note well
that this is not the same as saying that a world is a sum
of actually represented objects.
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a

priori goes this far, and it goes

a bit further,

it is

impossible to give any content to the concept of
the far
side object. To give content to this concept, it
is

necessary to access the far side object without the

mediation of the blue tinted spectacles. Ex hypothesi

,

however, such access is impossible, and so no content
can
be given to the concept of this object. In short, the

concept of the far side object is necessarily empty. In
terms of the Kantian world picture, no content can be

given to the concept of the distinct and representation

independent object If it were possible to give content to
this concept, it would be possible to access this object

without in any way representing it. Such access is
impossible, and so no content can be given to this
concept. In short, the concept of the distinct and

representation independent object is necessarily empty.
There is another way in which the first version of

Kant's argument fails, which reinforces the point just
made. It might also be said that the idea of an object,

which is opposed by both Kant and those who affirm that
there are many actual worlds, is the idea of

a

distinct

and representation independent thing that necessitates
the order and consistency of our representations or

perceptions. Such an utterly distinct object is supposed
to necessitate this order and consistency by being the

orderly and consistent thing to which our experience
corresponds. As Kant wrote:
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1

Now we find that our thought of the
relation of all knowledge to its object
carries with it an element of necessity;
the object is viewed as that which
[1]
prevents our modes of knowledge from being
haphazard or arbitrary, and which [2]
determines them a priori in some definite
fashion. For in so far as they are to
relate to an object, they must [3]
necessarily agree with one another, that
is, must [4] possess that unity which
constitutes the concept of an object .^ 8

According to this idea, an object has at least two
essential features. An object is (1) that which is

distinct from and independent of our representations, and
(2)

that to which our representations correspond. An

object consequently has a four additional features. An
object is (3) that which prevents our representations
from being haphazard or arbitrary,

determines our representations
definite fashion,

(5)

(a

(4)

that which

priori) in some

that by virtue of which our

representations cohere or agree with one another, and

(6)

that by virtue of which our representations possess that

unity which constitutes the concept of an object, or

directed to an object. How is it that such an account of
what it is to be an object explains the order and

consistency of the stream of consciousness? The essential
idea of the realist's answer is that if our perceptions

are perceptions of orderly, consistent, distinct and

perception independent objects, they must themselves be
58 CRITIQUE,

pp.
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orderly and consistent. On the one hand,
there is an
intuition to be had here, but this is, according

to the

stricter standard of logical validity, just

a non

sequitur. Why? Because, suppose that our perceptions
are

perceptions of orderly, consistent, distinct and

perception independent things; not only doesn't it follow
that our perceptions are themselves perception distinct,
but it doesn't follow that our perceptions are themselves

perception independent. It isn't clear what sense can be
made of the thesis that our perceptions are independent
of our perceptions. Mutatis mutandis, it doesn't follow

that our perceptions must themselves be orderly and

consistent. It might be that the intuition can be

developed in

a

manner that ameliorates the transgression

of the logical standard in question, but

I

will not

pursue this possibility here. On the other hand, the

essential reason why this answer is wrongheaded is that
it presupposes as much as it attempts to explain, to wit,

that the objects that are distinct from our perceptions
are themselves orderly and consistent. Let me explain

this
Consider, in the style of James' thought

experiment, an ordinary object such as a book. Such an

object is discovered through
a

a

series of perceptions over

period of time. An important fact of our common

experience is that the turning of
or, at least,

a

page never precedes,

it has not yet preceded, the discovery that
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one's book is, after a long history of
book like

behavior, a hippogryph or chimera. In other words,
our
perceptions of ordinary objects such as books are
both
orderly and consistent. What explains this? According

to

the answer in question here, it is because that
which is

discovered, or perceived, on the turning each page, is

a

book that is both distinct from, and independent of, our

perceptions of it. Perceptions are orderly and
consistent

,

because they are directed to an orderly

,

consistent and distinct and representation independent
object. This, however, is hardly an explanation. If one's

perceptions of

book could go awry, even the distinct

a

and representation independent book in itself could go
awry. In other words, if the turning of a page could

precede the perception of something entirely fantastic,
the book in itself might be such that its page aspects

precede its fantastic aspects. Certain apparently chaotic

trains of perceptions can't be ruled out by appealing to
an orderly and consistent book in itself, since this

presupposes that such a book can't conduct itself in
chaotic manner. More generally, any reason to suspect the
order and consistency of the stream of perception is,

mutatis mutandis

,

a

reason to suspect the order and

consistency of supposedly distinct and representation
independent objects.
A similar point can be made about the unity of

consciousness and the unity of the object. The essential
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idea is that if one is puzzled about the oneness
of

consciousness, one should also be puzzled about the
oneness of the object. Both Kant and those who affirm
that there are many actual worlds oppose the conception
of what it is to be an object that underpins the

supposition that the unity of consciousness is explained
in terms of a unitary and representation independent

thing. Such an object is supposed to necessitate this

unity by being the unitary thing to which our

representations or perceptions correspond. The pivotal

question is: how does such

a

conception of what it is to

be an object explain the unity of the stream of

consciousness? The realist answers that: were our

perceptions directed to some unitary thing, they would
themselves be unitary in the manner made clear -

I

hope -

by James' thought experiment. Although there is an

intuition here, this is just

a

non sequitur

.

As

I

noted

above, even if our perceptions were directed to

perception independent things, it wouldn't follow that
our perceptions themselves would be perception

independent. Mutatis mutandis

,

it doesn't follow from the

premise that our perceptions are directed to

a

unitary

thing that our perceptions must themselves be unitary.

I

will ignore the possibility that the relevant intuition

could be developed in a manner that ameliorates the non

sequitur

.

Instead,

I

will focus on the reason why this

answer is wrongheaded, namely, it presupposes as much as
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it attempts to explain, to wit,
that representation

independent objects are themselves unitary.
Let me
explain this.
In the case of James' thought experiment,
an

object, to wit, a sentence, is discovered through
a

series of perceptions over

a

period of time. The point of

James' thought experiment is that these perceptions
are

possess a certain kind of unity. This raises two
questions:

(1)

what is this unity? and (2) what explains

it? In the first stage of Kant's argument, the premise
is

that the nature of this unity is best understood in terms
of its explanation, and the essential idea is that there
is a unitary and perception independent object, and the

manifold of consciousness is directed to it. In short,
our perceptions possess the unity of James' thought

experiment because they are directed to an unitary and

representation independent object. In the context of the
above discussed explanation of the presumed order and

consistency of consciousness,

I

noted that postulating an

orderly and consistent object was hardly an explanation.
Similarly, postulating a unitary object is hardly an

explanation of the unity of consciousness. If the unity
of our representations needs to be explained, the unity

of the representation independent thing in itself also

needs to be explained. In other words, if the unity of
our perceptions of the various aspects of some object

needs to be explained, the unity of these aspects also
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needs to be explained. For example, if the unity
of our

perceptions of the various words of some sentence needs
to be explained, the unity of these words also needs
to

be explained. The disunity of our perceptions can't be

ruled out by appealing to the unity of an object in
itself

,

since this presupposes both that such an object

is unified,

and that it is obvious what the object's

unity is. Neither of these is obvious, however. Any
reason to think that the unity of consciousness needs to
be explained is, mutatis mutandis, also a reason to think

that the unity of objects in themselves needs to be

explained
Kant's alternative account of the order and

consistency of the stream of perceptions, which he
entitles the transcendental unity of apperception

,

shifts

the conceptual focus from the concept of the object as it
is in itself to the concept of objectivity

.

The basic

idea is that an objective representation is one that

stands in rule governed relations with other

representations, and that objects are what objective

representations represent. To say that representations
are objective is to say that they are subject to a rule,

and so it is necessary to connect them in some one

definite manner; to say that representations necessarily
stand in certain temporal relations is to say that they
are objective. As Kant wrote:

244

If we enquire what new character
relation
to an object confers upon our
representations, what dignity they thereby
acquire, we find that it results only in
subjecting the representations to a rule,
and so in necessitating us to connect them
some one specific manner; and
conversely that only in so far as our
representations are necessitated in a
certain order as regards their time
relations do they acquire objective

m

,

meaning

[

Bedeutung

]
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Kant maintains, moreover, that objects must, on this
analysis, have the third through the sixth of the

features cited above, yet it need not be supposed that

objects are either distinct, or that they are that to

which our representations correspond. Although this shift
is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Kant's concept

of an object, it is precisely this that

I

hope to

appropriate in order to give sense to the thesis that
there are many actual worlds.
The fact of the necessary emptiness of the concept
of the utterly distinct and representation independent

object provides the advocate of

a

plurality of actual

worlds with at least a partial justification of Kant's

alternative conception of what it is to be an object.
Kant believed that his conception of what it is to be an
object is justified because it delivers the desideratum
of unique a priori knowledge, but the advocates of a

plurality of actual worlds maintain that there is no
59 CRITIQUE, p. 224, A197=B242-243
Emendation is due to
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better
sense
here
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me. It might make
Bedeutung as reference
.

.
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unique a priori, or, in other words, there are many sets
of categories. So, what motivates their acceptance of the

Kantian conception of what it is to be an object? Here is
one answer: it is the only coherent alternative to what
is a necessarily empty account of what it is to be an

object. What, however, is the Kantian alternative to

conceiving of objects as distinct and representation
independent? Kant begins to answer this question in the
second stage of the argument of the Subjective Deduction.
The argument of the first stage is, in short,
flawed, and it is the aim of the subsequent stage to

ameliorate it. In fact, the aim of each of the last three
stages - or last four stages, if the Second Analogy is

counted as

a

stage — is to both correct some flaw in the

doctrine and the argument of the preceding stage, and to
advance to a more adequate doctrine and argument. Be this
as it may, at this point,

I

will assume that what has

been said is sufficient to secure the thesis that the

concept of the unique, utterly distinct and

representation independent object is necessarily empty.
Not only does the conception of such an object have no

explanatory value, but there are then no unique, distinct
and representation independent objects. This is,

I

suppose, what Kant meant, when he wrote:

That a concept, although itself neither
contained in the concept of possible
experience nor consisting of elements of
possible experience, should be produced
completely a priori and should relate to
246

a

an object, is altogether contradictory and
impossible. For it would then have no
content, since no intuition corresponds to
it; and intuitions in general, through
which objects can be given to us,
constitute the field the whole object, of

possible experience

The importance of this is situated in its providing the

advocate of a plurality of actual worlds with a

justification for accepting Kant's alternative conception
of what it is to be an object: it is the only coherent

alternative to what is a necessarily empty account of
what it is to be an object. This once again raises the

question of what this alternative account is, and this,
in turn, brings me back to my project of disentangling

the Kantian account of what it is to be an object from
the last three stages of the Subjective Deduction

,

and

this brings me to the argument and doctrines of the

second stage of this text.
There is an ambiguity in the explanation of the

unity of consciousness that is offered in the first stage
of the text at hand. First: one might say that the

manifold of representations is unified because each
representation is directed to an unique, distinct and
representation independent object. Second: one might say
that the manifold of representations is unified because

each representation can be subsumed under a concept,
namely, the concept of being directed to a unique,

distinct and representation independent object. In other
60 CRITIQUE, p.

129, A95.
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words, one might say that the manifold is unified
because

each of its elements can be subsumed under the concept
of
being of a unigue and utterly distinct object. This
is

equivalent to saying the manifold of representations is
unified because the concept of a unique and utterly
distinct object applies to each of its elements, that is,
each element of the manifold is a representation of a

unique and utterly distinct object. Therefore, there are
two incompatible explanations of the unity of the
manifold:

(l)

because each representation is directed to

a utterly distinct object,

or (2) because each

representation can be subsumed under

a

concept, namely,

the concept of being directed to a utterly distinct
object. These are two essentially different explanations.

The difference here is between explaining the unity of

the manifold of representations (1) in terms of something

that is not itself a representation, namely, some utterly

distinct object =

x,

and (2) in terms of something that

is itself a representation,

namely, the concept of being

directed to some utterly distinct object. The second
explanation contains the essence of the explanation of
unity that is proffered in the second stage of the

Subjective Deduction: the manifold of representations is
unified because there is

a

concept that applies to every

representation
With just the addition of this as yet undeveloped

account of unity, however, there is enough conceptual
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stuff to articulate and construct the
argument of the
second stage of the Subjective Deduction.
A pivotal

premise of this argument is that consciousness
is one.

Another premise is that there is only one alternative
to
explaining the unity of consciousness in terms of the

transcendental object =

x,

to wit: the contents of

consciousness are unified because they can be subsumed
under a concept, namely, the concept of being directed
to
some object = x. In other words, consciousness is one

because the manifold of representations can be subsumed
under the concept of an object = x. Yet another premise
is that the categories define the concept of an object =
x,

that is, they define the concept of being directed to

an object. Moreover, since any representation that is

directed to an object is ipso facto knowledge, any

representation to which the categories apply is
knowledge. So, since consciousness is one, the elements
of the manifold of representations can be subsumed under

the categories. Therefore, the contents of my

consciousness constitute knowledge.
It is not clear what conception of an object is at

work in this argument. Since the unity of the manifold of

representations is explained in terms of something that
is itself a representation, namely, the concept of being

directed to some object, that is, the categories, it
might seem that objects — transcendental or otherwise —
become irrelevant or superfluous. This is not true.
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Although objects do not figure in the explanation of the
oneness of consciousness, they don't thereby become
irrelevant, but they do become secondary in the sense

that what it is to be an object comes to be understood in
terms of the manifold of representations that can be

subsumed under the categories. This is the fundamental
shift that

I

have hitherto sought. Instead of thinking of

the unity of consciousness in terms of an utterly

distinct object in itself, Kant thinks of the unity of

consciousness in terms of the subsumption of our
representations under the categories, and he thinks of
objects in terms of what such representations represent.
There is

a

crude analogy between this and two ways

of understanding the conceptual relationship between

truth and reality. According to one understanding of the

conceptual relationship between truth and reality,

reality is conceptually prior to truth, and

a

true

statement is a statement that corresponds to some segment
of a representation independent reality. This is realism.

According to an essentially different understanding of
the conceptual relationship between truth and reality,

truth is conceptually prior to reality, and reality is
that to which all the true statements correspond.

Analogously, although we intuitively think that time and
space are conceptually prior to clocks and rulers, and

that clocks and rulers measure some pre-existent time and
space, we might invert this conceptual relation, and to
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think of clocks and rulers as conceptually prior to tine
and space. We might come to think that time and space are

what clocks and rulers measure. In other words, we might

think that time and space are defined in terms of clocks
and rulers, and not vice versa.

There is, however, little or no reason to think

that the categories define the concept of being directed
to an object. So, there is virtually no reason to believe

that the categories define objectivity, that is, the

concept of being directed to an object, and there is, in
effect, no reason to believe that the second stage

explanation of the unity of consciousness succeeds. Most
importantly, there is little or no reason to accept the

conception of an object with which the argument of the
second stage is entangled. Not much sense can be given to
the idea of the fundamental shift of the second stage,
and its concomitant conception of what it is to be an
object, unless it is clear how subsumption under the

categories unifies the manifold of representations. It
can't be the mere fact that there is a concept that

applies to every element of the manifold, since there

would then be many concepts that would unify the
manifold, for example, the concept of being

a

representation. It seems clear that Kant would not have

wanted to say that the manifold is unified because each
of its elements is a representation. Here, to pursue the

relevant conception of what it is to be an object, and to
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pursue the third stage of the Subjective Deduction, it is

necessary to introduce an additional premise, which is
the basis of Kant's analysis of the unity of

consciousness. This most important premise is, as Kant
wrote, that: "...a concept is always, as regards its
form, something universal which serves as a rule." 61 in

short, a concept is a rule.

The plan is to explain the unity of consciousness
in terms of the notion of a rule and several notable

features of rule-directed activities. If an activity is

rule-directed, then (1) it proceeds, vis-a-vis some rule,

correctly or incorrectly,

(2)

determined by some rule, and

it has stages that are
(3)

it has stages that

belong together by virtue of some rule, and that are set
off from other events that may be accidentally conjoined

with it. In other words, rule-directed activities
proceed correctly or incorrectly,
(3)

(2)

(1)

have stages, and

cohere. The last characteristic is the most

important: rule-directed activities have stages that

belong together

and that are set off from events with

which they may be fortuitously federated. As Wolff
writes
The third significant characteristic of a
regulated activity is its coherence. All
the parts or stages of the activity belong
together by virtue of the rule, and are
set off from other activities which may be
61 CRITIQUE, p.

135, A106.
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accidentally associated with it, for
example by occurring at the same time. 62

Consider counting. It is

a

rule— directed activity that

proceeds correctly or incorrectly. It has stages. Most
importantly

,

there is a way that the activity of counting

coheres, and is thereby one. In other words, counting has

stages that belong together by virtue of

a rule,

namely,

adding one, and that are set off from other events that

may be accidentally associated with it, for example,

tapping one's foot as one adds one.
The above noted facts about rules are not

sufficient to remedy the defects of the argument of the
second stage, and so to develop that of the third stage.
It is also necessary to distinguish two kinds of

activity: there are activities that yield rules, and

there are activities that yield something other than
rule.

a

In the latter case, the activity is first-order.

In

the former case, if the activity yields a rule that

directs a first-order activity, it is

a

second-order

activity. More generally, if an activity yields

a

rule

that directs an activity of the n-th order, it is an

activity of the n+l-th order. Corresponding to this

hierarchy of activities, there is a hierarchy of rules.
First-order rules direct first-order activities; second62 KTMA,

p. 123. Emphasis is due to me. It seems to be
that the notions of belonging together and being set off
are as vague as the notion of the unity of consciousness
that Kant wishes to explain, but I will not pursue this
issue here.
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order rules direct second-order activities; et cetera.

I

will, and need, only focus on first and second order

rules. The pivotal point here is that this distinction

between these first two orders of rules corresponds, or
is identical with, Kant's distinction between empirical

concepts and the categories. The distinction between
first and second order rules is the distinction between

empirical concepts and categories. In other words,

empirical concepts are first-order rules, and the

categories are second-order rules. It is now possible to
give an account of the unity of consciousness upon which
the argument of the third stage of the Subjective

Deduction depends, and that will facilitate the
explication of Kant's conception of what it is to be an
object. Its basic idea is guite simple; the manifold of

consciousness is one because its elements can be subsumed
under a rule that unifies them.
As with the arguments of the first two stages of

Subjective Deduction

,

a pivotal

premise of the argument

of the third stage is that consciousness is one. Another

premise is that consciousness is one because its elements

— representations — can be subsumed under

a

rule that

unifies them. Yet another premise is that the categories
are, given the above analysis of the categories and

rules, the rules for making the rules under which the

manifold is subsumed. So, the manifold of representations
can be subsumed under the categories. Moreover,
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representations that can be subsumed under
the
categories, which are rules, stand in
necessary relations
with other representations. Thus, the
manifold of

representations stand in necessary relations
with one
other. Further, given the above analysis
of knowledge,

representations that stand in necessary relations
with
other representations are objective, that is, they

are

knowledge. So, the manifold of representations are
objective, that is, they are knowledge.

Kant ends the Subjective Deduction with a fourth

argument that he thinks establishes the above cited

conclusion that "...all appearances stand in a

thoroughgoing connection according to necessary
laws...."
is one,

in short, the argument is this. Consciousness

and it is one because its elements can be

subsumed under a rule. So, the manifold of contents of my

consciousness must be subsumable under
definition, however,

a

a rule.

By

law just is a rule under which a

manifold must be subsumed. Therefore, the contents of
consciousness, that is, appearances, are connected by

a

necessary law. Be this as it may, given my aim of making
sense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds and
truths, it is more important to extract and articulate

the Kantian conceptions of what it is to be an object and

63 CRITIQUE,

p.
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what it is to be a world that are intertwined
with this
argument
What is an object? An object is not a utterly

distinct thing in itself. The concept of such an object
is necessarily empty,

and so it can do no philosophical

work. Moreover, if the objects of knowledge were utterly

distinct, not only could there be no a priori knowledge,
but there could be no empirical knowledge. As Kant wrote:

"Should nature [the world] signify the existence of

things in themselves, we could never cognize it either
priori or a posteriori

.

"

a

64 Most importantly,
given my aim

in this work, utterly distinct objects don't help to make

sense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds and
truths. There are really two issues here. First, there is
the question of what it is for a mental content to

represent an object; second, there is the question of
what it is to be an object. With respect to the former,
Wolff writes:
To say that mental content R represents
object 0 is to say that R is one of a
variety (=manifold) of mental contents
which has been, or can be, reproduced in
imagination according to the rule which is
the concept of O. 65

This is only a somewhat less lucid paraphrase of Kant's
words, when he wrote:

64 PROLEGOMENA,

65 KTMA
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If we enquire what new character relation
to an object confers upon our
representations, what dignity they thereby
acquire, we find that it results only in
subjecting the representations to a rule,
and so in necessitating us to connect them
in some one specific manner.... 66

The idea here is simple: a representation refers to an

object just when it can be subsumed under

a rule

— that

itself conforms to the rules for rules, namely, the

categories - that necessarily connects it with other
representations. What, then, is an object? Let an

objective representation be

a

representation that refers

to an object, that is, a representation that can be

subsumed under a rule — that conforms to the categories —
that necessarily connects it with other representations.
Then: something is an object just when it is represented

by an objective representation. Now, it is just a short

step to the relevant Kantian conception of a world:

world is just a sum of all objects, that is,

a

a sum of all

that is represented by some manifold of objective

representations
The pivotal question is this: how does this

contribute to my project of making sense of the thesis
that there are many actual worlds? To answer this
question,

First

:

I

must introduce two additional premises.

every representation is tensed. In other words,

time is the form of consciousness. Second

representing being is
66 CRITIQUE, p.

a

:

every

practical being. These are not,

224, A197.
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I

think, dubious premises. First, consider
the import of
the first. In conjunction with the
conclusion of the

fourth stage of the Subjective Deduction

,

it has an

important consequence, namely, a world consists
of a
series of causally related events. In short, a
world is
necessarily temporal. This is the conclusion of the

Second Analogy
The argument of the Second Analogy has three

premises: consciousness is one, consciousness is one

because its elements can be subsumed under rules, and

objective representations are exactly those that are, or
can be, subsumed under rules. Obviously, then, the

elements of the manifold of consciousness can be subsumed
under rules. Now, since representations are tensed, the
rules under which they are subsumed are themselves
tensed, that is, they state that representations of one

type temporally follow representations of some other
type. Consequently, the elements of the manifold of

consciousness are have

a

temporal order that is imposed

on them by virtue of their subsumption of tensed rules.
In other words, since time is the form of consciousness,

the elements of the manifold of my consciousness must

possess a rule-determined temporal-order. Now, an element
of the manifold of consciousness is objective just when
it falls under a rule that determines its place in a

temporal sequence of representations. So, since objects,
or events, are what objective representations represent,
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every event temporally follows another event
according to
a rule.

One consequence of this is that

a

world consists

of all the events that possess an order
that is imposed

by tensed rules. Another consequence of this
is that

a

time is a sequence of events that possesses an order
that
is imposed by tensed rules. To see the relevance
of the

second of the two premises that

I

noted above, it is

necessary to distinquish between two kinds of time. This
is the distinction between isotropic and anisotropic

time. The former might be best explained by contrasting

time with space. Disregarding the obvious empirical
questions, space itself has no direction. North and south
are but local directions, and the same is true for up and
down. Although these oppositions may be defined in terms
of the earth and its physical properties, they have no

meaning outside the framework they can provide. To say
that space is isotropic is to say that the contents of
the universe and their physical properties do not define
a

spatial direction. To say that space is isotropic is to

say that it has in and of itself no direction.
As space is isotropic, time is isotropic. To say

that time is isotropic is to say that it has in itself no
direction, that is, the contents of the universe and

their physical properties do not provide a physical

correlate for temporal direction. Thus, time is isotropic
just when no criterion — physical or otherwise — can be
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given for the proposition that one event
is before
another. Although the guantity of chocolate
is

principle,

I

in

suppose - measurable, it is not true to
say

that one event, A, is earlier than another
event,

B,

just

when the quantity of chocolate at the time of A is
less
than the quantity of chocolate at the time of B.
More
generally, to say that time is isotropic is to say that

there is no measurable feature of the world which is such
that one event, A, is before another event, B, just when
its quantity at the time of A is less than its quantity

at the time of B. Now, time is anisotropic just when

there is a correlate for the later than relation.
Let me make the following aside. It might seem

that entropy is an essential part of the definition of
the later than relation. It is not difficult to suppose

that entropy is, at least in principle, a measurable

feature of the world. So, one might conjecture that: one
event, A, is later than another event, B,

just when the

quantity of entropy at the time of A is greater than the

quantity of entropy at the time of

B.

Presumably, this is

based on the second law of thermodynamics, to wit: "No
change occurring in an isolated system can result in

a

decrease in the entropy of the system." 67 There are two
problems with this. First, it the above conjecture
67 Bas C. Van Fraassen, An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Time and Space, Columbia University Press, New York
(1985), p. 89. Hereafter: IPTS.
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requires the space of events to be the
entire universe,
but it is not clear that the universe
is an isolated
system. The second problem is that the
above is a crude
version of the second law that has been supplanted

by a

statistical version, to wit: "A change occurring
in an
isolated system will most probably lead to a state
of

greater or equal entropy.'' 68 As Van Fraassen concludes,
"...we cannot simply define later than as the direction
of change to higher entropy in most cases." 69

I

don't

know whether this is right. My aim is to note the issues
raised by these considerations. Since they transcend the
scope of this work,

I

will not pursue them here.

Now, time is anisotropic just when there is a

determinable correlate for the later than relation. Even
if physics can't provide a correlate for this relation,

it doesn't follow that there is no such correlate.

Dilthey suggests that there is

a

determinable correlate

for the temporal direction of human events. He wrote:
...the parts of filled time are not only
qualitatively different from each other
but, quite apart from their content, have
a different character according to whether
we look from the present back to the past
or forward to the future. 70

68 IPTS

p.

92.

69 IPTS, p.

93.

,

70 W.

Dilthey, Selected Writings, edited, translated and
introduced by H.P. Rickman, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1976) p. 209. Quoted by Wolff, NT, p. 216.
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The past can be regretted, but it cannot be
the object of
intention or purpose. The future can be the object
of

intention or purpose, but it cannot be regretted.
Consequently, human events are such that there is

a

difference between past and future, and so there is

a

determinable correlate for the later than relation. To
say this, however, is to say that human time, that is,
the sequence of human events, is anisotropic.

Although Dilthey's observation establishes the
fact that human time is anisotropic, it doesn't explain

this fact. This is where the second premise, which

I

noted above, becomes relevant. Recall that this is the

premise that: every representing being is a practical
being. Or, in other words, every representing being is

purposive being. Crudely put, the idea here is that
purposes impose an anisotropic structure on time 71 A
.

purposive being sets out to get things done, and there
is,

therefore, always a distinction between things done

and things to be done. Consequently, when a purposive

being represents itself, its representation will always
be asymmetrically divisible into at least two parts. A

world consists of all the temporally ordered sequence of
events that are the senses of some manifold of objective
71 This is not my idea, rather it is an idea articulated
by Wolff in NT. I add an argument for the conclusion that

the premise that purposes impose an anisotropic structure
on human time in conjunction with the Kantian account of
what it is to be a world implies that there are many
actual worlds.
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representations. Moreover,

time just is such a

a

sequence of events. Thus, since

a

a

representing being is a

purposive being, the time within which a representing

being exists is anisotropic
To draw my conclusion that there are many actual

worlds, it is necessary to add one last premise: not all

representing beings have the same purposes. If different

representative beings set out to get different things
done, the times within which they exist will be

asymmetrically divided in different ways. Consequently,
since each time will be structurally different, they will
not be congruent, and so they will not be the same. In

other words, since there are many purposes, there are

many times. Since a world is

a sum of

what is in a time,

there are many actual worlds. Now, since each such world
is the sum of what is represented by some manifold of

objective representations, each such has

a

complete

description, and so there are many truths.
The preceding argument has taken my reader down

a

long and tortuous road. So, it may serve my readers well,
if

I

repeat the summary that

I

presented at the begining

of this essay.

There are many representing beings.
Premise

(1)
[

.

(2) The set of representing beings
partitions into many non-empty classes.
Premise
[

.

(3) For each such class of representing
beings, there is a set of purposes, and

263

each set of purposes is incompatible with
every other such set. [Premise.]
(4) For each class of representing beings,
there is an ideal sum of representations
that has an asymmetric structure imposed
by the set of purposes associated with the
class of representing beings in question.
[Premise.

There is no ideal sum of
representations that includes or subsumes
all the ideal sums of representations that
are associated with the various classes of
representing beings. [3,4]
(5)

(6) There are many ideal sums of
representations. [2,4,5]
(7) For each ideal sum of representations,
there is an actual world. [Premise.]

(8)

There are many actual worlds.

(9)

There are many truths.

With this,

I

[6,7]

[6,8]

can bring this work to a close.
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